Petition for ICF delegations

#1

Dear community,

We are working on a petition regarding the ICF delegations here:

Would appreciate any feedback, this is a work in progress.

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#2

As we discussed earlier, even though I generally agree about intention, the stated problem of top 33% concentration cannot make significant change by icf delegation distribution.

Only thing we can suggest to icf is to stay away from top 5 validators.(quite certainly they will) Besides that, any other strategy does not contribute to resolve top 33% problem.

To resolve top 33% problem, strategies other than icf delegation suggestion I believe.

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#3

I’ve been thinking about a two vector delegation approach. The vectors are total stake and a performance measurement.

To me, stake should be delegated somewhat equitably among validators exhibiting similar performance. We start by defining performance bands.

As an inelegant example -

  • Performance Band A could exhibit no slashing for X blocks and greater than 98% uptime

  • Performance Band B would exhibit no slashing for X-Y blocks and 95%-97% uptime

Delegations are then made inversely to total stake within each band. Those with the largest total stake in the band would receive the lowest delegation. Those with the lowest total stake receive the highest delegation.

I recognize this isn’t a perfect solution. I doubt there is a perfect solution. My hope is the proposal leads to continued conversation about the topic, one that leads to greater stake decentralization.

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#4

Anyone from Tendermint or validators see this come up after all the Testnet?
Or not imagined this can happens?
They not have solution or statement about ?

#5

And imo asking to IFC for delegate to others and try the jing-jang its not the solution.

That is not going to repair the software that allowed centralization.

#6

i agree that delegation of ICF wouldn’t change much the centralization. I hope we can rethink our reward mechanisms. as we discussed previously, I can summarize them as following:

  1. reducing reward rates for validators who have too much voting power. we have two proposals for this already. this will force delegators rethink their delegations by economics incentives.
  2. tax(2~3%) from rewards and distribute evenly or proportionally to all validators. this will let validators have basic income, consequently solid the whole network.

NOTE: I summarized from our previous discussion. be free to let me know if I missed or misunderstood.

#7

Since the Interchain Foundation has published on this matter, I believe the petition is obsolete: