# Return of AADAO ATOM LP to Cosmos Hub Community Pool

**URL:** <https://forum.cosmos.network/t/return-of-aadao-atom-lp-to-cosmos-hub-community-pool/17419>\
**Category:** AADAO\
**Created:** [October 8, 2026, 2:26pm UTC](https://forum.cosmos.network/t/return-of-aadao-atom-lp-to-cosmos-hub-community-pool/17419 "2026-10-08T14:26:07Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![cosmoslabs](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex031/user_avatar/forum.cosmos.network/cosmoslabs/32/8828_2.png) [@cosmoslabs](https://forum.cosmos.network/u/cosmoslabs)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2026, 2:26pm UTC](https://forum.cosmos.network/t/return-of-aadao-atom-lp-to-cosmos-hub-community-pool/17419/1 "2026-10-08T14:26:07Z")

</div>

**Amount: 555,400 ATOM  
Date:** October 2, 2026

**Governing Proposals:**

[Proposal 800](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/800)

[Proposal 805](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/805)

[Proposal 823](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/823)

[Proposal 880](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/880)

[Proposal 950](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/950)

[AADAO Proposal A176](https://daodao.zone/dao/neutron10xwzc88kefwtlup9c2tmw4mj4ng7u79g8lsapp0c9jc02xt247zqwzzghf/proposals/A176)

* * *

## **I. Executive Summary**

On September 10, 2026, **555,400 ATOM** was returned to the Cosmos Hub Community Pool, consisting of the original 450,000 ATOM allocated to AADAO and approximately 105,000 ATOM of accrued stATOM staking yield. The [final deposit](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/transactions/9E2A7DCBAC33B25421E8C4D0956B6249BD8A2FA3D1CB82C4E8DC6C182568C40B) completed a process that began in March 2025.

The assets were recovered in full. However, the length and complexity of the process exposed material weaknesses in the governance and custody framework for Community Pool assets.

Three issues drove the delay:

1. **No enforceable offboarding mechanism.** AADAO wound down without a defined process, accountable owner, or fallback authority for returning Community Pool assets.

2. **Fragmented governance instructions.** Multiple proposals modified or redirected the same position without clearly superseding prior instructions, creating uncertainty over the authorized destination of the assets.

3. **Custody depended on former personnel.** Execution remained dependent on a four-of-seven multisig controlled by individuals who were no longer active within AADAO. Loss of institutional knowledge and signer availability delayed execution.

The central lesson is straightforward: **governance approval does not guarantee accountability and or execution.** Any Community Pool mandate involving custody of assets should establish clear ownership, enforceable offboarding obligations, succession procedures, and a fallback mechanism from inception.

The final return was completed through sustained coordination by AADAO Oversight, with technical execution support from Cosmos Labs and Cosmos Labs Korea.

## **II. Background**

[Cosmos Hub Proposal 800](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/800), passed June 27, 2023, allocated 450,000 ATOM from the Community Pool to AADAO to provide liquidity to the stATOM/ATOM pool on Astroport (Neutron) in support of Stride’s Interchain Security agreement with the Hub.

The mandate evolved through several subsequent governance actions:

- [Proposal 805](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/805) authorized liquid staking of half of the position into stATOM.

- [Proposals 823](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/823) and [880](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/880) extended AADAO’s custody while the intended Timewave/Valence successor structure remained under development.

- [Proposal 950](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals/950) authorized transfer of the position to the Valence covenant, but the transfer was not executed following turnover within AADAO.

- Proposal 955 subsequently directed a broader clawback of Hub liquidity positions to a Hydro committee, creating uncertainty over whether the AADAO position was included.

When AADAO’s mandate was not renewed in 2025, the organization entered wind-down without a formal mechanism for transferring or returning the assets. The resulting dispute over the appropriate destination of the position was ultimately resolved by [AADAO Proposal A176](https://daodao.zone/dao/neutron10xwzc88kefwtlup9c2tmw4mj4ng7u79g8lsapp0c9jc02xt247zqwzzghf/proposals/A176), which approved its return to the Community Pool.

