Sunsetting Atom Accelerator DAO (AADAO)

[ATOMAcceleratorDAO]

Summary

After careful consideration, Atom Accelerator contributors have unanimously voted for the DAO to go into maintenance mode and return all funds not needed to fund grantee obligations and maintenance mode activities, back to the community pool.

Motivation

As we approach the Alt Coin season, the Cosmos Hub needs a team to support its growth effectively. In the past year, the team at AADAO:

• Secured core infrastructure for the Cosmos Hub, including funding the Hub’s IBC relayers; establishing a first-party archive node, improving data reliability for integration partners; and establishing reliable data pools for all other developers on Lava Network.
• Successfully supported the regular Cosmos Hub Testnet Program, helping it incentivize validators for higher engagements, as well as accelerating the launch of PSS by funding the ISLE testnet.
• Arranged for an emergency security audit for the Liquid Staking Module
• Helped to demystify the economics for PSS, with a tool that is used by every team considering adopting Interchain Security
• Significantly increased ATOM utility in NFT and CFTs, including securing ATOM minting on Stargaze, promoting ATOM at live NFT events, and facilitating the premier Cosmos NFT collection, Bad Kids, to adopt ATOM as its denomination.
• Further helped ATOM utility by helping to bring to to market Amulet Finance (self-repaying loans), supercharging Asteroid Protocol (Hub inscriptions), Superbolt (NFT-finance with ATOM) and soon Atlas DAO (NFT Aggregator and NFT-fi)
• Supported end-user tools and platforms to promote the Hub and AEZ, including Spelldrop (ATOM Airdrop Tracker, as an argument to buy and hold ATOM), the Cosmos Ecosystem Jobs Board (tracking over 1500+ open roles in the ecosystem), and running the ATOM 5K quests campaign (attracting over 5,000 active users)
• Also helped to bring to market Data Lenses’ Airdrop Snapshot tool - allowing new projects to easily snapshot and airdrop to ATOM stakers, as well as holders of liquid staked ATOMs!
• Allowed the Cosmos Hub for the first time benefit from the value created in the ecosystem, through venture investments in Elys Network, Drop Protocol, Plaza Finance and others. When these projects come to TGE, tokens will be airdropped to the Hub Community Pool.
• Supported numerous teams by acting as their counter-party for the Cosmos Hub, helping them navigate the complexities of our ecosystem and extensively supporting their GTM.
• Organized the Cosmos Hub’s first-ever first-party events at EthCC and DevCon, engaging over 2,250 registrants and establishing the Hub’s presence at industry-leading gatherings; in addition to organizing, attending or representing the Hub at 40+ other events and podcasts to promote the Cosmos Hub
• Successfully organized the first three major hackathons for the Cosmos Hub - South Korea, Dubai and Barcelona (soon) - including producing developer documentation and university partnerships.
• Transformed the Cosmos Hub grant program to include extensive non-financial support, such as go-to-market strategies, resulting in better products for the Cosmos Hub.

In total, just looking at our grants program, we processed 368 applications, which otherwise would have likely been governance proposals, rejecting over $33.77 million worth of unviable funding requests to safeguard Hub’s resources over the past 20 months.

However, as many of you know, navigating the recent events has been challenging for the DAO. Since before the dismissal of the General Manager, contributors were discussing the need for critical changes for the DAO to become more effective in the growth of the Cosmos Hub, and those discussions were compounded with his dismissal.

Initially, pursuing a proposal for a third mandate with a narrower scope and well-defined functions made sense for all contributors. Today, that’s no longer the case.

This decision was not taken lightly.

While we at AADAO are firm believers in operating transparently and being held accountable for our actions, we believe that the current approach of the Oversight Committee has created a challenging dynamic that significantly hinders our ability to operate effectively. As such, no AADAO contributor wants to continue working in the DAO or to lead it going forward.

We did our best to continue delivering, always in good faith and with the best intentions, despite the unfavorable conditions, but this isn’t sustainable in the long term.

Decision

After carefully considering Atom Accelerator DAO’s future at a recent meeting, contributors reached a unanimous conclusion: under its current Oversight committee, AADAO’s value proposition to the Cosmos Hub appears significantly limited.

