SubDAO Treasury System for the Hub

I think that this proposal needs a full rewrite and that it contains certain trigger words and phrases that endanger the hub.

I’m very happy to jump in on the rewrite.

What trigger words and phrases…?

For sure, I would be happy to assist in a rewrite that would be better phrased, and a system more viable for the Hub to adopt! I know some of my phrasing isn’t ideal for the system at hand, and the concept itself needs ironed out. So I would love the opportunity to iron out some details!

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other than software upgrades, this is false:

your assertions are contradicted by the obvious lack of due diligence or possibly corruption of validators apparent when voting history is scrutinized. Validators voted to pass prop101, awarding 20k ATOM to an initiative entirely unrelated to neither the cosmos nor ATOM, as well as 1800 ATOM paid to a fellow validator for videos on a channel with no views.

delegators dont make the decisions in the cosmos, the top 25 validators do.

further evidence of validator’s inability to do due diligence and/or corrupt funding practices through kickbacks to validator’s friends can be seen in gravity bridge prop108, where top validators in the ATOM active set like P2P voted to use community funds to pay off their own validator’s carbon debt.

centralizing the treasury further around a few validator installed gate keepers being paid to administer funds to themselves is not a tenable solution if decentralization is a goal of the Hub.

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Thanks for the feedback!

Validators have certainly contributed to treasury mismanagement, due to lack of due diligence. However, assuming this system inherently centralizes around validators is incorrect. Would you propose that we blacklist validator wallets from some of the subDAO’s created? That should be considered. Anything is considered. The entire point of what I wrote is that I would like to transition to a more efficient model, that has different levels of decentralization where necessary.

However, it would not be wise to blacklist validators from every subDAO. I do not blame all of our Governance inefficiencies on Validators. The Props you mentioned, were all pretty niche, and while they spent money, that money has already been minted back into existance. Validators play a crucial role, and are more technical than most delegators, which means on technical funding initiatives, they should have the option to have an opinion and a vote. But like I said previously, the goal is not to centralize around validators being able to spend endlessly, the goal is to create different systems of governance with different mandates and parameters to stick too.

I would love to hear feedback on which specifically mandated subDAO’s, the community is interested in creating and how they should be governed. Validator wallet blacklisting from certain subDAO’s doesn’t seem too out of line, if this is expressly disclosed in the governance process of subDAO creation. This subDAO would also have to be approved and funded via governance, as any subDAO would be.

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Funding can be made transparent, predictable, accessible, decentralized and eliminate the need to pay treasury managers using existing governance mechanisms to direct the chain by market forces.

Starting with an annual governance vote to assign a budget as a % of the community pool or $ amount of development funds to be distributed across general categories of funding like infrastructure 40%, innovation 20%, marketing 10%, ecosystem 30% as an example,
projects that want community pool funding then campaign for their project to the community to support their project in a semi-annual ranked choice voting where the top 3 or 10% or other is granted a vested award allowing funds to be revoked through a confirmation vote before the next round of funding is voted for. *could also distribute additional vested awards if you move up significantly in rank from one award to distribution vote or other incentive structure.

This makes the funds validators will inevitably pay themselves through governance predictable in their regular governance distribution, transparent and goes to someone with a strong reputation in the community. this system incentivizes community growth through outreach to get the best funding.

Half the annual allocation of CP funds could be converted into a stable coin over 6 months to reduce price impact on ATOM

The funds would be available to anyone who applies and vested funds are awarded based on the top ranked teams in their class.

If devs and validators want to be funded well from the community pool, they should have to work for it.

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I agree that having more tooling to allocate resources would be highly beneficial.

With that in mind, it’s worth considering:

  • How does replicated security affect what the Hub treasury funds?
  • What tooling and infrastructure will consumer chains bring to the table that can solve some of these issues?

I am personally of the mind that now that the ATOM accelerator DAO exists to address from the Cosmos Hub’s particular point of view

The Hub should hyper-focus all of its common resources and policies on strengthening the ATOM economic zone via attracting consumer chains that will add value to the Hub, and building strong relationships with those chains via economic alignment and support.

I would agree, a large portion of funding from the Hub should be directed at replicated security. However, I believe that even in the scenario that we only spend for items regarding RS, we have multiple different subDAO options. I know Informal largely works on the Hub and and RS, but a more centrally controlled subDAO dedicated to funding bug bounties and audits for consumer chains, before they launch. One subDAO dedicated to the on-boarding of consumer chains.

On a side not, one idea I’ve been thinking about, is around, if the community wants to keep the Hub minimal and not put CosmWasm in the Hub. If this is the case, then there is potentially an opportunity to put together a permissionless CosmWasm enabled ATOM sidechain, that is a Consumer chain from the Hub. This chain would use ATOM as its main utility token and be governed by the Hub. This would leave a new area for a subDAO to come in and fund projects to develop on the chain.

I feel like we will find many different ways to be able to utilize different mandated subDAO’s, going forward.

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I discussed this exact model in the ATOMZone discussions last week on a Twitter Space and believe the SubDAO model is 100% the way to go. Not every proposal needs to be voted on by the entire community and the Hub needs to figure out a way to remain decentralized while being transparent and more effective.

I would love to see DAODAO have its own consumer chain where subDAOs dedicated to certain areas of expertise are led by core contributors voted on by the entire community.

