[PROPOSAL] [DRAFT] Migrate Prop 800 Funds from AADAO Multisig to a Valence Covenant Controlled by ATOM Governance

Hub Proposals Signaling/Text
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Summary

This is a signaling proposal to give consent to move the LP tokens generated from Hub Proposal 800 from the Atom Accelerator DAO (AADAO) multisig to a Valence Covenant that is directly controlled by the Cosmos Hub. This proposal does not add any new liquidity to this position. It simply migrates the liquidity position from a custodial multisig to a Covenant that can be directly controlled by Cosmos Hub governance.

Background

As a part of the agreement to onboard Stride as the second blockchain borrowing security from the Hub via Interchain Security, the Cosmos Hub approved Proposal 800, which directed 450,000 ATOM from the Hub’s Community Pool to bootstrap the ATOM:stATOM pool on Astroport on Neutron. Per the text of proposal 794, which onboarded Stride to ICS, this ATOM / stATOM liquidity on Neutron is an essential component of the ICS agreement for which, in part, Stride is currently paying the Hub $300k-$500k per year in shared revenue.

At the time, the only way for the Hub to deploy its protocol-owned liquidity (POL) was to use a trusted intermediary multisig — for which the AADAO was selected to be the neutral stewards to custody these tokens.

It has always been the community’s intention for AADAO’s stewardship of Hub’s POL to be a temporary interim solution until a solution is developed that gives the Hub direct control of the POL. Now that the Hub has a governance-controlled ICA on Neutron via Proposal 935, the Hub can now directly control its POL with a Valence Covenant.

Transferring this POL position to a Valence covenant ensures that, as with the upcoming launch of Hydro (pending the outcome of governance), the community can easily ensure that this POL continues to be paid for and is wholly subject to the will of hub governance.

With this proposal, Stride is reaffirming its intention to support a migration to hydro of the POL positions that weren’t negotiated as part of its ICS agreement. This proposal addresses only the position currently deployed on Neutron as part of the original ICS agreement, as outlined by the AADAO in this post.

About Valence Covenants

Covenants are a network of smart contracts (currently residing on Neutron) that allow counterparties to engage in specific protocol to protocol actions like joint liquidity provisioning without the need to rely on trusted intermediaries. Covenants are modular and can be individually configured to include specific permissions depending on the counterparties’ distinct needs.

The Stride Covenant

The Covenant between the Cosmos Hub and Stride gives Hub governance the following permissions with respect to this LP position:

  1. Add/remove liquidity from the Astroport LP deployed on Neutron
  2. Return ATOM or stATOM to the Hub’s governance module or its associated interchain account on Neutron

As a result of moving the LP shares to this Valence Covenant, the Cosmos Hub will have the ability to directly manage the LP position as was intended by proposal 800.

Emergency Actions

Covenants allow the party (i.e. the Cosmos Hub) to authorise an emergency committee (EC) to perform immediate emergency actions. The EC cannot withdraw the funds to themselves. The EC can only withdraw funds to the Cosmos Hub’s governance module, which is controlled by the Cosmos Hub’s governance. This EC is important because issues may arise that require action faster than the governance of the party could take given their voting period.

AADAO will serve as the EC for the Valence Covenant with the ability to refund the Covenant’s assets to the Cosmos Hub.

Upgrades

Admins of the Covenant have the authority to migrate the contracts or upgrade the configs. The admins of the Valence Covenant will be AADAO and the Cosmos Hub whereby either party may unilaterally upgrade the contract.

Process

The process to migrate from the AADAO multisig to a Valence Covenant is very simple.

Step 1) Community passes a Hub proposal granting AADAO consent to move the LP tokens to a Valence Covenant (i.e., this proposal)

Step 2) A Valence Covenant will be deployed via Timewave’s open source repository, which generates a deposit address on Neutron

Step 3) AADAO sends the LP tokens it is already custodying to the Valence Covenant deposit address on Neutron

Once the funds are in the Valence Covenant, the Cosmos Hub will have direct control of the assets.

Conclusion

By passing this proposal, the Hub gives AADAO consent to send the LP tokens it generated via Prop 800 to the Valence Covenant with AADAO as the emergency committee and both AADAO and the Hub as the Covenant’s admins.

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We are excited that Valence is now ready to take over this POL, and we hope Cosmos Hub governance approves this change.

Albeit repeating the draft proposal text above, we want to reiterate that the initial 450k ATOM allocated to this POL was negotiated as part of Stride’s deal to onboard on to Interchain Security, for which Stride is contributing fees to the Cosmos Hub.

At the time, the only way to execute on this POL was to use an intermediary - who would receive funds from the Community Pool, and then enter into the DeFI position. As neutral stewards of the Cosmos Hub, AADAO was asked to be that intermediary.

But now that Valence Covenants are ready - it makes sense to migrate the funds to a Covenant - allowing Cosmos Hub governance to directly interact with the funds, eliminating the need to have a multisig to exercise the wishes of governance on POL deals.

While initially mandated by prop 800, our mandate to steward these funds was further updated by prop 805 and prop 880. This mandate is set to expire on Sep 1, 2024. We hope Cosmos Hub governance is able to signal our next steps with regards to these funds before the mandate expires.

It is also worth noting that the Atom Accelerator DAO supported the development of Timewave’s Covenant v1 and v2 contracts - to allow decentralized management of assets by chain governance without relying on intermediaries.

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Hello, Stride.

Hoping all is well with the team. With Prop#950 closing in 6 days, thought it would be good to revisit this topic via this forum.

With the recent events regarding Astroport, one could absolutely see the necessity to move any/all funds away from that protocol, however, curious if this prop was not strategically utilized, as a way to maneuver drawing, in a creative way, from the Cosmos Hub CP via a third-party intermediary, i.e. AADAO.

With the proposed formation of “Hydro” currently being held under scrutiny, RE the recycling of insider committees and the concern of further centralizing governance voting power, could you please alleviate the concern that this direct prop wasn’t a calculated and coordinated effort simply to draw funds to an extension of the alleged insider committee?

With the way these recent proposals, and related past proposals, seem to be passing with flying colors, it truly seems the collective, centralizing entities have self proclaimed/declared themselves as the entire “community” of the Cosmos Hub, completely disregarding minority interests (understandably). With this in mind, the “will of hub governance” only, and unfortunately, seems to translate to the will of us, the recycling insider committee (i.e. whales who came in w/ large amounts of capital for the undisclosed objective of taking over governance control).

Would greatly appreciate your thoughts, to again, alleviate this concern.

Thank you.

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Hello, Stride.

I hope the team had a great weekend. With four days remaining for this proposal to close, currently at 37.98% quorum, it would be intriguing to see if Prop #950 were to pass, especially if there is a lack of response here. In respect to busy schedules, can fully understand response rate, but in honor of the collective CP funds, or in this case the recycling of, it could be beneficial to alleviate minority concerns, and even gain additional support, by responding.

It is also noted that some Top 20 validators continue to vote in favor of seemingly related proposals. To mitigate unfair voting advantages, especially if affiliations and conflicts of interest are not favored to be disclosed, in light of stewarding decentralization, perhaps it should be proposed that with CP related spending, top 20 validators are restricted to vote?

Together, we can continue to make ATOM great.

Thank you.

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The silence speaks volumes. Hoping this is not a clear indication of being part of the alleged centralized, insider group.