Therefore, we decided to do the following:

• Take the DAO into “Maintenance Mode”
  • Effective 29 November 2024 (2 weeks from today), AADAO will be in maintenance mode.
  • This means that except for critical grant applications in the process of coming in, Atom Accelerator will not be processing any future grant applications.
  • By 31 December 2024, all applications will have been processed, and the DAO will know exactly what its funding obligations will be during the Maintenance Mode.
  • The Maintenance Mode will last till all open grants are completed.
  • A skeleton crew of 3-4 contributors will remain on payroll during the Maintenance Mode to manage outstanding grants/milestones. Their FTE will be at most 40% for 2025 Q1, tapering down to 0% in subsequent months, accounting for reduced duties as grants complete. We plan to share more details on staffing and timeline soon.
  • All other contributors have volunteered to remain on the multi-sigs of AADAO to assist with any governance-related topics post-mandate without pay (such as voting to authorize payment disbursement)
• Return all remaining funds allocated to AADAO in its funding renewal proposal
  • Shortly after 29 November 2024, most of our excess treasury will be returned to the Community Pool. This amount will represent all remaining assets in the custody of AADAO except for:
    • Payroll for November and December 2024
    • Expected payroll for the Maintenance Mode team
    • Funds earmarked for approved grants with unfinished milestones
    • Small contingency for unexpected fees such as legal/ admin
    • $1 million USDC held back for applications yet to be processed
  • Shortly after 31 December 2024, we will send back any amount from the $1 million held for applications yet to be processed, since all applications and funding will have been confirmed by then.
  • At the end of the Maintenance Mode, send back any amounts left over from funding not sent due to grants not delivering, and any amount left over from the contingency budget.

There are of course many other aspects we will need to figure out over the coming days, in order to ensure a responsible shutdown. We will update the community on these aspects soon.

We plan for the Oversight Committee to continue their duties during the Maintenance Mode, but have yet to discuss with them about their expected FTE commitment during that period. We plan to share more details about the full staffing of the DAO for the Maintenance Mode very soon.

Final thoughts

We want to reiterate that this decision was not made easily. AADAO contributors poured their hearts into delivering value for the Cosmos Hub even during the recent challenging circumstances and we always hoped that we could find a way through this.

In the end, we had to soberly assess whether the DAO, in its current form, could still provide meaningful value to the Hub. We sadly concluded that our ability to deliver was critically constrained. Therefore, we felt the responsible thing to do was to step back.

There were other ways to address the situation, but we all agreed to prioritize the Hub’s best interest and chose the path of least drama. Our focus now is to honor the commitments made to grantees and to make sure our wind down is orderly.

It’s been an honor and privilege to serve you all. We will do our utmost to responsibly wind down as outlined above. Thank you for your understanding.

Regardless of what happens, we remain passionate believers in the Cosmos Hub vision and believe, with or without us, the Hub will succeed.

Long Live ATOM!

[PaulEdward]

Lots of positives to take away from this truly unique effort. Hope the best stick around , we need you!
Cheers

[tknox35]

I noticed a lot of contributors who were clearly invested deeply in to making this a success. It’s a shame things went the way they did, but after seeing how some were treated by the public and the general hassles of it all, I don’t blame anyone for not wanting to continue.

There’s still a valuable role a DAO of this type could play for the Hub, so hopefully it gets some continuation in another form.

[btruax]

Thank you for your service, especially to those I worked with closely - Syed, Joni, Reena, and Jordy. I know you four were always showing up with your best intentions.

I’ll catch y’all around the Interchain!

Vaya con Dios.

[mr-t]

We, the Ark Protocol team, want to express our deep gratitude to the AADAO team. Especially: Syed, Curious J, Mark and Malek!

We do understand why operations cant be continued - it is a real pity that this team isnt able to continue operations under this circumstance. Though we DO hope Cosmos is finding a way of keeping those advocates for the ATOM Economic Zone!

We’d fully support for a new AEZ DAO for driving Cosmos into a bright future!

Long Live ATOM!

[Cosmos_Nanny]

@ATOMAcceleratorDAO

While we at AADAO are firm believers in operating transparently and being held accountable for our actions, we believe that the current approach of the Oversight Committee has created a challenging dynamic that significantly hinders our ability to operate effectively. As such, no AADAO contributor wants to continue working in the DAO or to lead it going forward.

