[Conversation]
Positive this is a very popular, well rounded topic of discussion, however:
If we are all to simply accept the CP being equivalent to the [edited] 5th (currently) ranked Validator, in relation to its weight in ATOM (currently), curious:
If not, would sincerely appreciate your time in helping to understand why.
Thank you in advance.
I have made my peace with the idea after Atom One forked. Now we have two philosophies in parallel, and somehow it is good for the ecosystem.
Whatâs wrong with copying something that another chain is doing and itâs beneficial?
I also believe that, in the long run, a political reform will be necessary to strengthen the networkâs resilience and its democratic structure. Imposing a cap on the voting power per validator (for instance, no validator should hold more than 5% of voting power over the chain) seems to me a strong way to improve resilience. Similarly, as you mentioned, separating the voting power of delegators from that of validators (or at least allowing delegators to freely choose the address that represents their voting influence) is also a valuable idea.
That being said, even though Iâm strongly convinced of the need for such reform to ensure the networkâs democratic health, I believe now is not the time to focus on resilience. The priority should be to establish a clear territory and a solid use case. But I can assure you that when the time comes, Iâll be the first to bring these ideas back.
Vote delegation is a very important topic indeed, one that we have covered years ago, even though it failed to catch the communityâs interest so far. It may take time for many to fully appreciate where vote delegation is likely headed in the long run. Based on our research and past contributions on the topic, we believe the most robust governance architecture will naturally evolve into the following layered structure:
The default and most desirable outcome:
The token holder votes directly.
This ensures the most direct form of democratic expression.
If the token holder chooses not to vote, the delegated representative â a member of a governance council â inherits the voting right .
These representatives, or âgovernors,â would ideally be subject-matter specialists, selected by the token holder to reflect their values or interests.
Importantly:
If neither the token holder nor their chosen governor casts a vote, the validator may step in as the final fallback and exercise the vote.
This ensures that the network can still move forward on critical decisions, but without placing undue weight or influence on validators by default. In practice, validators would likely vote only on technical matters , such as upgrades, where their expertise is relevant and needed.
This multi-layered structure â direct voter > delegated council > validator fallback â creates a more resilient, representative, and accountable governance system . It recognizes that token holders have different levels of availability and expertise, and allows for flexible participation without centralizing control.
Weâve previously outlined this vision in our post on governance councils and treasury modules , which you can find here:
Ideation â Governance Councils & Treasury Modules
This layered model doesnât remove responsibility â it distributes it more efficiently , encourages specialization, and empowers the community to evolve governance participation over time.
I also think the direct votes should override validatorsâ vote.
Appreciate validators casting âabstainâ votes on topic influencing on their revenue or other topics where their votes can have a bias.
Understandable.
Agreed, especially if the model chain specializes in governance issues, specifically.
Respect the drive to be first. May the Cosmos Hub prosper.
Your teams work and tonal posture is highly appreciated. Keep up the great work (+everyone here)
Agreed.
Disagree here. Validators primary role is securing the network. Delegators/Stakers, not idle holders without stake, should be expected to vote. All of this could easily support why we should keep the current 14 day voting period (minus the expedited voting proposed change).
Separate delegation/voting weight.
Agreed, but..
RE CP weight. It is roughly equivalent to rank #5.
Thank you, Govmos, for sharing this valuable thread âIdeation - GovernanceâŚâ and the work you, and your team, provide.
Some key points (that personally stood out):
Response:
Response:
Not sure how to feel about your ideation being based off of XRP(?). Have not explored their ecosystem to have an opinion, but I digress.
There is a clear, significant difference in:
from our Hub validators.
How often are we seeing:
versus seeing (referencing @Taguâs post: " Validators.. The Cancer of Cosmos?")
Unless there is misunderstanding here, liquid staking should not be utilized as a means to redistribute, wrt voting:
Considering the usual very low participation to online governance, donât you think many proposals will not even reach Quorum with this kind of rule?
I like the idea and it totally makes sense but self stake voting power is no different from a delegated voting power where the staker doesnât vote. That why I think :
This would allow delegators to express their opinion in a much mode direct democracy on any subject. For now, this voting power is being delegated and canât be overruled unless validator decides to âabstainâ voting.
While relying exclusively on self-bonded stake to define voting power may be too rigid a solution, we believe youâve touched on a compelling idea. At Govmos, we find it particularly elegant to consider incorporating self-delegation into the vote inheritance model.
Rather than applying it as an absolute rule, we would suggest a more nuanced, relative approachâpotentially using self-bonded stake as a cap on the voting power a validator can inherit. This would mirror the logic used in the Liquid Staking Module (LSM), where validator-linked shares are bounded by self-bond levels.
Weâd be especially interested to hear @Noamâs thoughts on the technical feasibility of implementing such a mechanism.
Good question and unsure the answer.
How is the quorum, in this proof-of-stake system, calculated exactly? If, within the current, low participation environment, Hub Validators were completely decoupled from delegators voting weight, would we still be reaching quorum?
Was not aware of this. Unless a validator specifically votes âabstain,â delegators casted vote are overruled, regardless?
Absolutely.
Interesting and good suggestion, especially when personally against relying on LSM, completely.
Reminder: Prop993. DROP now has âindirectâ say RE Hub governance, through Neutron. Why? If DROP were to experience a bug, or their system goes down, those remaining silent on this matter, are not only saying they are fine with valueless derivatives in our CP, but having DROP keep Hub voting influence?
Agreed.
We may need this more rigid solution, especially when the Cosmos Hub is without a global Validator commission rate as well. All the while, we see quite a few top Validators, with little self-stake, inherit:
I think itâs a good idea to base the voting power on self bond, but you still need to set an asymptote (for example, a 5% cap on voting power), because otherwise you end up with voting power becoming centralized on centralized exchanges, which are mostly self bonded.
On the other hand, the issue youâll face if you try to cap voting power in any way is that you might end up with the same validators appearing multiple times under different identities to bypass the cap. Itâs tricky, and this would require regulating validators by prohibiting them from duplicating their nodes, with heavy slashing penalties enforced by governance, assuming good faith.
These are all absolutely valid points and we are 100% aligned with them.