That’s an interesting idea actually. It could help “shuffling” the active set a little bit, too.
This aligns precisely with the recommendations we made in our analysis:
In our research on PSS economics, we examined the promising dynamics created by combining exclusion lists with a strict vote power cap: the-vote-power-cap
We’ve also analyzed and suggested a pathway for scaling Top-N public good consumers as revenue grows: top-n-analytic-trends
For Stride, which allocates 15% of its 500,000$ annualized revenue to the Hub (as well as a share of STRD inflation), we propose lowering the Top-N parameter to between 60% and 75%, equating to roughly 20-36 validators required to operate (while others can still opt-in voluntarily). Alongside this, a strict 5% vote power cap would ensure efficient allocation of the security budget among participants. Currently, profitability remains elusive for validators, but these adjustments present a more balanced approach to achieve potential future profitability as the chain’s revenue grows.
Conclusions:
In summary, we recommend lowering the Top-N parameter to 75% or below, combined with a vote power cap of 5%. These adjustments provide a more sustainable baseline while awaiting future revenue growth. As the revenue increases, more validators are expected to opt-in voluntarily and adjust their validator fee parameters to share more rewards with their delegators, by lowering their validator fee.
Thank you for reading,
Govmos.
6 Likes
I’ve thought a lot about this as well.
The scariest thing, imo, about migrating to something like top-75% is that it introduces additional uncertainty around upgrades, as Stride will have to rely on a smaller subset of validators to upgrade on time (many of which would be CEXs).
Upgrading on time can already be challenging, so it’d require a lot of confidence that the remaining set would be able to process upgrades in a timely manner.
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We previously proposed utilizing an exclusion list to address those validators who have caused issues in the past. While this would be a bold step, setting important precedents within the ecosystem, Stride serves as a prime example of a chain that has been negatively impacted by the underperformance of certain centralized custodial validators.
As neutral contributors, we aim only to offer a practical solution to the challenge at hand, while acknowledging the significant political ramifications that such an action could carry. Ultimately, the decision rests with Stride, and we remain committed to supporting the best outcome for all parties involved.
Bump on the topic of absolutely pathetic rewards from Stride. The #1 validator (by far) earns less than 160$ per month given its withdraws on Sep 15, Sep 30, and Oct 15.
Stakewolle.com, forced to validate for Stride like all 113 validators with more voting power, earns 1.7$ per month!?! That’s 0.06$ per day. WTF.
We’ve proved the concept of ICS, which was totally worthwhile. Now, however, is the time to allow validators to opt-out of particular chains.
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I bump the topic as well.
Successful chains (Akash, Noble, …) use Cosmos without incurring any fee
Stride is mantained at a loss and they do not distribute the ATOM across all validators
Me and others have difficulty to understand the sustainability of ATOM and it probably deserves a dedicated thread.
Indeed these numbers are problematic, we have previously shared our insight on this topic and believe that instead of switching to an opt-in model, @Stride should consider lowering the Top-N.
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How is that a solution? Do all validators get LSM delegations from Stride in the top 75%?
If not it just displaces the problem but does not resolve it in any way.
Furthermore, after 1 or 2 years being forced to validate Stride at a loss, we would just be told that we aren’t needed anymore, thank you for your service?
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I disagree wholly with the OP’s premise - for the year 2024, Stride has generated 22% Hub’s $1.65m revenue - and that’s taking into account ATOM’s inflation rate [see the data on Numia’s DataLenses]
I am however in favour of the suggestions in this thread about reducing val-size - concentrating the rewards for stakers, so that we get more than dust individually.
I understand this hesitancy from Robo. Cosmos Hub (the mainnet) has perfected the art of timely coordinated upgrades. I think the team at CryptoCrew, Hypha, Brian (Informal), and I can help you replicate the Hub’s processes so that Stride can also get better at val coordination. And a smaller valset would only make this easier!
RIP. Yeh, the smaller valset size will mean this. However, assuming:
- something like a final set of 50 vals
- excluding the top 20 and bottom 10
- and Stride adopts an active PSS whitelist/blacklist to exclude non-active network participants
I’d be very surprised if a top-quality validator like High Stakes doesn’t make the cut
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I want to remind everyone of something: It is now possible for validators to choose their commission rate, per consumer chain. This means that if a validator feels that they are not making enough money from Stride, they can up the commission on the Stride consumer chain, without affecting commission rate on the Hub.
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Sincere thanks for the reminder. Tongue-in-cheek “Woo hoo!”, now we will make 20x basically zero per day:
0.001209 NTRN
0.003954 stOSMO
0.000040 stLUNA
0.007995 STRD
0.006112 stSTARS
0.000688 stJUNO
0.000003784464989569 stINJ
0.001126 stATOM
0.000934646889938490 stEVMOS
0.007749 stUMEE
0.000002 ibc/FA33D22EED651DC2D251315AAE2E7C5BA924D308081EE9760AE653AA2F6661CB