Solutions To AADAO Systematic Issues That Led To Alleged Misconduct

[rmalakaib]

Disclaimer

This article discusses the conduct of AADAO’s former project manager, who remains innocent of all alleged claims until proven otherwise in a court of law within their jurisdiction. All claims made here about the project manager are entirely conjecture and not my own words but paraphrases from AADAO’s Oversight Committee.

Identification: rMalakaib

Change Log:

1. 10/31/2024 reworded point 3 in AADAO 2024 Key Takeaways for increased clarity.

Intro

This analysis will decouple the structure in 2023 and 2024 to derive more actionable and detailed insights as to AADAO’s efficacy and systematic issues. The below article will only focus on AADAO 2024 but I’ve also included a LINK to a longer detailed read on AADAO 2023 structure and lessons learned. On a personal note, this feedback is meant to be constructive, with the goal of bettering a community I love, the Cosmos Hub.

AADAO 2024 Key Takeaways

• Centralization of power in the Project Manager: The 2024 AADAO structure centralized decision-making authority in the Project Manager, leading to conflicts of interest and undermining the separation of powers within the organization.
• Checks and balances flaws: The Project Manager’s control over performance compensation, including their own, revealed critical structural weaknesses, allegedly allowing them to bypass necessary oversight and inflate their compensation.
• Project Manager Distortion: Given the unilateral and sole power of the PM to formulate performance based compensation policy it became possible for the PM to allege that the Oversight Committee’s interrogration of the proposed policy was an appeal to receive higher bonuses for themselves.
• Conflict of interest and structural failures: The lack of independent oversight, especially regarding performance-based compensation, created a system where key decisions were vulnerable to manipulation, indicating the need for greater separation of powers.
• Lessons learned and future improvements: Effective oversight requires full independence from the entities it monitors, clear separations of power, and a multi-liaison approach to decision-making to avoid centralizing authority in one individual or group.

Table of Contents

• Disclaimer
• Intro
• AADAO 2024 Key Takeaways
• AADAO 2024
  • AADAO High-Level Organization Design
  • AADAO Low-Level Organization Design
  • Separations Of Power & Checks/Balances
• AADAO 2024 Efficacy
  • Background Of Why The Alleged Misconduct Happened
  • Expansion in AADAO and System Architecture From AADAO 2023 - 2024
  • Alleged Evidence The Project Manager Abused Their Separation Of Powers
  • Checks And Balances That Prevented Collapse
  • AADAO Structural Issues That Created This Alleged Misconduct
• Lessons Learned From The Alleged Misconduct
• Solution To AADAO 2024 Systematic Issues

AADAO 2024

The passing of Proposition 865 sought to charge AADAO 2024 with the same mandate as AADAO 2023: to “create a grant program to support small/medium-size projects for open source software, public goods, and ecosystem initiatives that add value for ATOM holders.” The primary difference between the renewal and the inaugural funding proposals was how AADAO created a specialized organizational structure to accomplish these ends.

AADAO High-Level Organization Design

At a fundamental level, AADAO functions in a bicameral state between the operating committees, I categorized as the Strategy Committee and the collection of all subDAOs, and the Oversight Committee. Below is an overview of authorities; if a more comprehensive understanding of the outlined tasks is needed, head to APPENDIX A in the LINK above.

• Operating Committees:
  • The Strategy Committee is the overseeing executive body of AADAO’s purse, strategy, and subDAOs.
    • The Project Manager leads the strategy committee and is the solely responsible individual for the budget, subDAO KPIs, and subDAO roadmap.
  • The Grants subDAO conducts Venture investing and grant acceptance/due diligence processes. Grants are of one of three types: Open, RFP, or Quadratic Funding.
  • The Marketing subDAO is entirely responsible for facilitating all outward advertisements and communications.
• The Oversight Committee ensures the subDAOs and Strategy Committee, what I call the operating committees, are acting in the best interest of the Cosmos Hub community by handling grant vetoing, disputes, and termination.
• AADAO revenue share agreement states that as AADAO generates value for the Cosmos Hub community pool, 20% of those inflows are reserved for AADAO.