## III. Timeline

| Date | Event |
| --- | --- |
| June 27, 2023 | Proposal 800 allocates 450,000 ATOM to AADAO. |
| Aug 2023 - Feb 2024 | Proposals 805, 823, and 880 modify and extend the mandate. |
| Aug 30, 2024 | Proposal 950 authorizes transfer to the Valence covenant; transfer is not executed. |
| Mar 2025 | Recovery process begins. Custodial wallet is identified as a four-of-seven CLI multisig controlled by former AADAO personnel. |
| May - June 2025 | Dispute over the authorized destination of the assets is escalated and resolved through AADAO Proposal A176 in favor of returning the position to the Community Pool. |
| Aug - Sept. 2025 | Position is unwound; stATOM transfers require multiple tranches and signer coordination. |
| Mar - July 2026 | Remaining ATOM transfer requires repeated signing rounds due to signer unavailability. |
| July 31, 2026 | Final four-of-seven multisig execution completed; [262,470.9 ATOM](https://www.mintscan.io/neutron/transactions/6FB6476CE900D056A3148DAB4184471FD3A7D635754DD361E5974DA723648A7A) transferred to the Hub-side multisig. |
| Sept. 10, 2026 | [555,400 ATOM deposited into the Community Pool](https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/transactions/9E2A7DCBAC33B25421E8C4D0956B6249BD8A2FA3D1CB82C4E8DC6C182568C40B), completing the return. |

## **IV. Control Failures**

### **1. No Offboarding or Succession Mechanism**

By 2025, none of the seven original multisig signers remained active AADAO contributors. Neither the mandate nor any subsequent proposal assigned responsibility for returning the assets upon AADAO’s wind-down.

**Control implication:** Community assets should never depend indefinitely on the availability and voluntary cooperation of former personnel.

### **2. Inadequate Custody Records**

Critical institutional knowledge was lost as AADAO personnel departed. This was compounded by the deletion of relevant Slack records by former AADAO co-founder Ryan, eliminating records that could otherwise have been referenced during the recovery process.

As a result, the custodial wallet, multisig structure, signers, and key ownership had to be reconstructed using archived materials and records informally retained by former participants.

**Control implication:** Custody of community assets requires durable, organization-controlled records of wallet ownership, signing authority, key responsibilities, and succession procedures. Critical records should not depend on individual accounts or remain subject to deletion when personnel depart.

### **3. Conflicting Governance Instructions**

Six Cosmos Hub governance proposals: 800, 805, 823, 880, 950, and 955, plus AADAO did not consistently state whether they superseded or modified prior instructions.

**Control implication:** Governance affecting the same assets must maintain a clear and auditable chain of authority.

## **V. Recommendations**

Future Community Pool-funded custodial arrangements should incorporate four minimum controls:

1. **Mandatory offboarding provisions.** Every mandate should identify who is responsible for returning or transferring assets, the applicable deadline, and the fallback mechanism if the primary custodian cannot execute.

2. **Clear governance hierarchy.** Any proposal affecting previously authorized funds should explicitly state whether it supersedes, modifies, or confirms prior governance and identify the controlling instruction.

3. **Documented custody and succession.** Wallet structures, signing authority, key ownership, and successor arrangements should be maintained as institutional records rather than dependent on individual personnel.

4. **Continuing obligations for signers.** Signing authority over Community Pool assets should carry an explicit obligation to cooperate with required transfers following expiration, termination, or non-renewal of the underlying mandate.

These controls would reduce execution risk, shorten recovery timelines, and ensure that Community Pool assets remain operationally accountable throughout the full lifecycle of a mandate.

We thank the former AADAO signatories who completed the required signing rounds, AADAO Oversight for coordinating the recovery, and involved CL teammates for their technical and operational support throughout the process.