AADAO’s decision to sunset operations comes as a surprise. In fact, we discussed how they might revise their current mandate as recent as yesterday – and contributors expressed a desire to defer the decision to January 2025.

Core Issues

The Mandate

The fundamental challenge facing AADAO, as seen from an oversight perspective, lies in its inability to effectively define a clear and actionable purpose for its future. The current mandate of galvanizing the DAO’s efforts around “value accrual for ATOM” is overly abstract and fraught with practical and known shortcomings:

1. Subjective Interpretation of “Value”: The term “value” continues to lack concrete definition and qualification, leading to inconsistent and subjective interpretations; as made manifest through its decisions and key activities
2. Ambiguous ROI Metrics: The absence of clear and standardized methods to measure return on investment (ROI) results in inconsistent evaluations of the DAO’s effectiveness (internally and externally).
3. Speculative Impact on ATOM Price: The linkage between the DAO’s activities and any measurable positive price movement for ATOM is speculative and unsupported by evidence.
4. Ventures: The ventures function is fundamentally incompatible with the reporting obligations of a community-owned DAO. It would not be an overstatement to suggest that the founders of AADAO, along with its various leads, presented the community with a vision of a transparent, public DAO, while their actual ambition appeared to be creating a venture capital-style entity funded by public resources.

For nearly two months, contributors have been unable to articulate a more focused scope or define clearer operational objectives. **This ongoing paralysis reflects a failure of organizational identity and relevant purpose. It is doubtful that friction with the oversight function is the issue. We’re just a convenient and politically available excuse.

Rather, confusion and uncertainty with what the hub needs and what AADAO can actualize within their established operational framework and individual capabilities, are factors. And most importantly, it’s about what they can get paid.

It’s About Money

The primary barrier to AADAO’s continued viability under its current roster of contributors is rooted in unresolved compensation issues and divergent expectations regarding remuneration for full-time roles.

While the contributors have attributed their “discontinue/dissolve” decision to operational impediments caused by oversight, recent conversations suggests that the primary trigger for their collective decision relates to compensation expectations and clearer limitations to what they they can be paid.

The fundamental tension exists not between oversight procedures and operational efficiency, but rather between contributors’ desired compensation levels and connecting entitlement to demonstrable effectiveness to the community.

Failure of Contributor Retention Stems from Misuse of Bonus as a Recruitment Tool

The recruiting framework for contributors was built around a complex, speculative, and unapproved bonus-based remuneration system. Contributors accepted below-market base salaries in exchange for the prospect of “high-reward” bonuses. That was the trade-off.

This arrangement was predicated on the assertion—promoted by the former GM—that ATOM would reach a price of $20, enabling contributors to qualify for 50% of their performance-based bonus eligibility for merely average individual performance.

Beyond individual performance bonuses, the bonus compensation structure also included team bonuses, retention bonuses, and bonuses for strategic committee members. Unfortunately, this chaotic variable compensation structure served as a primary recruitment tool – and due to the leadership and culture of the organization, this theoretical possibility of bonuses transformed into an promise and expectation.

Contributors expressed frustration with oversight for raising questions about vague and inconsistent KPIs, claiming that such inquiries were obstructing their ability to receive bonus compensation. They explicitly stated that they would not have accepted their roles had they known that the bonus methodology was not formally ratified. Instead, they accepted their positions under the assumption that the methodology, as presented to them, was already established policy, requiring only superficial KPIs to justify the disbursements (this is not how transparent organizations or operators reason or behave).

Due to public discussions surrounding the former GM’s termination, substantial community disagreement with the bonus methodology was unequivocally established. The community overwhelmingly rejected two key aspects of AADAO’s proposed bonus structure:

1. Rewarding bonuses for average performance and
2. Establishing bonus “incentives” without community-approved Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), a clear deviation from what was authorized under Proposal 865.

Imo, the root of the issue lies in the organization’s failure to define its purpose clearly. The abstract and poorly understood mandate has hindered contributors and leadership alike from developing meaningful and measurable KPIs throughout the year.

The root of the issue also lies with leadership recruiting contributors under false and or half baked pretenses.

