I appreciate the ambition behind this proposal and the amount of work that clearly went into it. I also agree with an important part of the diagnosis: the Cosmos Hub needs a clearer and more durable connection between ecosystem growth and ATOM’s long-term economic relevance. In that sense, I do not think this proposal is addressing a trivial issue.
That said, I do not support the proposal in its current form.
My concern is not that Osmosis has been unimportant to Cosmos. It has clearly played a major role as a liquidity venue in the ecosystem, and the proposal is right to point out that the Hub today lacks a substantial, recurring, attributable revenue stream of its own. My concern is narrower, but more important: I do not believe the proposal has yet shown that this particular transaction, in this particular structure, is sufficiently justified from the Cosmos Hub’s perspective.
The first issue is structural. The Hub is being asked to make a relatively concrete commitment, while the most important economic outcomes remain uncertain. The proposal states that approximately 665.1M OSMO would be eligible to convert into ATOM over a six-month window. It also states that full participation would require approximately 11.82M ATOM, that the Hub Community Pool currently holds about 10.11M ATOM, and that the remaining approximately 1.75M ATOM could be minted one time if needed. Those are concrete numbers and a concrete obligation. By contrast, liquidity migration is explicitly described as user-driven and voluntary, and the proposal itself says it makes no assumption that all existing liquidity will migrate.
That asymmetry is difficult for me to get past. If the strategic value of this transaction depends on actual migration of liquidity, users, and activity, why is the consideration largely fixed while the core outcome remains voluntary? Even if one agrees with the broader strategic rationale, shouldn’t the structure do more to align what the Hub pays with what the Hub actually receives?
The second issue is valuation. The proposal uses the 30-day TWAP of the ATOM:OSMO price on March 11, 2026 as the basis for the conversion rate. That may be a practical mechanism for a token conversion, but it is not, by itself, a persuasive acquisition framework. A market ratio can be a reference point, but it does not explain why this is the right risk-adjusted transaction for the buyer, or why ATOM holders should bear the downside if the expected strategic benefits do not fully materialize.
Related to that, the proposal states that Osmosis generated approximately $5.5M in revenue in 2025 and has projected core maintenance costs of roughly $550k per year. I do not dispute that those figures are stated in the post. But I do think they require much more context before they can support a decision of this scale. What exactly is included in “core maintenance costs”? Is that figure meant to describe a narrowly defined maintenance budget, or a broader operating model that the Hub should understand as durable and sufficient over time? Does it include the full cost of engineering, infrastructure, security, frontend, product, partner support, and ongoing development in a way that would justify the long-term assumptions embedded in the proposal?
That distinction matters. At a minimum, the proposal has not yet shown the full operating profile the Hub would actually be taking on. If the Hub is being asked to underwrite a strategic transition, I think the community needs a clearer picture of what exactly it is being asked to support. For that reason, I do not think a single projected annual maintenance figure is enough. I would want to see a more detailed, multi-year, itemized operating picture showing how Osmosis has actually been funded and run over time, which costs are recurring, which are non-recurring, and how the proposed post-merge budget relates to the real historical cost of maintaining, developing, and growing the exchange.
The third issue is governance mandate. This proposal does not merely suggest importing useful modules. It describes a post-merge Cosmos Hub that would secure infrastructure, host liquidity, support asset issuance, facilitate capital formation, and serve as the sole execution environment for the DEX, with the migrated modules running natively on Hub validators and under Hub governance. That is not a narrow implementation detail. It is a meaningful expansion of the Hub’s role. While that may be directionally consistent with some recent decisions that expanded the Hub’s functional surface area, this proposal is materially larger in scope and consequence.
I am not arguing that the Hub must remain static. I am arguing that changes of this scale should be made explicitly. If this is the intended direction, shouldn’t it be addressed directly as a mandate question before it is embedded in a transaction-focused proposal? The issue here is not whether that direction is inherently wrong. Reasonable people can disagree on that. The issue is whether the community has explicitly chosen that direction, or whether it is being asked to accept it implicitly through a specific deal structure.
The fourth issue is accountability. The proposal states that the Osmosis Grants Program would be re-mandated under Cosmos Hub governance, would take responsibility for maintenance, development, and growth, and would receive both its current assets and non-OSMO assets from the Osmosis Community Pool, with the claim that this would fund post-merge operations for at least six years. It also states that those assets could be clawed back by governance vote. That does describe authority. But authority is not the same thing as a clearly bounded accountability framework.
What are the performance expectations under that mandate? What are the stop conditions? What would count as underperformance? What level of reporting would allow the Hub to distinguish between successful execution, passive maintenance, and strategic drift? A clawback right is useful, but it is reactive. It does not answer the broader question of how Hub governance is supposed to evaluate and oversee an ongoing operating mandate of this kind.
The fifth issue is continuity at the application and ecosystem level. The proposal is commendably clear that third-party Osmosis contracts and applications will not be automatically migrated, and that individual teams can choose whether to redeploy on the Hub. That honesty is helpful. But it also makes clear that the Hub is not acquiring guaranteed continuity of the broader Osmosis application environment. It is acquiring a module migration, a frontend migration path, and a voluntary process through which users, liquidity providers, and app teams may choose to move.
That brings me back to the central concern: what exactly is binding here from the Hub’s perspective, beyond the transaction cost and the governance transition itself? If the answer is that the Hub is buying strategic possibility rather than guaranteed economic continuity, then I think the price and structure should reflect that much more clearly than they currently do.
None of this is meant to dismiss the underlying problem the proposal is trying to solve. Fragmentation has clearly imposed costs on the ecosystem, and the Hub does need a more legible economic role. But if the Hub is being asked to commit treasury resources, potentially mint additional ATOM, expand its functional scope, and take on a larger institutional responsibility, the burden of proof should be correspondingly high. I do not think that burden has been met yet.
For those reasons, I believe the more responsible position at this stage is to vote no, or at minimum to require that a substantially more rigorous and explicitly bounded framework be presented before this proposal is considered for support.