Cosmos Quarterly #2 Q3-26 - Hardening, Interop, and the Hub & Tokenomics Roadmap

We think a formal apology to the community and a post-mortem are warranted for the extreme level of delay to make sure it doesn’t happen in the future. This would not have been acceptable in any legitimate company or project. Especially during the first half of this year where the security incidents did not hit, what exactly caused the Q1 tokenomics deadline to be missed without any apparent reason? We do remember “ICF review” taking forever. Was that the thing “out of your control”? If so why does the ICF have to be hindering any progress? Why such bureaucratic bullshit in a fast-moving industry, and why are we still not moving fast?

For god sake Magmar said “I was wrong” last year and now you are saying “I was wrong”. Who’s next, Nico? How do you expect the community to still have any confidence after all of this ridiculousness?

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A correction and some ideas to keep the ATOM discussion going

Hi @RoboMcGobo and everyone,

I want to start by correcting something I said in my previous comments. While reviewing several documents and proposals from the forum, I mixed up information and attributed figures to Gauntlet that don’t appear in its official Phase 1 report. That was my mistake, and I’m sorry.

The 2%–6% inflation range, which includes a 4% example, comes from a community proposal, not an official Gauntlet recommendation or a Cosmos Labs decision. I also mixed that discussion up with other proposals, such as The Interchain Real-Yield Alliance, which suggests a different range. So I withdraw my previous claim that Gauntlet or Cosmos Labs had formally proposed reducing staking yields below 10%.

The original 2%–6% proposal can be found here: Tokenomics idea n°1.

The calculations I made at the time were hypothetical scenarios based on certain assumptions about total supply and the amount of ATOM staked. They weren’t validated predictions of what would actually happen. The fee revenue estimates I mentioned weren’t sufficiently verified either, so they shouldn’t have been used to support a firm conclusion.

I also want to correct one specific figure. When I mentioned hypothetical annual revenue of $3.5–4 million and 275 million ATOM staked, I didn’t make it clear that I was assuming an ATOM price of $1.50. At that price, the equivalent gross APR would be approximately 0.85%–0.97%. So not all of that range would fall below 0.9%.

And regarding my reaction to simply untrue: I took it personally. Looking back, you were questioning whether my claims were supported by the sources, and you were right to point that out. I withdraw my request for a retraction and regret turning a technical disagreement into something personal.

I also want to make it clear that I’m speaking only for myself as a delegator. I withdraw any previous references to representing a wider group or to coordinated “NoWithVeto” opposition before we’ve even seen the actual proposals. I think each proposal should be judged on its own merits once it’s published.

On longer commitments and liquidity

I understand your clarification that Cosmos Labs doesn’t intend to introduce mandatory lockups. My concern is something different: what happens if much higher rewards are offered to people willing to commit their tokens for longer periods?

If standard staking, with its usual 21-day unbonding period, paid considerably less than a 6- or 12-month option, each delegator would have to choose between accepting lower returns or giving up some flexibility.

I’m not saying that such a model will necessarily be proposed, or that it would always be a bad thing. I’m saying that if it’s considered, I think it’s important to clearly show how returns would change depending on how many people choose each option.

A few ideas I’d like to see explored

I’m not presenting these ideas as finished solutions. They’re simply areas that I think deserve a closer look, backed by data and an assessment of how they could affect delegators and validators.

1. Linking issuance to revenue, without requiring an automatic 1:1 replacement

I think it makes sense for real revenue to gradually become a source of rewards for participants. But I don’t believe every reduction in issuance must automatically be matched, point for point, by new revenue.

If a proposal says delegators’ returns will be maintained, then it should explain what additional, recurring, net revenue would support that.

If rewards are going to be reduced without fully replacing them, then it should explain why the remaining security budget is considered sufficient and what risks the change could create for delegators and validators.

Just as a simple mathematical example: distributing 1.5 million ATOM per year among 300 million staked ATOM would be equivalent to 0.5% gross APR. And with a total supply of 500 million ATOM, reducing annual issuance by 1.5 million ATOM would mean a 0.3 percentage-point reduction in the annual inflation rate.