First we would need to identify the subDAO categories. This isn’t an exhaustive list, but just off top of my head:

  1. R&D (IBC development, tokenomics, new Interchain services)
  2. Third-Party Auditing
  3. Developer Relations/Outreach
  4. Business Development (developing GTM strategy for ideas coming out of R&D and liaison with institutions inquiring about leveraging Cosmos stack)
  5. Marketing
  6. Budget Planning/Finance

The Hub needs a business and budget planning process:

  1. Strategy/Allocation (we have $X to spend, how do we want to spend that across each subDAO)
  2. SubDAO Business planning (what do they want to get done, whats a high-level estimate of cost to get it done, milestone planning, etc)
  3. Community re-adjusts budget based on subDAO business planning
  4. Community approves business plans
  5. Monthly/Quarterly Reporting by subDAOs to community on milestones
  6. Finish year, go back to Step 1

All funds should be streamed to each subDAO and the ability to control payment streaming should be held at the community-level.

Every community member should be able to join a subDAO (or multiple) that they’re interested in. SubDAO leads should have terms with limits that balance a cohesive strategy from year-to-year while also encouraging leadership churn to bring new ideas to the forefront.

Count me in to help developing this further. I did business and budget planning in my past life for a large corporation.


This is a very interesting point of view, I think subDAO model of treasury funding can be helpful for the Hub and capital allocation, I also like the idea to keep it as decentralized as possible

Thank you for this idea, we definitely need to discuss this proposal more

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even if i mostly agree with your points, i feel the hub should hyper-focus on strengthening the upcoming consumer chains (Neutron, Duality, etc) before even thinking of attracting new ones.

  1. i don’t think the hub needs to attract dozens of chains into its economic zone
  2. i believe 6 or 8 strong consumer chains with strong purposes and alignment is way better than 30 chains whose 20% of them are useless one year later
  3. i believe the hub shouldn’t underestimate the efforts that have to be made to minimize the costs w adding new chains for low ranked validators - and should work actively to keep their confidence


about what @effortcapital said, as often, it’s a massive +1 on my side

i see a lot of opinions about how a subDAO treasury system should be used to centralize public funds to direct the future of the chain according to a few opinions, but no reasons to believe a centralized subDAO treasury system would be effective, more efficient, or positive for the hub verse a decentralized funding methodology.

A subDAO treasury system should at very minimum be able to clearly justify the overhead involved in centralizing public funds under a handful of administrators rather than keep funding decentralized and directed according to the desires of hub users

just as importantly, a detailed description of the subDAO Treasury system’s direction for the hub and its benefit is absent from the conversation.

is it not the case that the hub should change slowly and deliberately based on cyclical market conditions where the hub funds experimental and innovative initiatives and once they successfully demonstrate their value the hub appropriates them into their hub and spoke model, given the open source nature of the hub and the public good centric mandate of the ICF in combination with ranked choice voting i roughly summarized previously to fund projects the community would most like to see without relying on the opinions and administration of a few funding gatekeepers on the communities dime?

are u really aware of the capabilities of the DAODAO like subdaos in terms of vesting/funding allocations/transparency/accountability/etc ?

i’ve deleted my previous comment because i re-read your first explanation on how things should be made and i’ve just thought it was quite good and also quite feasible with a subdao model in a more effective way and also that your way of thinking would be so much more interesting and constructive without this “anti-centralizing-things” everywhere that often distorts realities.

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My argument against DAODAO/subDAO model pertains to its use as a systemic implementation. but yes, I understand and see the promise these tools and do not mean to discount their value as an innovative solution where there currently is none. I assume that within ranked-choice type funding model, many DAODAOs and subDAO’s would emerge as popular grant recipients and encourage this.

My rhetoric can sometimes lean hyperbolic when i feel valid criticisms are being entirely ignored within the discussion. I have a number of ideas and questions relating to DAODAO that i have withheld in general conversation because of concerns they may be persuasive and make advocating for a decentralized funding methodology more difficult.

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I’m not against ranked-choice voting, but I see that in the budget planning process at the community-level where we collectively decide what we want to spend our yearly budget on (which is then streamed to subDAOs with their own business plans and milestones that they need to report back to the entire community on on a period basis).

I don’t want to centralize Mgmt of the treasury, I want to compartmentalize strategy execution without developers having to come to the entire community for every spend proposal

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I appreciate from the both side of you all. Since we all know what’s on ground. I think we should work it out immediately. I support Stablecoin right from beginning and It’s be better for us to understand this project. Something good will come out from there. I believe we aren’t going to regret it’s.

i think i see what you are saying, or at least what you said made me realize an issue with vesting between funding periods making funds idle and unable to be spent by a DAO following its award. maybe 2/3 vesting or a category that is specific to DAOs. ill return to this,

but i disagree with your second point, i think that developers should have to come to the entire community with the pitch they would give a grants administrator of a DAO or subDAO in order to recieve funds from the community pool. of the many advantages daos do have, I dont see DAOs or subDAOs being necessary or resistant to corruption especially when tasked to distribute funds broadly. a semiannual distribution to the most popular and promising projects and DAO initiatives according to the community at large should not have an issue gaining support.

a certain amount of sacrifice to speed seems necessary for the hub to remain leaderless, decentralized and as close to unstoppable as PoS can get.

perhaps a lending facility where a risk adjusted portion of vested funds can be borrowed against by grantees.

a certain amount can easily become an amount that leads to irrelevance. competition is growing, often without leaderlessness spirit/decisions making. we’re not in 2019 anymore. i don’t think we can still afford the luxury of sacrifying this certain amount.

btw to end on a sarcastic note, there is no better way to be as close as unstoppable than being motionless.

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