Disclaimer: This is an independent proposal from an ordinary Cosmos community member. I am not affiliated with Cosmos Labs, the Interchain Foundation, or the Cosmos Hub development team. This is not an official initiative or a finalized technical specification. My intention is to share an idea and gather community feedback.
TL;DR
I would like to propose exploring ATOM Shield, a limited emergency freezing mechanism for native ATOM on the Cosmos Hub.
The goal is to prevent stolen ATOM from being moved further during major security incidents, without halting the entire network, while leaving final decisions to decentralized governance.
The proposed mechanism would work as follows:
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1 Security Council member: Initiates an immediate freeze lasting up to 1 hour.
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Additional Council approval: Extends the freeze for up to 24 hours from the initial action.
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At least 2/3 of all active Council members within 24 hours: Confirms the freeze until governance reaches a decision.
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Cosmos Hub governance: Decides whether to unfreeze, maintain the freeze, or authorize recovery of the assets.
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Failure to meet approval thresholds: Results in automatic unfreezing.
The total number of Security Council members and the initial confirmation threshold would be determined through community discussion.
The Security Council would only have freezing authority. It would not be able to transfer or confiscate assets.
Background: Why Is This Needed?
1. Neutron Governance Exploit — September 2026
During the Neutron governance exploit, approximately 1.73 million ATOM associated with the attack were transferred to the Cosmos Hub.
Although the Cosmos Hub itself was not exploited, validators coordinated an emergency network halt lasting approximately 24.5 hours to prevent further losses.
A subsequent emergency software modification enabled the recovery of 1,227,121 ATOM.
While the recovery was successful, the incident demonstrated a significant limitation: protecting assets associated with a specific attacker required halting the entire network and implementing an exceptional software change.
Cosmos Hub incident response report
2. Cosmos EVM Exploits — August 2026
A vulnerability in shared Cosmos EVM code was exploited across six Cosmos-based networks.
Attackers moved and exchanged stolen assets through bridges and exchanges.
Although these incidents did not involve an exploit of the Cosmos Hub itself, they highlighted the importance of responding quickly to stolen funds across the broader Cosmos ecosystem.
Cosmos EVM security post-mortem
3. Binance Security Incident and Arbitrum’s Response — October 2026
During the recent major Binance security incident, cooperation among stablecoin issuers and other industry participants helped freeze a substantial amount of assets associated with the exploit. However, frozen assets should not be confused with funds that have already been recovered.
The Arbitrum Security Council also executed an emergency upgrade to move approximately 8,425 ETH and 74.56 million ARB associated with the incident into a separate holding address.
This demonstrated that intervention after an exploit can help secure assets.
However, it also raised concerns about decentralization, as powerful emergency upgrade permissions can potentially allow assets to be moved without their owner’s signature.
Arbitrum Security Council emergency action
These incidents suggest that Cosmos Hub should explore a predefined emergency response mechanism that can protect assets while minimizing the risks of centralized control.
Proposal: ATOM Shield
Phase 1 — Immediate Emergency Freeze
When a major exploit is identified, a single authorized Security Council member could submit supporting evidence and immediately freeze ATOM held at a specific address.
The initial freeze would last up to 1 hour.
The purpose is to prevent attackers from moving funds while multiple Council members are coordinating their response.
To limit potential abuse, individual members would face restrictions on the number of simultaneous freezes and the amount of ATOM they could freeze. Repeated unilateral freezes of the same assets to circumvent time limits would be prohibited.
Phase 2 — Council Confirmation
Additional approvals would determine whether the freeze remains active.
| Approval requirement | Effect |
|---|---|
| 1 authorized member | Immediate freeze, up to 1 hour |
| Additional approval threshold (TBD) | Freeze extended for up to 24 hours from initiation |
| At least 2/3 of all active Council members within 24 hours | Freeze maintained until governance reaches a decision |
| Required approvals not obtained | Automatic unfreeze |
The total Council size and intermediate approval threshold would be decided through community discussion.
If at least two-thirds of the Council confirms the freeze, it would remain in effect until Cosmos Hub governance decides its outcome.
This would prevent potentially stolen assets from being automatically released while governance deliberations are ongoing.
However, I recognize that such a mechanism could also result in prolonged freezes of legitimate users’ assets if governance fails to reach a decision.
To address this, confirmed freezes should trigger mandatory governance review, periodic reassessment, and an expedited appeal process.
The exact safeguards against indefinite or wrongful freezes should be an important part of community discussion.
Phase 3 — Governance-Based Resolution
The Security Council would only have the authority to freeze assets. Final decisions would belong to Cosmos Hub governance.
Possible outcomes would include:
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Unfreeze: If the evidence is insufficient or the assets were incorrectly frozen.
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Asset recovery: If the exploit and rightful ownership are independently verified, governance may authorize a specifically defined transfer to the legitimate owner.
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Continued freeze: If further investigation is required and governance approves continued restrictions.
Governance voting alone should not be considered sufficient to determine legal ownership.
Independent security investigation and ownership verification should be required before any asset recovery decision.
Protecting Decentralization
While emergency freezing could reduce losses from major exploits, it could also introduce new censorship risks and potential governance attack vectors.
I believe the following safeguards would be essential:
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All freeze requests and approvals must be publicly recorded on-chain.
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Security Council members must not have unilateral asset transfer or confiscation authority.
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Council membership should be distributed among independent participants with diverse interests.
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Single-member freezing powers must have strict limits and protections against repeated abuse.
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Temporary freezes must automatically expire if approval requirements are not met.
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Confirmed freezes must undergo mandatory governance review and periodic reassessment.
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Affected users must have meaningful appeal and accountability mechanisms.
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Emergency freezing powers must not include unrestricted software upgrade authority.
Additionally, ATOM can exist in different states and environments, including staking, IBC transfers, and DeFi protocols.
Before implementation, thorough security reviews would be necessary to identify possible bypasses and prevent unintended consequences for legitimate users or shared liquidity pools.
This proposal is not a request to immediately enable freezing powers on mainnet. It is a suggestion to begin discussing whether such a mechanism is desirable and whether it can be implemented safely.
Potential Benefits
If implemented securely, ATOM Shield could help prevent further movement of stolen ATOM without requiring a network-wide halt in situations similar to the Neutron incident.
It could also establish clearer and more predictable incident response procedures, potentially improving confidence among users and institutional participants.
Of course, it would not guarantee recovery of assets already transferred to other chains or exchanged for other tokens. Some incidents might still require broader emergency measures.
Questions for the Community
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Should Cosmos Hub introduce a limited emergency freezing mechanism for native ATOM to improve its response to major exploits?
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Would allowing a single Security Council member to initiate a temporary freeze, followed by confirmation from at least two-thirds of the Council, provide a reasonable balance between rapid response and decentralization?
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What safeguards would be necessary to prevent abuse, governance attacks, and unjustified long-term freezes while keeping assets protected until governance reaches a decision?
As an ordinary community member, I started thinking about this idea after observing the recent security incidents affecting the Cosmos ecosystem and the broader cryptocurrency industry.
My intention is not to centralize Cosmos Hub, but to explore whether rapid emergency intervention and decentralized decision-making can coexist.
I do not claim that this is the best possible design. If there are safer or more decentralized alternatives, I would genuinely welcome them.
I would appreciate feedback, criticism, and suggestions from validators, developers, security researchers, and the wider Cosmos community.