An Old Idea About ATOM: Combining Price, Staking, and Real Revenue to Reduce Token Issuance
Hi @RoboMcGobo and @qxnico,
First of all, thank you both for taking the time to reply and listen to the ideas we share on this forum.
A few years ago, when ATOM was offering a staking APR of around 16%, I started wondering how we could reduce the creation of new tokens without forcing those of us who stake ATOM to give up a significant part of the economic value of our rewards.
Eventually, I put the idea aside because I lacked the data and technical knowledge to develop it further. When Cosmos Labs announced its work with Gauntlet, I thought it might be worth revisiting.
In short, I am not proposing a simple APR cut. I would like to explore a combination of four elements: the existing staking mechanism, an issuance adjustment linked to sustained increases in ATOM’s price, real revenue that can replace newly issued tokens, and incentives for long-term staking.
These four elements would serve different purposes, but I believe their real potential lies in how they work together.
I have developed two possible models for the price adjustment, although I do not know which would work better.
My biggest concern, however, is how Cosmos Hub could generate enough sustainable, recurring revenue to finance an increasing share of staking rewards over many years.
I would like Gauntlet to examine these mechanisms together, using its data and simulation tools, rather than studying each one in isolation.
1. The Starting Point
I want to briefly explain how staking works because not everyone reading this forum necessarily knows where the different percentages come from. I have also had to learn quite a bit while developing this idea.
The current mechanism links inflation adjustments to the proportion of ATOM that is staked. When the bonded ratio falls below its target, inflation tends to increase; when it rises above that target, inflation tends to decrease, within the configured limits.
For reference, the parameters I have been working with are a target bonded ratio of 67% and nominal inflation limits of 7% to 10%. These would need to be verified before running any simulations.
However, inflation and staking APR are not the same thing.
Imagine a total supply of 100 ATOM, with 64 ATOM staked, and 10 newly issued ATOM allocated entirely to staking rewards over a simplified reference period.
10 / 64 x 100 = 15.625%.
That would be the theoretical gross return for that period, before commissions, community tax, and other adjustments.
The actual annualized return also depends on the number of blocks produced and how rewards are distributed.
I am not suggesting that we replace the existing mechanism with arbitrarily chosen APR percentages. I want to explore an additional adjustment while preserving its role in network security.
If a price-based adjustment conflicts with network security, a properly established and data-supported security budget must take priority.
2. Using Price Increases to Reduce Issuance: Two Models
Let’s imagine I have 1,000 ATOM staked, ATOM is trading at $1, and I receive a 20% APR.
Without compounding, that would mean 200 ATOM in annual rewards, worth $200.
Now imagine ATOM rises to $1.05.
To receive the same $200 in rewards, I would need:
200 / 1.05 = approximately 190.48 ATOM.
My APR in ATOM would fall to approximately 19.05%, but my rewards would retain the same $200 value at the price used in this example.
My original 1,000 ATOM would remain staked, subject to the usual staking risks. I could sell, restake, exchange, or use the rewards I receive.
Of course, none of those options guarantees a profit. If ATOM’s price falls afterward, the value of those rewards changes as well.
I would also no longer be receiving the same percentage return relative to the increased market value of my investment.
The question I want to explore is whether sustained price increases could allow us to issue fewer ATOM without reducing the economic value of rewards by the same proportion.
Model A: Updating the Price Reference Every Year
This was my original idea.
We would use ATOM’s average price during the previous year as the reference for the following year.
After calculating the baseline issuance through the staking mechanism, we would apply the following adjustment:
Price factor = minimum of 1 and (reference price / observed price).
The observed price would need to be a representative average, not a single market quotation.
For example, with a reference price of $1.50 and an observed price of $1.65:
Price factor = 1.50 / 1.65 = approximately 0.90909.
Reduction in baseline issuance = approximately 9.09%.
If the observed price returned to the reference level or fell below it, this additional price-based reduction would disappear.
The reference would be updated every year.
The advantage is that previous reductions would not accumulate indefinitely. This might help maintain the attractiveness of staking, including for new participants.
The disadvantage is that updating the reference could restore some of the issuance previously reduced.
We would also need to simulate gradual transitions between annual references, possible anticipatory trading or staking behavior, and the resilience of price data sources against manipulation.
Model B: Preserving Previous Reductions
In this second model, the initial reference would be the actual average price over the twelve months preceding implementation, rather than an arbitrarily selected figure.
From that point onward, we would record completed annual price averages and use the highest one observed.
The formula would be:
Price factor = minimum of 1 and (initial reference price / highest completed annual average since implementation).
The factor would be applied only once to each baseline issuance calculation, rather than repeatedly applying the same reduction to an already adjusted amount.
To illustrate this, let’s assume a hypothetical supply of 540 million ATOM and a nominal inflation rate of 10%.
This gives us a nominal reference provision of 54 million ATOM per 4,360,000 reference blocks. I will keep that figure constant solely to compare the price adjustments.
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At $1.50 per ATOM, 54 million ATOM would be worth $81 million.
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If the highest annual average reached $2, the factor would be 1.50 / 2 = 0.75.
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Adjusted issuance would be 40.5 million ATOM, worth the same $81 million at the price used in the example.
The problem arises if the price subsequently falls.
At $1.40, those 40.5 million ATOM would be worth only $56.7 million.
For this reason, we would need clear rules defining when some issuance should be restored to protect network security.
I would also compare three alternatives: preserving all previous reductions, preserving only part of them, or resetting the reference as in Model A.