These are theoretical figures, before validator commissions and other deductions. The actual comparison would also depend on how issuance and new revenue are distributed among delegators, validators, and the community pool.

2. Gradual issuance changes, with limits and safeguards

I’d be interested in exploring gradual adjustments rather than sudden changes. But if an automatic issuance adjustment mechanism is proposed, I think it should have clear limits, sufficiently long observation periods, and a way to correct course if unexpected problems arise.

I’d also be careful about treating flows to exchanges as direct evidence of selling. Those transfers don’t always mean ATOM has actually been sold, and some may simply be part of an operator’s internal activity.

Before using those flows to trigger changes, it would be worth testing how reliable the indicator is and how easily it could be manipulated.

I’d also like to see a clear distinction between the conditions that would stop further reductions and those that would allow a previous change to be reversed if security or liquidity deteriorated.

3. Making automatic reward compounding easier

I’d like to see voluntary options for automatically reinvesting staking rewards, without changing the conditions of the original staked capital or introducing additional lockup periods.

Auto-compounding could make staking more convenient and improve compounded returns over time.

But I understand that it doesn’t create new revenue for the Hub or change the nominal APR. So I’d see it as a useful improvement for users, not as a reason to increase issuance.

4. Decentralization and concentration of voting power

I also think it’s important to keep discussing voting-power concentration. Rather than trying to determine whether a particular address is selling its tokens, it would make more sense to look at measures that could help create a more balanced validator set.

The Vote Power Tax had already come up in earlier discussions, and as you mentioned, you brought that idea to Gauntlet’s attention for possible evaluation during Phase 2.

I think it’s worth looking into, although that doesn’t mean it has been approved or that it’s necessarily the best solution.

If it’s considered, we’d need to look carefully at who would bear the cost, including smaller delegators, and how to prevent a large operator from splitting its voting power across several validators to get around the rules.

It should also be clear that this kind of measure aims to reduce voting-power concentration through economic incentives and a redistribution of rewards. It doesn’t create new revenue for the network by itself.

What I’d like to see in Phase 2

When the proposals are published, I’d like to be able to compare at least the following points:

  • What issuance limits are being considered, and how network security would be protected.

  • How APR and APY are calculated for standard staking under different bonded ratios.

  • What would happen to returns if longer commitment options were introduced, depending on how many people chose them.

  • Where the proposed revenue would come from, what costs would be involved, and how much would actually reach delegators.

  • How the changes would affect small and medium-sized validators.

  • What mechanisms would allow a change to be paused or corrected if its effects turned out worse than expected.

I’m not writing this to oppose every change or to defend a fixed yield regardless of what happens. I want the Hub to be sustainable, but I also want decisions to be clearly explained and their effects on the people securing the network to be properly assessed before they’re implemented.

Thank you, @RoboMcGobo, for the clarifications and for keeping the discussion focused on the technical issues.

As far as I’m concerned, I’ve now corrected my previous statements, and I hope we can continue discussing the actual proposals once they’re available.

Trave

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The network is absolutely not secure with ATOM at $1.4 and still dropping. Fix that first.

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Hi Trave!

Thank you very much for correcting the record. As you say, I definitely wasn’t intending my message to be a personal attack against you, and I apologize if it came across as such! I was only pointing out that we haven’t made any claims about what an ideal inflation adjustment mechanic should be our whether an inflation cut is even an appropriate thing to do. We always want to ensure that whatever decision is made is informed by research and thoroughly discussed and agreed upon by the community.

This is a great point, and you’re getting at one of the things we mentioned in the original tokenomics post last year. We think a revenue-linked inflation model could be promising, but it’s hard to envision it being successful without a meaningful idea of where that revenue will come from. Because of that, we want to ensure the wrap up has a substantive discussion of the Cosmos Hub / ATOM roadmap included as well, so you and everyone else that reads the post has a good idea of where the Hub’s revenue could come from if the product is successful.