Without a clear purpose, there can be no clarity about what constitutes success — or what people should be reasonably paid.

In part, it remains the opinion of oversight that the bonus structure was conceived and promoted in a convoluted fashion to strategically obscure the actual possible compensation of contributors.

Retraction of the Bonus Program and Current/Future Compensation Realities

Recognizing the flaws in the bonus methodology and program—especially its lack of transparency and accountability—contributors recently voted to return the remaining 88k bonus ATOM to the community pool. As a result, contributors’ compensation now consists solely of their base salaries.

Salary Increases (as of 10/31)
Oversight has acknowledged that several contributors’ salaries were less competitive compared to senior team members and advocated for increases as early as August.

In October, @CuriousJ proposed average salary increases of 30–36% for eight contributors – utilizing the former GM’s $14,500 salary and 1.2% of bonus ATOM as funding sources for the increases.

While oversight supported the principle of more competitive salaries, we found the specifics of his various proposals problematic:

• The proposed salary increases lacked consistent justification and were unevenly applied across roles without a sound rationale. These adjustments were largely based on what individuals desired or found “acceptable,” rather than being grounded in a consistent and objective evaluation of the responsibilities or any demonstrated expansion of responsibilities.
• The new salaries exceeded the compensation brackets established via Proposal 865.

Oversight’s Position:

• Oversight challenged the proposed 36% increases as exceeding the compensation brackets established under Proposal 865.
• While one contributor’s compensation was acknowledged as below market norms (within the $15-$20 hourly range), other proposed increases were deemed unjustifiable within the established compensation tiers via cosmos hub governance.
• Following negotiations with @CuriousJ and @Syed , oversight agreed an average increase of 27% for eight contributors’ salaries did not breach the provisions of proposal 865, and the increases were implemented with October 31 payroll.

Oversight also faced significant resistance from several contributors when we insisted that salary increases be communicated transparently and publicly. Such resistance is fundamentally at odds with the values of transparency and integrity that AADAO professes to uphold and abide by.

The intersection of strategic uncertainty and unresolved compensation expectations are more likely reasons why current contributors have chosen not to continue. Resolving these challenges demands a thorough and honest reassessment of the DAO’s foundational purpose, coupled with an intellectually and socially honest evaluation of its successes and failures.

Additionally, there exists a significant disconnect between the contributors’ desired compensation levels and the objective value of their work. Bridging this gap is essential for any future iteration of the DAO to align compensation expectations with measurable contributions and demonstrable impact.

Conclusion

Claims that oversight obstructs AADAO’s operational effectiveness are disappointing.

AADAO’s announcement to fold is a product of contributors’ dissatisfaction with their economic incentives. Despite salary increases, the majority of contributors continue to believe their compensation is inadequate for their keep.

The decision not to continue the DAO – or with the DAO reflects a disconnect between what they want versus what they can get.

Path Forward

The key questions for the community are:

1. Can a new team develop a relevant and revised mandate?
2. Would they accept current compensation levels?

Any new leadership/contributors would likely need to operate within existing compensation constraints, as higher rates beyond what is currently established as compensation are unlikely to receive hub approval.

[vixcontango]

Wow, what a shitshow.

[yoda]

This is Oversight working as it should. The mess here was created at the genesis of the DAO under the previous GM. The current team were all handpicked by him - we are seeing the results of that now.

Way forward is an RFP process to decide on what the DAOs mission should be going forward (can’t be something as inane as value accrual to Atom). With motivated actors and real KPIs. The current set up is a mess that’s been allowed to continue for way too long.

Kudos to Oversight for standing on business.

[MvpMatt1]

Hello my name is Matthew Richards most people call me Matt. You may know me from my X account @_CryptoNomad1 or from my YouTube channel Matt’s Crypto Corner.

I am a deep advocate and educator of cryptocurrency with a background in cybersecurity methodology, and I am a true cosmonaut with a strong love for the ATOM token and the projects within the COSMOS ecosystem.

I am very saddened to see the sunsetting of the AADOA team because I was a true believer in the people behind the scenes and their goal to make ATOM a great asset making all its holders proud.

I want to do my part and help contribute to any further formation of the AADOA team doing my best to make a brighter future for ATOM and its ecosystem.

