I concur that preventing spam proposals from reaching the blockchain is more crucial than the potential impact on community participation. I am open to a significant increase in the minimum deposit requirement, provided there is broad community support. While I am unsure of the exact amount the minimum deposit should be, I acknowledge that an increase is warranted.
My preference is for a reduction in the number of proposals, focusing on enhancing their quality rather than dealing with the volume of spam proposals currently observed.
I intend to cast my vote in alignment with the majority’s preference, believing in the collective wisdom of the community on this topic.
Thank you for providing the reasons that lead you to change your mind. It is genuinely hard to admit that we can be wrong sometimes. The fact that you did it is testimony to your faithful commitment to improve the chain. This episode is yet another example proving that data accuracy must be absolutely preserved in the forums.
Regarding data, we have to mention that we have a relatively similar argument in ICS rewards debate in this forum. You showed violent opposition to this, similarly questioning our motivations. Our intention is simply to collect data in anticipation to a forthcoming debate, avoiding problems encountered in other proposals where flawed data was also displayed. As proven once again in this post, wrong data leads to wrong decisions.
Despite that hiccup, we also want to encourage you to go further with the idea of mandating an “Arguments Against this Proposal” section in every proposal. This is a really good idea
I do think that it should be expensive to put a proposal on the Hub, or at least “harder” in different ways because it is a bad look for governance to appear full of scams/useless proposals for new users.
If a proposal is important enough to bring up to governance then if the proposer does not have enough funds to do so, can request a sponsorship from other validators or users to help reach the deposit. That also shows that there is at least some consensus on the proposal and it is not a rogue proposal brought up from nowhere, which will lead to more fruitful discussions in the forum. One cannot just send their idea (even if brilliant) over to voting to Congress, there is some channels they need to pass through first.
Yea, we could filter the main endpoints that list proposals on the backend. The idea of doing it on the frontend is that the frontend can move more quickly, but if frontend providers aren’t moving quickly then perhaps doing it on the backend is better.
Either way, we need solid information on when exactly these spam proposals are still visible to implement the fix anywhere. Has anyone in this thread been gathering that?
The idea of using frontend filtering is certainly one way to “fix” the problem of potential harm contained in spam proposals’ links. However, we haven’t seen strong arguments opposing the idea that raising the minDeposit is also part of the solution. To us, the problem is not only the phishing scam links but also the concern that raising governance awareness through a public vote should not be an easy task. It should be the final step following a carefully conducted preliminary debate right here on the forum. Of course, this relates to the general vision one can have on governance. One thing we’ve learnt from this debate is that we should be more cautious and raise gradually, instead of “sending a strong message” and increase the level of pain for spams’ creators.
If we want to increase further in the future, that should only be considered along a broader debate on the governance framework. We believe that the Hub should consider having a general debate that confronts major different points of view on this complex matter. We have plans to initiate that in the coming weeks and hope to have you and other prominent forum participants share their views as well.
Your contributions to this current debate on minDeposit has been very valuable and we hope that you will also take part in this general governance framework discussion.
We have now updated the initial post and moved it to [LAST CALL]. At the moment we prefer to opt for the most conservative approach of 500. We will leave that final stage for another week and see if there is a significant shift in the poll which would require to update to another level.
I don’t understand the proposal process
The price of atom is floating and may be higher or lower in the future.
Will the proposed deposit amount need to be changed again as the price changes?
For example, 250atom currently costs about US$2,500 (250atom X10.3 price)
If the atom price rises to $30
USD value is $7500 (250atomX30 price)
People always use dollars to measure whether it’s too much or how much
Whether it can be defined by a [fixed] deposit amount
How many atoms are needed is decided in June every year
If the current price of atom does not exceed 2 times, there is no need to change it.
For example, define the deposit amount and set it to 5,000 US dollars.
Assume that the price of atom in June 2024 is 10
The average price of atoms in June in 2025 is 18, no more than 2 times, no change required, still 500 atoms
(5000/10=500)
In 2025, the average price of atoms in June is 4.9. If it exceeds the multiple, [change] 5000/4.9=1020 atoms is required.
In 2025, the average price of atom in June is 30. If it exceeds the multiple, [change] is required.
5000/30 =166 atoms
Please forgive me if there is an error in translation.
it may be appropriate to measure over a year the number of proposals in the chain before and after this modification depending on the evolution of the price, and if it is proven that this negatively impacts the governance process, then we can always change this parameter in the future
As explained in the original post, the rationale behind this proposal is to tackle the indisputable problem that is spam proposals taking an overwhelming share of the on-chain proposals. Moreover it seems like the pace has been raising more recently. The target for this proposal is not to use a $ base value to set the desired minDeposit. This dollar denomination can only make sense if we try to compare with other Cosmos projects.
Anyway regarding this proposal, the goal is to propose an adequate response to try and reduce the amount of spams. According to the community’s input, we will move gradually and assess the situation step by step. We also plan a more global governance debate in the near future which will talk about the minDeposit again, but this is a topic for another day!