Similarly, the post will have a comprehensive discussion of the Hub’s economic security ratio, and how that compares to other chains, so that people can evaluate whether the Hub is paying the correct amount for security or too much.

This also makes sense, and we’d have to work with the necessary front-ends and API providers if that were the case, to ensure that any variable inflation by staking duration is accounted for in standard queries.

I’m curious what your thoughts are on whether this is a model that you’d find preferable to forced lockups, or are you opposed to variable staking rates as a matter of principle?

Many of the other items you mentioned have also been top of mind for us, and based on what you’re telling me, I believe you’ll be pleasantly surprised by what you see in the final tokenomics takeaways! I’m looking forward to discussing it with you :slight_smile:

Thanks again for correcting things and for the excellent feedback and ideas!

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Thanks @TRAVE; the input is good, and we do want to hear what the hard lines are for folks. As Robo said, we are coming from the same perspective, and we have these points in mind; we believe sustainability has to work for all network participants. We will take your phase 2 inputs in :raising_hands:

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An Old Idea About ATOM: Combining Price, Staking, and Real Revenue to Reduce Token Issuance

Hi @RoboMcGobo and @qxnico,

First of all, thank you both for taking the time to reply and listen to the ideas we share on this forum.

A few years ago, when ATOM was offering a staking APR of around 16%, I started wondering how we could reduce the creation of new tokens without forcing those of us who stake ATOM to give up a significant part of the economic value of our rewards.

Eventually, I put the idea aside because I lacked the data and technical knowledge to develop it further. When Cosmos Labs announced its work with Gauntlet, I thought it might be worth revisiting.

In short, I am not proposing a simple APR cut. I would like to explore a combination of four elements: the existing staking mechanism, an issuance adjustment linked to sustained increases in ATOM’s price, real revenue that can replace newly issued tokens, and incentives for long-term staking.

These four elements would serve different purposes, but I believe their real potential lies in how they work together.

I have developed two possible models for the price adjustment, although I do not know which would work better.

My biggest concern, however, is how Cosmos Hub could generate enough sustainable, recurring revenue to finance an increasing share of staking rewards over many years.

I would like Gauntlet to examine these mechanisms together, using its data and simulation tools, rather than studying each one in isolation.

1. The Starting Point

I want to briefly explain how staking works because not everyone reading this forum necessarily knows where the different percentages come from. I have also had to learn quite a bit while developing this idea.

The current mechanism links inflation adjustments to the proportion of ATOM that is staked. When the bonded ratio falls below its target, inflation tends to increase; when it rises above that target, inflation tends to decrease, within the configured limits.

For reference, the parameters I have been working with are a target bonded ratio of 67% and nominal inflation limits of 7% to 10%. These would need to be verified before running any simulations.

However, inflation and staking APR are not the same thing.

Imagine a total supply of 100 ATOM, with 64 ATOM staked, and 10 newly issued ATOM allocated entirely to staking rewards over a simplified reference period.

10 / 64 x 100 = 15.625%.

That would be the theoretical gross return for that period, before commissions, community tax, and other adjustments.

The actual annualized return also depends on the number of blocks produced and how rewards are distributed.

I am not suggesting that we replace the existing mechanism with arbitrarily chosen APR percentages. I want to explore an additional adjustment while preserving its role in network security.

If a price-based adjustment conflicts with network security, a properly established and data-supported security budget must take priority.

2. Using Price Increases to Reduce Issuance: Two Models

Let’s imagine I have 1,000 ATOM staked, ATOM is trading at $1, and I receive a 20% APR.

Without compounding, that would mean 200 ATOM in annual rewards, worth $200.

Now imagine ATOM rises to $1.05.

To receive the same $200 in rewards, I would need:

200 / 1.05 = approximately 190.48 ATOM.

My APR in ATOM would fall to approximately 19.05%, but my rewards would retain the same $200 value at the price used in this example.

My original 1,000 ATOM would remain staked, subject to the usual staking risks. I could sell, restake, exchange, or use the rewards I receive.

Of course, none of those options guarantees a profit. If ATOM’s price falls afterward, the value of those rewards changes as well.

I would also no longer be receiving the same percentage return relative to the increased market value of my investment.

The question I want to explore is whether sustained price increases could allow us to issue fewer ATOM without reducing the economic value of rewards by the same proportion.

Model A: Updating the Price Reference Every Year

This was my original idea.

We would use ATOM’s average price during the previous year as the reference for the following year.

After calculating the baseline issuance through the staking mechanism, we would apply the following adjustment:

Price factor = minimum of 1 and (reference price / observed price).

The observed price would need to be a representative average, not a single market quotation.

For example, with a reference price of $1.50 and an observed price of $1.65:

Price factor = 1.50 / 1.65 = approximately 0.90909.

Reduction in baseline issuance = approximately 9.09%.

If the observed price returned to the reference level or fell below it, this additional price-based reduction would disappear.

The reference would be updated every year.

The advantage is that previous reductions would not accumulate indefinitely. This might help maintain the attractiveness of staking, including for new participants.

The disadvantage is that updating the reference could restore some of the issuance previously reduced.

We would also need to simulate gradual transitions between annual references, possible anticipatory trading or staking behavior, and the resilience of price data sources against manipulation.

Model B: Preserving Previous Reductions

In this second model, the initial reference would be the actual average price over the twelve months preceding implementation, rather than an arbitrarily selected figure.

From that point onward, we would record completed annual price averages and use the highest one observed.

The formula would be:

Price factor = minimum of 1 and (initial reference price / highest completed annual average since implementation).

The factor would be applied only once to each baseline issuance calculation, rather than repeatedly applying the same reduction to an already adjusted amount.

To illustrate this, let’s assume a hypothetical supply of 540 million ATOM and a nominal inflation rate of 10%.

This gives us a nominal reference provision of 54 million ATOM per 4,360,000 reference blocks. I will keep that figure constant solely to compare the price adjustments.

  • At $1.50 per ATOM, 54 million ATOM would be worth $81 million.

  • If the highest annual average reached $2, the factor would be 1.50 / 2 = 0.75.

  • Adjusted issuance would be 40.5 million ATOM, worth the same $81 million at the price used in the example.

The problem arises if the price subsequently falls.

At $1.40, those 40.5 million ATOM would be worth only $56.7 million.

For this reason, we would need clear rules defining when some issuance should be restored to protect network security.

I would also compare three alternatives: preserving all previous reductions, preserving only part of them, or resetting the reference as in Model A.

These are simplified examples using a constant baseline.

In reality, supply and other protocol parameters change over time, and any implementation would need to address the existing inflation limits, technical requirements, and governance process.

3. The Combination Is What Really Matters

I do not want price adjustments to become the only solution.

My proposal is to combine the existing staking mechanism, price-based issuance adjustments, real revenue, and long-term staking incentives.

Each component would have a different role.

Price increases could allow us to reduce rewards denominated in ATOM without reducing their value in dollars by the same proportion at the relevant price.

Real revenue could replace newly issued ATOM without further reducing the total reward received by delegators.

And staking seniority could help encourage long-term participation, although it would not automatically generate revenue or reduce issuance.

Let’s return to the example where rewards were adjusted to 190.48 ATOM.

Suppose Cosmos Hub also generated enough net revenue to finance the equivalent of 0.20 percentage points of APR.

For a position of 1,000 ATOM, that would represent 2 ATOM.

The illustrative distribution would then be:

  • Rewards funded through new issuance: approximately 188.48 ATOM.

  • Rewards funded through real revenue: the equivalent of 2 ATOM.

  • Total rewards: approximately 190.48 ATOM.

As a delegator, I would still receive approximately 190.48 ATOM in total, but only 188.48 would need to come from newly issued tokens.

If the revenue were received in dollars or other assets, we would need to define how it could be converted into existing ATOM or distributed directly.

That distinction matters.

The price adjustment reduces APR measured in ATOM.

Real revenue then replaces part of the remaining issuance without reducing the total reward any further.