AADAO Low-Level Organization Design

Wallets for: Grants Committee, Operational Multisig, Oversight Committee, Strategy Committee.

AADAO 2024 old operational design

Separations Of Power & Checks/Balances

AADAO 2024 Efficacy

Given that the new AADAO structure took hold in February, it is difficult to determine the individual efficacy of each new grant and venture allocation.

From a systems perspective, we can determine whether or not the new structure of AADAO 2024 effectively handles conflict. The recent alleged misconduct surrounding the project manager and the auditor of AADAO perfectly displays how, in a live-fire environment, AADAO’s separations of power and checks/balances work.

Background Of Why The Alleged Misconduct Happened

In short, the alleged misconduct involved the Project Manager and the Oversight Committee regarding base salaries, performance bonuses, KPIs of the Project Manager, subDAOs, and Oversight Committee, which resulted in the Project Manager’s termination. While maleficence is required for any alleged misconduct, the objective is to demonstrate how the alleged misconduct was a direct result of the AADAO 2024 system design and what the lessons learned were.

Expansion in AADAO and System Architecture From AADAO 2023 - 2024

Visually comparing AADAO 2023 versus AADAO 2024 displays a clear shift in the Review Committee to the Operating Committee. This shift is categorized by a centralization of power into the strategy committee and its liaison, the Project Manager. In AADAO 2024, the Project Manager oversees the subDAOs, making the Strategy Committee largely reliant on the Project Manager. As an extension, the Strategy Committee’s exercising of power becomes contingent on the word of the Project Manager, although optional.

The Project Manager in AADAO 2024 inherits considerable influence over the Strategic Committee, causing the separation of power between the Committee and the PM to blend and the checks and balances to vaporize. As explained in the Separations of Power & Checks/Balances section, the Strategy Committee, by simple majority, votes on the budget before funds are dispersed. At the same time, the Project Manager is solely responsible for creating the budget and individual bonus KPIs. It is fair to assume that the Project Manager heavily influences the ratification of the compensation plans and budget for subDAOs. This assumption is supported by the Oversight Committee’s statement, “In my view, since those developing the methodology and KPIs stood to benefit most from the bonus, disclosing the KPIs was essential to address any potential conflicts of interest“ (Reply to [Project Manager]).

In Proposition 865, there was a link to the above document stating that the KPI targets will be published in an upcoming transparency report and that the Oversight Committee must sign off on performance-based compensation for it to pass.

The issues of this alleged misconduct are three-fold:

1. The passing of a proposal means passing everything on the governance forum. A separate vote is needed to amend the original document if something needs to be included.
2. The project manager controls performance compensation plans for everyone, including themselves, which is a clear conflict of interest.
3. The project manager determines the community oversight’s performance compensation, meaning that the Project Manager could allege that the Community Oversight Board is withholding the performance compensation plan because they want higher compensation for themselves.

Alleged Evidence The Project Manager Abused Their Separation Of Powers

"Compared to the 2023 base salary structure, all returning contributors had accepted reduced base salaries, with a mere two out of seven receiving a nominal 5% raise in base salary. In stark contrast, the GM gave himself a 36% raise to his base salary. Because the GM’s retention-based formula utilizes 2024 salaries, as opposed to 2023 salaries, this results in yielding an 86% increase of 12 (assuming an ATOM average value of $8.66) for the GM’s 2024 total monthly compensation when compared to his monthly remuneration during the 2023 pilot year” (AADAO Oversight Special Report).

Checks And Balances That Prevented Collapse

• The PM cannot fire the oversight committee.
• For performance compensation plans to pass, the oversight committee must approve (Reply to [Project Manager]).

AADAO Structural Issues That Created This Alleged Misconduct

1. The project manager controls all performance compensation.
2. Community oversight committee receives performance compensation and operating budget from the project manager.