These are simplified examples using a constant baseline.
In reality, supply and other protocol parameters change over time, and any implementation would need to address the existing inflation limits, technical requirements, and governance process.
3. The Combination Is What Really Matters
I do not want price adjustments to become the only solution.
My proposal is to combine the existing staking mechanism, price-based issuance adjustments, real revenue, and long-term staking incentives.
Each component would have a different role.
Price increases could allow us to reduce rewards denominated in ATOM without reducing their value in dollars by the same proportion at the relevant price.
Real revenue could replace newly issued ATOM without further reducing the total reward received by delegators.
And staking seniority could help encourage long-term participation, although it would not automatically generate revenue or reduce issuance.
Let’s return to the example where rewards were adjusted to 190.48 ATOM.
Suppose Cosmos Hub also generated enough net revenue to finance the equivalent of 0.20 percentage points of APR.
For a position of 1,000 ATOM, that would represent 2 ATOM.
The illustrative distribution would then be:
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Rewards funded through new issuance: approximately 188.48 ATOM.
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Rewards funded through real revenue: the equivalent of 2 ATOM.
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Total rewards: approximately 190.48 ATOM.
As a delegator, I would still receive approximately 190.48 ATOM in total, but only 188.48 would need to come from newly issued tokens.
If the revenue were received in dollars or other assets, we would need to define how it could be converted into existing ATOM or distributed directly.
That distinction matters.
The price adjustment reduces APR measured in ATOM.
Real revenue then replaces part of the remaining issuance without reducing the total reward any further.
This is why I am proposing a combined approach instead of simply cutting APR.
The idea is to reduce our dependence on newly created tokens while making that transition less painful for those of us who stake ATOM.
Long-term staking incentives would have another role.
I would explore a weighted reward system based on how long ATOM has remained staked, without introducing additional mandatory lockups or promising a fixed APR.
However, rewarding long-term stakers primarily redistributes rewards. It does not create revenue or automatically save issuance.
We would need to study whether such a system could maintain sufficient staking participation and network security with a lower overall reward budget, and whether it might discourage new delegators.
I would also support making voluntary compounding easier.
Any additional compounding bonus would need its own identified funding source, without counting the same revenue twice.
4. The Hardest Part: Making Real Revenue Sustainable
We can design issuance adjustments, but formulas do not create customers or guarantee revenue.
What services will users actually pay for?
How much revenue will remain after expenses?
And how much of that revenue will genuinely reach Cosmos Hub and be available to support its security and staking rewards?
Potential opportunities include asset issuance and distribution, cross-chain funds and indexes, infrastructure services, USDC-related partnerships, and fees generated by applications that actually use the Hub.
But what matters is not simply that these opportunities exist.
We need to know which services can produce real economic value, how much net revenue they could generate, and what proportion would actually benefit ATOM.
We also need to distinguish between Cosmos Labs’ revenue, economic activity elsewhere in the ecosystem, and revenue genuinely available to Cosmos Hub.
To understand the scale, let’s assume 345.6 million ATOM are staked and ATOM trades at $1.50.
Replacing one percentage point of APR would require:
345,600,000 x 0.01 x 1.50 = $5,184,000 in annual net revenue.
Replacing 0.20 percentage points would require:
345,600,000 x 0.002 x 1.50 = $1,036,800 in annual net revenue.
These are not guaranteed revenues. They are simply examples showing the scale of the funding required.
There is another important distinction.
If ATOM’s price or the total amount staked increases, maintaining the same number of APR percentage points through real revenue requires more dollars.
Maintaining a fixed dollar value, maintaining a given APR in ATOM, and financing a certain percentage of total rewards are three different objectives.
For me, the real long-term question is not how much issuance we can replace in a single favorable year.
It is how much of the total reward and security budget we can reliably fund through recurring economic activity over the next ten, fifteen, or twenty years.
If we cannot generate and maintain that revenue, we will eventually face the same problem again.
5. What I Would Like Gauntlet to Study
I am not asking you to send me all the data so that I can attempt the calculations myself.
I would like you to evaluate the combined approach using your tools, historical data, and simulations.
In particular, I would be interested in:
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Issuance and staking rewards compared with the current system.
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Network security, staking participation, and stake concentration.
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The economic viability of small and medium-sized validators.
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Prolonged declines in ATOM’s price or commercial revenue.
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Technical implementation costs and rules for stopping or reversing adjustments.
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The recurring net revenue needed to fund different proportions of staking rewards.
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Whether combining these mechanisms produces better results than applying them individually.
Historical prices could help calculate hypothetical issuance under different rules, but they would not prove what ATOM’s market price would have been or how participants would have reacted.
I am particularly interested in Model A because it was my original idea. Model B came later, and I believe both are worth comparing.
But what matters most to me is testing the entire combination, rather than treating price, revenue, and staking incentives as unrelated solutions.
I am not trying to reduce APR simply for the sake of reducing it, and I am not promising zero issuance.
I want to explore whether these mechanisms could reduce our dependence on newly created ATOM without placing the entire burden on delegators or compromising network security.
If some parts do not work, we should improve them or discard them.
I believe this combined approach could help address part of the problem currently being discussed in the forum. But the biggest challenge remains: how can Cosmos Hub generate enough sustainable, recurring revenue to finance an increasing share of staking rewards and network security over time?
That is the question I believe deserves the greatest attention.
Do you think this combined approach is worth exploring?
Thank you again for listening and taking the time to respond.
Trave