This is why I am proposing a combined approach instead of simply cutting APR.

The idea is to reduce our dependence on newly created tokens while making that transition less painful for those of us who stake ATOM.

Long-term staking incentives would have another role.

I would explore a weighted reward system based on how long ATOM has remained staked, without introducing additional mandatory lockups or promising a fixed APR.

However, rewarding long-term stakers primarily redistributes rewards. It does not create revenue or automatically save issuance.

We would need to study whether such a system could maintain sufficient staking participation and network security with a lower overall reward budget, and whether it might discourage new delegators.

I would also support making voluntary compounding easier.

Any additional compounding bonus would need its own identified funding source, without counting the same revenue twice.

4. The Hardest Part: Making Real Revenue Sustainable

We can design issuance adjustments, but formulas do not create customers or guarantee revenue.

What services will users actually pay for?

How much revenue will remain after expenses?

And how much of that revenue will genuinely reach Cosmos Hub and be available to support its security and staking rewards?

Potential opportunities include asset issuance and distribution, cross-chain funds and indexes, infrastructure services, USDC-related partnerships, and fees generated by applications that actually use the Hub.

But what matters is not simply that these opportunities exist.

We need to know which services can produce real economic value, how much net revenue they could generate, and what proportion would actually benefit ATOM.

We also need to distinguish between Cosmos Labs’ revenue, economic activity elsewhere in the ecosystem, and revenue genuinely available to Cosmos Hub.

To understand the scale, let’s assume 345.6 million ATOM are staked and ATOM trades at $1.50.

Replacing one percentage point of APR would require:

345,600,000 x 0.01 x 1.50 = $5,184,000 in annual net revenue.

Replacing 0.20 percentage points would require:

345,600,000 x 0.002 x 1.50 = $1,036,800 in annual net revenue.

These are not guaranteed revenues. They are simply examples showing the scale of the funding required.

There is another important distinction.

If ATOM’s price or the total amount staked increases, maintaining the same number of APR percentage points through real revenue requires more dollars.

Maintaining a fixed dollar value, maintaining a given APR in ATOM, and financing a certain percentage of total rewards are three different objectives.

For me, the real long-term question is not how much issuance we can replace in a single favorable year.

It is how much of the total reward and security budget we can reliably fund through recurring economic activity over the next ten, fifteen, or twenty years.

If we cannot generate and maintain that revenue, we will eventually face the same problem again.

5. What I Would Like Gauntlet to Study

I am not asking you to send me all the data so that I can attempt the calculations myself.

I would like you to evaluate the combined approach using your tools, historical data, and simulations.

In particular, I would be interested in:

  • Issuance and staking rewards compared with the current system.

  • Network security, staking participation, and stake concentration.

  • The economic viability of small and medium-sized validators.

  • Prolonged declines in ATOM’s price or commercial revenue.

  • Technical implementation costs and rules for stopping or reversing adjustments.

  • The recurring net revenue needed to fund different proportions of staking rewards.

  • Whether combining these mechanisms produces better results than applying them individually.

Historical prices could help calculate hypothetical issuance under different rules, but they would not prove what ATOM’s market price would have been or how participants would have reacted.

I am particularly interested in Model A because it was my original idea. Model B came later, and I believe both are worth comparing.

But what matters most to me is testing the entire combination, rather than treating price, revenue, and staking incentives as unrelated solutions.

I am not trying to reduce APR simply for the sake of reducing it, and I am not promising zero issuance.

I want to explore whether these mechanisms could reduce our dependence on newly created ATOM without placing the entire burden on delegators or compromising network security.

If some parts do not work, we should improve them or discard them.

I believe this combined approach could help address part of the problem currently being discussed in the forum. But the biggest challenge remains: how can Cosmos Hub generate enough sustainable, recurring revenue to finance an increasing share of staking rewards and network security over time?

That is the question I believe deserves the greatest attention.

Do you think this combined approach is worth exploring?

Thank you again for listening and taking the time to respond.

Trave

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