ATOM has a strong community the Technology binding the cosmos is unmatched in the crypto industry. This ecosystem has some of the best people committed to making constant improvements and is second to none with IBC technology.

Those in this community who are loyal to ATOM who want to see it in the GREEN rivaling all the best projects deserve to have that dream come true and that is what my goal is. My goal is to help contribute in any way that I can to the best of my abilities; and I hope that if there’s anyone that has the same passion for this ecosystem as me, will come together to make ATOM STRONG with a clear vision forward.

This is only an early chapter in ATOMS Book and I know we will all be here to witness the rise…

Sincerely.

Matthew Richards

[Cosmic_Validator]

@ATOMAcceleratorDAO

In total, just looking at our grants program, we processed 368 applications, which otherwise would have likely been governance proposals, rejecting over $33.77 million worth of unviable funding requests to safeguard Hub’s resources over the past 20 months.

This is not correct. Before the AADAO was created there were not almost 400 governance proposals requesting funding, and if the AADAO had not been created, following this trend there wouldn’t had been neither 368 governance proposals requesting funding. This argument to avoid so many governance proposals thanks to the AADAO was one of the initial flawed arguments presented by Youssef in favour of the AADAO.
The AADAO didn’t ‘safeguard’ the Hub’s resources for the last 2 years, the reason why there weren’t 400 proposals before requesting funding is that there is a risk involved since a deposit of ATOM is needed for the proposal to go on-chain. This is just a perfect filter: most of the low quality projects that applied to the AADAO wouldn’t have put a governance proposal if they knew they were bringing little value and risked having their proposal rejected and ATOM deposit burned for spamming. Furthermore, even the few projects who took the risk to put a proposal for funding, it wasn’t guaranteed at all that the proposal would pass since all the ATOM holders and validators had to review and approve

@ATOMAcceleratorDAO

In the end, we had to soberly assess whether the DAO, in its current form, could still provide meaningful value to the Hub. We sadly concluded that our ability to deliver was critically constrained. Therefore, we felt the responsible thing to do was to step back.

How is the current form of the AADAO different to when it was initially created? And why it could presumably provide value before but now no? What was constraining your ability to deliver?

[Govmos]

Thank you for your service. We respect the decision made and recognize it as the most viable outcome under the circumstances. The abundance of reasoning provided highlights that there was no feasible alternative.

We sincerely hope the community will find the resilience to rebuild a stronger entity and learn from the missteps that led to this unfortunate situation. As pioneers, we understand that mistakes are often stepping stones to future success.

A special thanks to the team who navigated this challenging period with remarkable professionalism, staying steadfast until the very end.

Sincerely,
Govmos.

[ccclaimens]

At CryptoCrew, we would like to express our gratitude to all AADAO contributors. Having collaborated closely on various projects, we can attest to the quality of work and personal dedication that was delivered by the team. We sincerely hope that you will keep contributing to the Hub and the Interchain and we look forward to seeing what you will do next!

[iamkatietv]

In relation to what people are suggesting about continuing the AADAO in a different form, I’m on board with some of the things Rizbe is suggesting. Some of his recent tweets have some good thoughts in them. Here’s one: x.com

[ImmutableLawyer]

Axis Advisory will be taking a look at AADAO’s operations to assess whether the structure can be overhauled or continued w/new personnel, operational parameters, & renewed vision.

We will be keeping you updated!

Kind regards,
Immutablelawyer
Axis Advisory

[Govmos]

@ImmutableLawyer

assess whether the structure can be overhauled or continued w/new personnel, operational parameters, & renewed vision

At Govmos, we firmly believe that the DAO’s internal decision to sunset its operations, as determined through a DAODAO vote, should be fully respected. This reflects the organization’s acknowledgment of the challenges faced and the impossibility of continuing under the current framework.

@Cosmos_Nanny

Claims that oversight obstructs AADAO’s operational effectiveness are disappointing.

This is particularly troubling. Oversight should act as a safeguard, not as an impediment. The suggestion that it has obstructed operations raises concerns about the extent to which oversight may have overstepped its original mandate. Additionally, any attempt to maintain control by replacing members while retaining the same structure only exacerbates these issues.

@Cosmos_Nanny

Can a new team develop a relevant and revised mandate?