I think this is a very good idea. Define the MinDeposit based on a dollar denominated stable coin. That way if the price of Atom fluctuates then the MinDeposit is stable. I am not opposed to increasing the MinDeposit, but we need to make sure we have consistency,
Like Shi-yi has pointed out 500 Atom @ $10 = $5,000, but 500 Atom @ $40 = $20,000.
If the price of Atom were to appreciate during the next Bull Cycle, we could find ourselves needing to adjust the MinDeposit back down because nobody will be able to pay the deposit.
But if we baseline the MinDeposit against a stable coin like USDC we avoid this scenario. But the MinDeposit must be paid in Atom.
I doubt we should take the fiat denominated route. But if community ever wants that instead, in terms of efficiency the best we can think of could be to define a “$ bracket” which requires intervention to readjust the on-chain parameter if broken out of. We could also double that with an annual anniversary readjustment back to the mean value of the bracket.
I love this proposal. I think the limit should be 1000 ATOM which is roughly $10,000. As Cosmos Hub grows the bar should be raised and be harder to make proposals. Size by definition comes at the expense of flexibility. Bigger things affect more people and as such should be changed more slowly. As ATOM price goes up the 1000 limit will become $20,000, $30,000 etc which I think is the right progression.
I am making differentiation between proposal that could be voted on chain and discussions here on the forums. I think people should discuss everything on the forums. There is no cost to doing that. When it comes to making actionable changes on the chain, this is now a much more serious matter as the discussion is getting materialized with some form of modification of the chain. As the chain becomes more economically important these changes need to be more substantive and changes should be avoided just for change’s sake. The changes need to have a material impact whose value proposition to all people using the chain is well understood.
As the bar for putting proposal increases, this will require the proposers to seek more people to sign onto their proposal to raise the required money. The very participation and discussion with more people who have to put their money at stake ensures that the proposal actually do add value and are serious.
I do agree with the OP that Cosmos Hub is seeing a lot of rejections and not well thought out proposals. I would put ATOM 2.0 in that bucket which was an attrocity. It was not targeted enough, very ambitious and simultaneously ill defined. Obviously it was a strategy document, but the Cosmos Hub governance isn’t a strategy forum. These forums here are a strategy forums. Strategy discussions are not material. They are theoretical. Ultimately a strategy needs to evolve into specific pillars of action. Those pillars are closer to reality and more material. That is something that people can understand better in its context. That is why operational votes are made on that. You can’t really vote on strategy because It is hard for anyone to square strategy with reality on the ground.
The Cosmos Hub governance is an operational war room where you vote on concrete deliverables that get to be put on chain. Strategic discussions are not supposed to happen in there. And I think the proposal limit should reflect that. 30% No with Veto is way too much governance spam for a chain of this importance. We need to eliminate from reaching governance vote both small frivolous proposals AND big strategy proposals that are too broad and ill defined in practical terms
the community has aligned itself with the fact that the strong point of the cosmos hub is its governance, it should not be made complicated in my opinion. A healthy hub cosmos is a hub cosmos with regular on-chain propositions
Nope… imo it shouldn’t be easy and cheap to put proposals on-chain.
I’m agree with Govmos and others, in most cases we need to debate and reaching a minimum level of consensus before putting on-chain. As you said, ATOM is a governance token so we need barriers in place to prevent both spams proposals and low-quality proposals.
Atom’s governance needs to be professionalized. Not anybody should be able to post on-chain proposals with a few bucks everytime he feels like it.
I am not complicating anything. We are all talking about simply changing an on-chain parameter. There is no additional formal process being discussed (at least not by me).
The more I think about this proposal, the more I like it. Its core purpose to reduce spam and protect both the governance process and the chain’s integrity is very persuasive. I am neutral about the exact amount at which the MinDeposit should be set. As I’ve previously stated, my intention is to align my votes with the majority in this proposal. My position on this proposal is evolving as I continue to read the on going discussions on this topic.
I’d like to raise a hypothetical question in this discussion: Is there a maximum threshold for the MinDeposit fee that could result in negative or unintended outcomes, possibly undermining the governance process? Moreover, during the last bull cycle, when Atom’s price surged past $40, did we observe any significant changes in the submission of proposals, such as a reduction in their number, a decrease in spam proposals, or an improvement in proposal quality?
My preference leans towards having fewer proposals submitted, with a focus on ensuring those that do make it to the chain are of significantly higher quality.
We share the same feeling. It seems like a more profound debate on the governance framework is required. Defining clear guidelines to access the on-chain audience. We started this Govmos initiative to reform governance for almost a year now, because we saw this as the most undervalued asset ATOM had in its toolkit. It’s safe to say that our expectations have been unmet for too long and that the overall quality of governance has barely moved through that period. It hasn’t degraded, but it clearly hasn’t improved either and that can’t be an acceptable outcome.
Despite little visible improvement to the governance system, there seems to be an increasing amount of people willing to reform it. We think the time has come to initiate a broader debate to define guidelines for basic on-chain governance requirements. This feels like an absolute requirement beyond doubling the minDeposit to study the real-world effect it may or may not have on spams.
Once voted through, we will promptly initiate a community debate in order to create a cooperative governance framework. We’ll share our vision and invite everyone else to do the same. Hoping to gather the best ideas collectively. We count on your participation.
