The delegated proof of stake (DPoS) model is based on a fundamental principle:
risk sharing between the delegator and the validator.
By delegating their tokens to a validator, delegators express their trust in the validator’s ability to operate securely and protect the network. However, the idea of penalizing the validator’s bond first in case of slashing could alter this principle.
In a DPoS, delegators should be incentivized to choose their validators carefully, because their own stake is at stake.
Delegation represents an act of trust, and this commitment must involve a shared risk. If this risk is transferred primarily to the validator via its bond, the fundamental delegation mechanism could lose its relevance.
Delegators could become less vigilant in their choice of validator, knowing that their risk is diminished, reducing the incentive for accountability and the overall security of the network.
Another argument is that validators could see this model as a double punishment. Not only do they take on the operational responsibility of the node, but they also have to commit a sufficient amount of capital to cover potential losses, thereby increasing the entry costs for new validators.
This could inhibit decentralization, a key element of many DPoS networks, by limiting participation to those with significant resources to risk.