Lessons Learned From The Alleged Misconduct

1. For performance-based compensation to pass, the Oversight Committee must sign off.
2. Sub DAOs should always have an oversight committee.
3. The oversight committee should not be within the organization it is overseeing.
4. The oversight committee should receive performance compensation and operating budget from the main DAO, not the subDAO it oversees.
5. One person should not make performance-based compensation plans.
6. A Sub DAO Committee of voters should have multiple liaisons to be independent of one for decision-making.
7. Separation of powers need to be made very intentionally.
8. The fewer people there are making the decisions, the more likely the decision is to avail to human nature’s tendency of greed, jealousy, ambition, retribution, and grandiosity.

Solution To AADAO 2024 Systematic Issues

Given all the above lessons learned and scenario analysis of the most recent alleged misconduct, I strongly recommend the Cosmos Hub amend AADAO’s structure in the following ways:

• The strategy committee needs two liaisons (in the form of two PMs) who communicate and oversee the Sub DAOs. Only one of these liaisons needs to be full-time, but preferably, both would be. Both liaisons should be a part of decision-making in the strategy committee.
• The Oversight Committee needs to be stewarded, funded, and managed by the Cosmos Hub.
• The PMs should have no power to set funding or compensation schedules of the Oversight Committee.

In summary, the 2024 AADAO structure’s separation of powers was ineffective, as it concentrated the authority to establish performance-based KPIs and base salary in the hands of one person, the project manager. The Strategic Committee was intended to provide oversight, but this system broke down due to the lack of multiple liaisons, effectively blending the separation of powers. As a result, allegedly, the project manager gained the ability to award themselves and others raises. Since the project manager controlled the base salary and performance bonuses for the Oversight Committee, they could argue that the committee’s refusal to approve compensation plans is driven by their desire to influence the structure for personal gain. The 2024 AADAO structure is ineffective because it creates COIs, dissolves separations of power, centralizes decision-making, causes factitious warring, and directly provisions for the Oversight Committee’s compensation plan.

I’d be open to help on a signalling proposal if the community indicates my advice and analysis is satisfactory. Understanding that talent acquisition is a main issue grant programs experience I accept that having another liason may be difficult.

Feedback is always welcome, thanks fren

[Cosmos_Nanny]

@rmalakaib thank you very much for your thorough analysis.
Largely in agreement with your observations and findings. However, your analysis of AADAO’s oversight dynamics requires important corrections, as there are a number of critical misapprehensions I wish to address for the record.

@rmalakaib

• Oversight committee limitations: While the oversight committee helped prevent total collapse, its reliance on the Project Manager for compensation and operating budget weakened its independence and ability to provide meaningful checks on authority.
• Conflict of interest and structural failures: The lack of independent oversight, especially

Oversight Function was Challenged by GM & Core Contributors

First, regarding the suggestion that the Oversight Committee’s independence was compromised by the GM’s control over our respective compensation - this characterization is inaccurate. And I must strongly disagree.

Our oversight capabilities, and our willingness to exercise checks and balances were not hindered by how or what we were/are paid. Or as to who set our pay.

Rather, the challenge to effective oversight stemmed from the contributor team’s resistance to accepting our mandate to represent Cosmos Hub community stakeholders’ interests. It is true to say, for some of the contributors, they subscribed to the view that the oversight function should be subservient to the strategic interest of AADAO. The Controller and I disagreed.

The real obstacle to effective oversight came from the underlying power structure. Contributors were hired by, paid by, and received potential bonuses via policies created and endorsed by the GM, creating a complex web of loyalties and dependencies. This dynamic naturally led to resistance against oversight authority, as contributors felt primary allegiance to the GM who controlled their compensation and employment. The psychological aspects of this hierarchy - where one person held disproportionate power over hiring, firing, and financial rewards - made it particularly difficult for contributors to fully acknowledge or accept oversight’s authority.