We strongly oppose any effort to “revamp” the AADAO by replacing its members and continuing under the current framework. Once the DAO’s remaining activities have been finalized as outlined in the sunset roadmap, all members should be dissolved. If the community wishes to pursue a new grant DAO with a revised mandate, it must be built from the ground up as an entirely new entity.

The conflicts between the DAO and its oversight structure serve as a significant red flag against attempting to restart the current DAO under any form. These issues stem from the rigid hierarchical structure, which proved to be a fundamental flaw. Instead, we advocate for rebuilding with a more decentralized and collaborative system.

---

Thank you for your attention.
Govmos.

[Guinch_Roze]

I tend to agree with what Govmos says, in the sense that it is probably better to start fresh with a reset of the DAO members, in order to avoid starting off on the wrong foot and to begin something new.

[CuriousJ]

That’s not how cosmos hub governance works…

[Cosmos_Nanny]

@Govmos

This is particularly troubling. Oversight should act as a safeguard, not as an impediment. The suggestion that it has obstructed operations raises concerns about the extent to which oversight may have overstepped its original mandate. Additionally, any attempt to maintain control by replacing members while retaining the same structure only exacerbates these issues.

In response to allegations regarding impeding operations, Oversight has acted fully within its prescribed mandate.

Cite an example of how and when we over reached.

When presented with prima facie evidence for misconduct and mismanagement of ATOM resources, we’re duty-bound to conduct appropriate investigations and provide requisite notifications to stakeholders. Such actions constitute basic exercise of oversight’s mandated responsibilities.

The sole instance where accusations of “obstruction” were levied by contributors against us transpired DURING a time when oversight expressed concerns that the proposed salary increases exceed the compensation parameters established via 865. We’re just reinforcing what was approved by governance, and ensuring compliance.

See for yourself.

From AADAO Slack

[Cosmos_Nanny]

@Govmos

At Govmos, we firmly believe that the DAO’s internal decision to sunset its operations, as determined through a DAODAO vote, should be fully respected. This reflects the organization’s acknowledgment of the challenges faced and the impossibility of continuing under the current framework.

It’s imperative to distinguish between individual contributor resignations and the organizational continuity of the DAO, which was established through hub governance. Resignations from current cohort of contributors should not be conflated with “sunsetting” the DAO.

While contributors retain discretion regarding their individual participation, it would exceed contributors’ authority to unilaterally dissolve an organization established through governance procedures.

Imv, the contributors as a collective do not have authority to deprecate the DAO structure itself. Substantial resources have been invested in establishing the DAO’s operational and legal framework, and this infrastructure should remain available for potential succession by new contributors under modified or renewed mandates (assuming the new mandate is approved through hub gov).

Oversight previously advised current contributors that, should they elect not to pursue mandate renewal, a structured succession protocol should be implemented to facilitate the potential transition to new contributors who may wish to assume operational responsibility within the existing DAO framework.

Furthermore, should operations continue under new stewardship, it is advisable to subject the operational framework to independent expert review to ensure adequate risk mitigation for contributors operating within complex regulatory environments. To this end, welcome any analysis that @ImmutableLawyer (Axis Advisory) can provide — am aware there are some concerns with the Guernsey Purpose Trust. If the purpose trust is less than optimal — better to revise, than to throw to the baby out with the bath water as they say.

It can take a new team several months to create legal wrapper/establishment docs/internal protocols etc.

[StunZeed]

TLDR.

Don’t propose a second mandate and sell it to the community with the feature of electing oversight, if you’re not willing to work under such framework.

Rather than claiming that oversight is overstepping their mandate, say explicitly what they were doing that was overstepping.

It’s one thing if you’re mad that you can’t throw around salary raises that exceed what you proposed, it’s another thing to say that they’re not doing what they’re supposed to do. Help you make do things the right way

What’s right?
-Bringing to light misconduct as to your own ethical guidelines → you voted him out
-Reminding you of your proposed salary brackets → you agreed
-Telling you that you shouldn’t vote yes on this daodao proposal that censured Pati because you’d roll out a red carpet for Youssef to strike back. → you changed your vote

Oversight is not to blame having to step in so many times when it’s you who obviously aren’t professional enough to do things the right way.