Moving beyond coinholder governance: what Cosmos can learn from Zcash (and vice-versa)

A few quick thoughts, in no particular order:

  1. The Glue

Despite the sometimes well-publicized conflicts between the ECC and the ZF, the strong glue that holds everything together even when in the face of arctic-level stalemates is a strong desire on the part of each builder to serve the mission of freedom and privacy. This is something that has held Zcash trucking along through the ups and many downs - because the individuals know what they are fighting for.

Is there such a glue in the Cosmos community? I don’t know; I am relatively new to sticking my head into Cosmos. It would be good to try and find that point of coalescense while figuring out how to create a sustainable governance structure for Cosmos. What do Cosmonauts really, really care about, outside of token go up?

  1. ZCAP membership

The ZCAP was most effective at the beginning, years ago, when it was staffed with people who were engaged and involved + when ZEC was the #3-5 token (by market cap) + and there weren’t 100 other networks/coins to spend mindspace on. It has been publicly surmised that the ZCAP no longer represents the interests of the Zcash community, by me and others. I can dig up the post(s) if this is relevant. In addition, the “use it or lose it” nature of membership has resulted in people voting on things they have not spent time researching - I think this is inferior to letting people abstain instead. Importantly, the fact that ZCAP polling is managed by ZF means that they can hold discretion over what questions are asked and how those questions are phrased - which may misrepresent what “the community,” or ZCG, or other stakeholders mean to poll for.

If I were to do the ZCAP again, I would install more safeguards against absenteeism/presenteeism, as well as forms of shadow control. Otherwise, voting and decisions will be GIGO.

  1. Independence and effectiveness

The ZCG, with funds being administered by the ZF, and depending on the ZF for adminstration and budget, leads to loss of independence in action and scope. If a grant committee were to truly be effective, it has to have its own infrastructure.

Said more generally, if you were to have different arms of execution, they have to be able to independently operate - from what you say, it seems like that has been achieved after the 2019/2020 split, where the leaders of v1 of Cosmos are now leading truly independent organizations. That’s something to be proud of, IMO, even if was arrived at via a fractious path.

  1. Governing the leaders
    Caveat: I haven’t read all of Vitalik’s latest post on DAOs and governance.

Regardless of which entity form you choose (DAOs or corporate-style entities), if it has a layer of governance around it (DAOs) or above it (corporate), IMO you have to staff this layer with people who have experience managing strong leaders, in addition to people who can provide technical insight. Otherwise, as we are prone to do in a field as technical as crypto, some boards have become a technical advisory board and a rubber stamp for leadership, instead of a robust layer to safeguard the interests of relevant parties. “Relevant parties” in your case could be “the public,” coinholders, or whichever stakeholder groups you identify.

This governance layer must (a) proactively seek input from stakeholders, (b) be brave to debate against each other, and (c) be willing to rein in leaders where they deviate from the expressed interests of their stakeholders - per your quote from Vlad. The “right to exit” may be a precious option for stakeholders, but it is often an impractically expensive one to take given invested resources and opportunity costs (e.g. Ycash forked, but adoption is… I’ll let you judge for yourself).

I am inspired/impressed that you/Cosmos are thinking so thoughtfully about setting up governance for success. I believe an ounce of prevention >>> a pound of cure. Good luck with your search!

Author’s note: I was on the first Zcash grants panel (2021) and co-wrote the whitepaper you referenced in the grant committee’s mission. I have strong views on governance as I helped manage the board of a listed bank as well as studied how poor governance leads to zombie companies (https:// corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/01/11/japans-coming-wave-of-reform/). Of course, for-profit and non-profit organizations typically have very different drivers, so I’m not saying all of my opinions apply.

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