It’s also important to understand the broader context: effective oversight was completely unprecedented until recently. The Cosmos ecosystem lacks any established models for accountability or consequences. Through testimonials from the Controller and various contributors, both past and present, I can confirm that the oversight function faced consistent interference and undermining before my arrival in June. My approach to oversight clearly diverged from what the GM and some contributors had come to expect. I reject the notion that oversight should be merely a public relations exercise, satisfied through performative transparency measures. Unlike my predecessors, I view oversight as a substantive governance responsibility, not just ceremonial compliance through the production of transparency reports.

Our ability to exercise oversight was challenged due to lack of acceptance from the contributor team regarding the mandate of the Oversight Committee to represent the interests of Cosmos Hub. Due to the crisis, the consensus internally is to update the internal protocols and bylaws to unambiguously establish the independence of Oversight Committee’s mandate, and its members.

Additional amendments include provisions that allow removal of the elected member via an action of Cosmos Hub governance only. At the present time – the by-laws allow for removal of the elected member via initiation of removal from a Strategy Committee vote of 60%, and an all-DAO majority vote to remove the elected member.

The core contributors have also agreed to reform the selection process for non-elected Oversight positions (Coordinator and Controller). Under the current system, the GM and Strategy Committee hold excessive control over hiring wrt Oversight roles, with the exception of the elected member position. The revised approach, will establish a more transparent process for appointing the Oversight Controller and Coordinator positions. These roles will now be filled through an open, public application process, with active Oversight members leading the vetting and selection of candidates. This change shifts the power of appointment away from internal DAO management and creates a more independent, inclusive, and publicly accountable oversight structure.

Performance-Based Bonuses, Retention Bonuses & Recommendations from Oversight Members

Regarding compensation and bonuses, I must clarify several points.

As an elected Oversight member who joined in June 2024, I view my monthly compensation more as a public service honorarium, as it falls well below my standard consulting rates. For this reason, I did not negotiate my pay. I was told what I would be paid, and that was the end of that. Furthermore, performance-based bonuses were never a consideration for Oversight members. We don’t qualify, and we never asked to qualify.

The Controller explicitly communicated to the GM that Oversight members would not and should not qualify for performance-based ATOM bonuses if the rationale for performance bonus distribution is tied to “direct value” creation for ATOM (Feb 2024). Contrary to repeated mischaracterizations, the Controller’s series of logic questions about the bonus methodology, generated a rhetorical argument highlighting the inherent conflicts in the GM’s proposed system, not to lobby for Oversight’s inclusion. Only an idiot or a malicious actor would distort the Controller’s interrogation of proposed policy as an appeal to receive bonus benefits for oneself.

The retention bonus structure, which applies to contributors with 12+ months of service (including Oversight members), deserves particular clarification. These bonuses, funded from the 100k ATOM bonus pool authorized by proposal 865, are distributed monthly (ATOM) based on 2024 base salaries.

The Controller’s recommendation to use 2023 base salaries instead of 2024 salaries was grossly misrepresented as self-serving. In reality, the data shows the GM, not the Controller, stood to gain the most from using 2024 salaries. The GM’s 2024 salary exceeds the Controller’s by 383.33%, resulting in the GM receiving approximately 32% of all retention bonus ATOM earmarked for retention bonus distribution. Meanwhile, the Controller’s retention bonus decreased by 36.30% under the 2024 salary calculation.

Moreover, using 2023 base salaries would have provided more equitable distribution, ensuring consistency across team members (with the exception of the GM’s higher amount), avoiding extreme changes, and allowing for moderate increases of 10-15% for most team members. Equitability and fairness are also factors to policies and policy-making.

The implementation of the GM’s poorly designed and poorly understood policy using 2024 salaries, reflects a failure in internal governance, particularly in the Strategy Committee’s ability to effectively check the GM’s actions.

Request for Correction

While I appreciate your thorough research and evident understanding of several complex events that unfolded, I must request corrections regarding your conclusions about the interrelationship between oversight members’ compensation/bonuses and our oversight actions.

