I’m not sure that this solves the problem that you’re discussing, because basically it breaks proof of stake.
The stake of those large validators is also valuable and they paid for it.
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100% - large validators stake are valuable indeed
Hey, i’m not sure either - however, if top 20 val set were required to utilize abstain from certain types of prop - abstain could serve the eco well, no? because otherwise, a calculated/malicious group effort by whales are plausible.
As always, thankful to engage with you sir.
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Oh and thankful to you as well.
The trouble is that I really don’t think that we should require them to abstain because that invalidates the choices of their delegators.
Delegators to let’s say @Tosch 's sg1 or to @p2porg should have the same voting rights as delegators to notional.
Does that make sense to you?
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don’t they have the same right to override?
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Makes enough sense to respond with this plug/question:
What are your thoughts on proposing edits to the Atom One Constitution FWD Prop regarding this?
Sounds like the perfect place to resolve.
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Yes and the override mechanism is really excellent. However, the purpose of delegation is to allow someone else to take actions on your behalf.
So I don’t think it would be good to prevent validators from voting as suggested here, no matter how well ranked
I agree that the hub needs a constitution. I’m happy to have a look at that one but probably not today, I am working on a number of software patches.
If I were going to take a stab at creating a constitution for the hub, I would be looking to create something that:
- Retains the present economic model
- Encourages the practice of forking in times of political disagreement or turmoil
- Guides the hub itself to the most minimal possible code base
- brings features to the AEZ atomically
- Keeps quorum where it is (it’s a parameter anyhow iirc)
- eliminates abstain
- Preserves veto for only the following governance proposal types:
- client update
- software upgrade
- ICS consumer chain addition
I don’t know if these ideas are interesting or jibe with the a1 constitution but that’s approximately where I’d drive things.
On the ever controversial issue of CosmWasm on the hub, I’ll restate my preference matrix, which I think is pretty well in line with most folks building in cosmos:
- mesh in go and no contracts
- CosmWasm in go and only mesh or infra contracts
- CosmWasm in rust and only mesh
Probably I would vote yes on any of one two or three.
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a constitution shouldn’t exist to set economic models or to define governance parameters or to bring features.
a constitution should exist to set limits and to design a path toward a common goal.
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circling back after seeing the title changed to “modify abstain so that it does not count toward quorum”
I have very low faith in the cosmoshub governance system to meet quorum without the use of abstain on any, even remotely, controversial proposals.
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You a boss, Jacob. Salute. Collaboration ftw. We can do this.
If you don’t mind, i’ll copy paste your thoughts on the Constitution post?
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Sure, that’s totally fine with me.
Remember you can always select the text, click quote, and quote anything on this app kinda 4chan style.
If I recall correctly, ATOM one had one thing that I really didn’t like from a design perspective and that is increasing quorum.
I don’t think there’s a reasonable way to increase quorum and remove abstain and between the two options, I would much rather remove abstain because it influences votes without technically even being voting.
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thanks for notice, changing title is bad 
not counting abstentions in the quorum is not a good solution either.
- If I’m not sure I can vote on a proposal, I abstain.
=> I’m not avoiding the vote, I’m simply indicating that I’m not competent to make the decision. - If I want to avoid a conflict of interest, I abstain.
=> I don’t want my vote to be misinterpreted.
in both situations, I just step aside to let the right people decide.
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If the intent is to use Abstain to express neutrality or perhaps indifference, 50/50 weighted is the correct vote.
In the event a validator wishes to express “conflict” by voting abstain, while it’s socially accepted as expressing “no vote,” voting abstain does not recuse a voting validator. Technically and quantitatively it has a calculable effect.
In fact, voting abstain in non sequential elections where relative quotas are used as qualifying requirements – tallied abstentions in these contexts carry well known “no-show paradox” effects.
The impact of abstain in establishing QUORUM (ABSOLUTE quota, 40%, proportion of network) must not be conflated with its effects on THRESHOLD (RELATIVE quota, 50%, minimum proportion of participating voting power required to pass a proposal).
