No.
- Legal Structure
You received tens of thousands of dollars in your first year to establish a legal wrapper and chose a Guernsey trust? You should refund all the money you received for it.
A Guernsey Trust is inappropriate for any self-described DAO because of its highly centralized organization. Moreover, Guernsey trusts are weak legal wrappers that offer very little tax clarity and virtually no tax advantages in any jursidiction—and (for that very reason) they do not require $50,000+ to establish… It is shameful to propose this as your DAO’s legal structure after a year of work and inspires no confidence in your due diligence or ability to identify appropriate vehicles for advancing the Hub.
- subDAO Roadmap
This is just a wishlist of things with basically no actionable items. “Streamline integrations and partnerships,” “raise ATOM awareness with investors,” “bring revenue and airdrops back to the ATOM community pool”—you provide no metrics you want to achieve and no standards by which your work can be judged. Most of these will be occur simply by another bull run regardless of what you do.
You write:
As Growth SubDAO generates value streams for the Hub community pool, the subDAO proposes to reserve 20% of those revenues for its own treasury.
Until AADAO has repaid ALL of the grant money forwarded it by the Community Pool, neither it nor its subDAOs should retain ANY of the revenue—not 20%, not 2%, none. The claim that this “aligns interests” means you have no respect for the Hub funding you and should not be directing the Hub’s development. You should plan to repay the Hub its principal plus an interest rate for the risk it assumes in lending you money before AADAO and its subDAOs are allowed any claim to revenue.
- AADAO Team
I see no meaningful means for community participation or oversight of this DAO. The structure of AADAO should stand independently of the people running it, and those people should be elected by the Atom community separate from implementing an AADAO structure—not bound to any particular predetermined group of individuals.
- Budget and Compensation
Compensation of $625,000 (Grant subDAO with 3 listed employees, averaging $208,000 each) + $430,000 (Growth with 4 employees, averaging $107,000 each) + $96,000 (Oversight with 2 employees, averaging $48,000 each) is more than $1.1 MILLION in compensation for 14 people. Although it is not broken out in the budget, there is a subsequent claim that ~25,000 ATOM (at what USD value?) will be used so that “the Strategy Committee [of three employees, some with appointments on multiple subDAOs, averaging $80,000 each] will be compensated”—where does this come from?
Although the proposal claims that the 20% cut of revenue for Growth would make AADAO autonomous, there is no indication whether that revenue will be used to further supplement the proposed salaries. I would prefer that such revenue, after the principal plus interest has been repaid, be barred from any compensation payments to any AADAO member to preserve the DAO’s integrity and the Hub’s full sovereignty over this subDAO.
It is important to open up the staffing of AADAO and remove preselected individuals from the implementation so that AADAO can be competitive on its operational costs and avoid the perception of giving appointments to insiders, friends of friends, etc.