Your report incorrectly suggests that variable compensation factors influenced our ability to exercise checks and balances. Our actual compensation or potential compensation had no bearing on our oversight functions.

In fact, the September removal process demonstrates quite the opposite: despite being compensated for only 35% FTE, both the Controller and I devoted extraordinary hours to the situation. I personally committed approximately 140 hours (equivalent to 88% FTE), while the Controller contributed roughly 100 hours (62% FTE).

Our dedication to providing strong oversight and maintaining effective checks and balances stemmed from our deep sense of duty and clear understanding of our mandate as Oversight Committee members. We remained committed to this responsibility despite extraordinary time and economic costs; and we stuck the course even when core contributors’ actions directly challenged our authority.

Our commitment to oversight was firmly anchored in our fundamental obligation to the community. Any impediments to our oversight effectiveness stemmed from the GM having hired all the contributors, and the resulting loyalties and expectations created via the hiring process and hierarchy of the organization.

The GM engineered a complex compensation structure designed to maintain control over contributors. By setting base salaries below market rates, while offering the prospect of becoming more “whole” through a combination of individual and team performance bonuses, the GM created a system of quid pro quo incentives and financial dependency predicated on his authority and position.

The bonus structure was particularly calculated - with 50% of performance-based rewards guaranteed, as distributions were tied to average performance, the proposed bonus methodology ensured ongoing financial leverage over the entire contributor team.

The true challenges to oversight stemmed from this combination of the GM’s hiring power and variable compensation system that he singularly defined. Any suggestion that Oversight’s own compensation or the fact that the GM set our pay rates had influenced our oversight effectiveness is patently false, and frankly – nonsensical. I respectfully ask for you to amend your analysis accordingly.

That said, I do sincerely thank you for your substantial efforts in analyzing the governance dynamics of the organization. As mentioned, several amendments to protocols/bylaws will be effected to ensure Oversight and its members are established with greater independence and autonomy.

[Cosmos_Nanny]

@rmalakaib

For performance-based compensation to pass, the Oversight Committee must sign off.

In our view, it’s insufficient to have Oversight Committee sign-off. In fact, that’s what AADAO wanted us to do. For us to sign off.

However, our read/interpretation of proposal 865 (all the attendant communications in Forum) suggests that all bonus methodologies and their associated KPIs must be fully disclosed to and approved by the community. As oversight members, we maintained this position firmly - our role isn’t to rubber-stamp how ATOM bonus pool will be utilized.

Instead, our responsibility is to ensure complete transparency about bonus structures and mechanics. To be clear, with respect to bonus policies and ATOM distribution, oversight’s job is not to approve, but to ensure the community approves of the resource utilization.

[Cosmos_Nanny]

@rmalakaib

Sub DAOs should always have an oversight committee.

AADAO and all its subDAOs are subject to oversight from the Oversight Committee.

The AADAO consists of following subDAOs: Operations, Grants, Strategy, Oversight

Technically – Oversight is structured as a subDAO due to administrative reasons related to staging and distributing approvals and vetos in DAODAO. That said, it should be – and will be made explicitly clear, that Oversight is not subservient to the parent DAO or any of the subDAOs.

[Cosmos_Nanny]

@rmalakaib

The oversight committee should not be within the organization it is overseeing.

There have been conversations regarding establishing oversight as an independent DAO, wholly separate from AADAO; which authority to exercise oversight over AADAO and any persons/teams receiving community pool funding. Do you have any thoughts on such proposal?

[Cosmos_Nanny]

@rmalakaib

The oversight committee should receive performance compensation and operating budget from the main DAO, not the subDAO it oversees.

Are you saying the payments to oversight members should be made directly from the main/operations wallet, and not from the StratComm SubDAO wallet?

I shared how oversight salaries are disbursed in Transparency Report 7, and planned changes to disbursement mechanics.

