Thank you for sharing this idea. We agree that improving the Nakamoto coefficient is an important discussion, but we believe that many in the ecosystem tend to misunderstand the distinction between decentralization in governance and decentralization in execution. Both are critical, but their implications differ — and in our view, one carries slightly more weight than the other.
Governance vs. Execution
Take the example of a chain with 100 validators, each holding 1% of voting power. In a Cosmos BFT consensus, the Nakamoto coefficient would be 33, meaning it would take 34 colluding validators to halt block production. Importantly, such an attack could only stop the chain’s operation — it could not censor individual transactions or unilaterally alter the state without reaching 66% consensus power.
Now, imagine in this same chain that a single entity owns 50% of the token supply. Even if those tokens are distributed across many validators, this actor would control governance outright. In this scenario, the chain would look decentralized from a consensus standpoint but would be entirely centralized from a governance perspective. That entity could unilaterally push through malicious upgrades, alter balances, or force protocol changes.
On the other side, a decentralized governance structure with a relatively centralized validator set does carry risks as well, but these are mostly technical risks around liveness and performance. Validators must deliver on their responsibilities, or they face slashing and reputational penalties. Governance, by contrast, has far broader power over the protocol itself.
Where We See Priority
For this reason, we believe that governance decentralization is slightly more fundamental than execution decentralization. Cosmos governance is further complicated by the delegated voting system, where validators cast votes on behalf of delegators who do not actively participate. This introduces the risk of concentrated influence that may not accurately reflect token-holder intent.
To summarize, while the Nakamoto bonus is a valuable avenue to explore, we think it is crucial to first address the foundational risk of centralized governance through delegations. Once this baseline issue is mitigated, complementary mechanisms like the Nakamoto bonus can be meaningfully discussed and adopted.
For context, we have initiated a separate discussion on vote delegation caps, which we invite readers to have a look at: [LAST CALL] CHIPs signaling phase : Validator Vote Power Cap