With a relative quota the # of votes required to win varies w # of votes cast; thus w relative quotas, the effect of voter’s decision to abstain REDUCES the number of votes necessary to pass a proposal.
The issue with using abstain with current param for threshold, is that the abstainer’s potential support or opposition to the prop is often NOT removed in equal measure – 50/50, as commonly assumed, but removed in proportion of the relative quota requirement.
Will be sharing some chain data soon to convey the above.
then there should have work done on threshold/quorum parameters, instead of “nuking” anything.
Yes Tom. Think the communications here indicates the majority of us have moved beyond the nuke ABSTAIN position. Language is vital and instrumental in communicating ideas, and I understand how it can be alienating. And upsetting. But when you see the ideas expressed have substantively and substantially moved beyond a semantic thorn, let’s progress the discussion together rather than lite litigating word selection that was perhaps more cheeky than anything remotely malicious.
My updated thinking in modifying abstain is keeping it intact as applied for quorum. However removing abstain from calculating proposal threshold.
This is a more accurate way to express: “no vote,” or conflict of interest without losing participation points (as many validators are contractually obligated to do so).
Should a validator wish to express neutrality or impartiality, 50/50 weighted is the cleanest way to express this sentiment.
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As to concerns of removing abstain and its speculated effects on public engagement, please know that much of the research literature (political science/social choice theory/rational choice theory) for 50 yrs suggests abstentions are more often signifiers of voters alienation and apathy.
Not the opposite.
Preserving abstain as a vote option does not promote or enhance voter or civic engagement.
It’s more often an expression of capitulation, while exercising one’s duty of participation (in large public elections and or small legislative bodies).
If you’re interested in this stuff academically, I recommend:
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (classic)
G Tullock, Toward a Mathematics of Politics (classic)
M Holler, Power Indices and Coalition Formation
“Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed”, Ines Lindner
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i can understand your point. i know i can look like i’m upset, i have to do weird sentences in english ahah, and i must be excessive in a way yeah, but i’m rarely upset, not for virtual stuff.
i have no political or professional interest in being soft and academic. btw.
anyway.
i’m just saying nuking or removing abstain from the quorum count is no different.
it absolutely doesn’t take account of the “discussion” and the points made along the road, in my opinion.
blank votes should (maybe with a different rate ratio) count into the quorum.
they are something. they tell something more than the non-vote.
pulling them out of the quorum is like how work most of governance models we have irl. it’s negating the people who are interested, but want better, different, differently structured proposed paths.
ok there is a validators behavior issue, the same way there is one with NWV use, sybils, whitelabels, bribes and last minute vote switches, etc.
i don’t believe the current proposal, even politically updated, is a solution, for none of those issues.
the same way we’re going towards (optionally and modulable) private governance, we should differentiate individuals and validators (and CEX’s vals) weights, firstly.
Blank votes should mean something else regarding the vote outcome.
people (and validators) should be desincentivised to blank vote. rather than having their right to choose to not choose erased from the overall participation impact.
anyway, it seems it’s a all or nothing proposal, even once polished. and i still think there are way better ways to improve the votes meanings.
once there is a multi language forum live, i promise i’ll explain further my points, and would look like less “upset” i guess.
hi o/
[ edit: just read your second message. i don’t believe they’re just apathy and capitulation. abstention yep, maybe, most of the time. blank vote nope. i guess many cultures and studies are mixing the two. don’t think i have time to dive into these papers, but i take note, we’ll see, thanks]
I gotta say im fully puzzled to any argument that argues that removing the right to express oneself can be a good thing
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I see what a proposal like this would be trying to accomplish, however there is an easy work around for validators. They can just use a weighted vote and do 50%no 50% yes.
And this work around is fine if the intent is to express neutrality and or indifference. A weighted 50/50 expresses this more accurately than voting abstain as currently implemented.
However, if the intent is to express abstention due to COI, voting abstain with current tally parameters is problematic.
Please see