Oversight Salary Disbursement

Current Salary Disbursement Process: The Strategy Committee’s multi-signature wallet currently funds Oversight members’ monthly salaries.

Imminent Changes to Oversight Salary Disbursement: AADAO is developing a more autonomous payment system to enhance Oversight’s independence and impartiality:

• Annual Funding: The Strategy Committee’s wallet will replenish Oversight salaries once a year, unconditionally.
• On-Chain Vesting: DAODAO’s on-chain tools will manage salary vesting.
• Independent Compensation: This approach separates Oversight members’ pay from AADAO’s regular budgeting and payroll processes.

Creating this self-sustaining compensation structure will:

• Strengthen governance integrity.
• Ensure Oversight members are free from potential internal influence.
• Enhance the independence of Oversight members.

@rmalakaib

A Sub DAO Committee of voters should have multiple liaisons to be independent of one for decision-making.

Can you clarify what you mean? On which subDAO – or do you mean an advisory committee structured as a subDAO consisting of “voters”? How might the “voters” be determined, and by what process?

[rmalakaib]

@Cosmos_Nanny

Oversight’s own compensation or the fact that the GM set our pay rates had influenced our oversight effectiveness is patently fals

Hey Thank you for your feedback, I’m reading through it now and will have a full response shortly

Seeing as you have a greater knowledge base of AADAO than I do, I will strongly consider your thoughts. I will state that I read every available document from AADAO, and I do mean everyone, it is possible I’ve made an error as you state.

With that said, I don’t believe my conclusion to be non-sensical. I hope my article atleast serves to question whether we’ve structured AADAO correctly.

I do believe that I’ve also miscommunicated, I don’t think that “Oversight’s own compensation or the fact that the GM set our pay rates had influenced our oversight effectiveness”. In a moment I’ll try to elaborate more clearly.

[rmalakaib]

@Cosmos_Nanny, I appreciate your patience with my response. I was out with family. Thank you for reading and responding with such thorough, relevant feedback!!

INTRO

You are exactly right, I have mischaracterized the PM’s influence on the Oversight Committees effectiveness. This was not my intention. It was not that I misread the source material, but I poorly conveyed that specific point. I apologize, and I fully agree that the PM’s power over bonus methodology does not apply here. The objective of the poorly worded mischaracterization was to display exactly what you mention here:

@Cosmos_Nanny

The Controller explicitly communicated to the GM that Oversight members would not and should not qualify for performance-based ATOM bonuses if the rationale for performance bonus distribution is tied to “direct value” creation for ATOM (Feb 2024). Contrary to repeated mischaracterizations, the Controller’s series of logic questions about the bonus methodology, generated a rhetorical argument highlighting the inherent conflicts in the GM’s proposed system, not to lobby for Oversight’s inclusion. Only an idiot or a malicious actor would distort the Controller’s interrogation of proposed policy as an appeal to receive bonus benefits for oneself.

Supporting Evidence

More specifically, I desired to portray that a malicious actor (the PM) could distort the “Controller’s interrogation of proposed policy as an appeal to receive bonus benefits for oneself” if the Oversight Committee holds positive authority¹ over the performance-based compensation plans and, against the Controller’s insistence, the Oversight Committee is included in the performance-based compensation plan.

In the (Reply to [Project Manager]) document on page-18 image-1 point-3 where the PM sent the below Slack message, we can examine evidence of the very distortion you explained in the aformentioned quoted passage.

Further supporting evidence of this distortion can be found in the Project Manager’s reply to AADAO’s Oversight Special Report: GM Misconduct/Mismanagement where they stated:

“Asking for Oversight to be included in bonus distribution – which would have personally benefited herself – felt like a grave ethics violation for what is supposed to be the AADAO function with the most integrity.”

My thesis is exactly this: If the Project Manager is not permitted control over creating every facet of the Oversight Committee’s funding, then they can not falsely claim that the Oversight Committee’s involvement is a conflict of interest.

Proposed Amendment To Original Post

With your input, I’d reform my original comment from:

@rmalakaib

Oversight committee limitations: While the oversight committee helped prevent total collapse, its reliance on the Project Manager for compensation and operating budget weakened its independence and ability to provide meaningful checks on authority.

To:

Project Manager Distortion: Given the unilateral and sole power of the PM to formulate performance based compensation policy it became possible for the PM to allege that the Oversight Committee’s interrogration of the proposed policy was an appeal to receive higher bonuses for themselves.

All The Best,
Robert

1. “positive authority” refers to a governance mechanism where a proposal approved by one council only goes through if approved by another council.

[rmalakaib]

I entirely agree with you here. The quote above refers to the check that enabled the Oversight Committee to “ensure complete transparency about bonus structures and mechanics.”

[rmalakaib]

Thank you for asking; I’m an avid supporter of an independent Oversight DAO that the Cosmos Hub entirely and directly provisions. In short, for the Cosmos Hub to EFFECTIVELY scale/support/grow Partial Set Security, Grants Program, Venture Funding, and more, an independent Oversight DAO is required. Just as a collateral dept position protocol, like Sky Protocol, is only as effective as its liquidation engine and only as integral as it is free from corruption, so too are DAOs.

Background

Allow me to explain: the objective of any well-functioning government is to effectively and efficiently delegate resources to achieve a defined mandate. While easier said than done, a governance system must, like Sky Protocol, have an enforcement mechanism to remove bad actors to maintain the system’s integrity. The cognizant skeptic would emphatically state that not all bad actors can be removed, to which I’d reply, “You are exactly correct.” That is why we have separations of power, checks and balances, and multilateralism in governance today.

The Point

In order for the Cosmos Hub to scale further, an independent Oversight DAO whose authority is to ensure corporations, DAOs, community members, and individuals receiving community pool funding act in the best interest of the ATOM token holders is needed.

The oversight DAO would have to scale differently depending on how many entities receive community pool funding. I believe that the Oversight DAO should progressively scale into a flat horizontal multi-committee structure, dependent on the number of entities that receive community funding. If bandwidth and talent acquisition permit, the Oversight DAO should start with one committee and then progressively expand to multiple committees to cover the needed demand for oversight.

The Caveat

Of course, checks, balances, separations of power, and much more would need to be thoroughly considered to execute such a significant idea properly. If the community feels this is an avenue that needs to be explored, I’m open to a conversation or signaling proposal.

[rmalakaib]

Response To First Question:

@Cosmos_Nanny

Are you saying the payments to oversight members should be made directly from the main/operations wallet, and not from the StratComm SubDAO wallet?

I very much love the imminent changes to Oversight Salary Disbursement!!! While I still hold that the Oversight Committee should receive their funding directly from the Cosmos Hub (Main DAO) because of the potential for the PM to withhold funding, I believe the solution your team found solves this problem. Ideally, though, the Oversight Committee is entirely independent of the DAO it is overseeing. Understanding that my suggestion would require extensive changes and proposals on-chain, the imminent changes sufficiently address most of my concerns.

Additionally, elections for oversight members should happen in a ranked choice voting system.

Response To Second Question:

@Cosmos_Nanny

Can you clarify what you mean? On which subDAO – or do you mean an advisory committee structured as a subDAO consisting of “voters”? How might the “voters” be determined, and by what process?

Of course, the passage “A Sub DAO Committee of voters should have multiple liaisons to be independent of one for decision-making” refers to the Project Manager being the primary liaison between the Sub DAOs and the Strategy Committee. I assert that the Strategy Committee’s reliance on one liaison blends the checks and vaporizes the separations of power.

I believe that a Sub DAO Committee, like the Strategy Committee, should rely on multiple liaisons to generate decisions.The diagram under the “Solution to AADAO 2024 Systematic Issues” section shows two project managers acting as liaisons between the Strategy Committee and the Sub DAOs it funds. Having two or more liaisons ensures that the Strategy Committee’s checks and individual powers operate as intended.