It’s easy to shit on an existing system, and a lot of people like to do it. I’m not saying that the current governance system is perfect, and it’s not really even my goal to defend it here, but it’s naive to think that any other system wouldn’t have just as many vociferous complaints. The theme of the complaints might be different though. If you tried to put together some perfect system of committees, you’d have complaints that a bunch of insiders were embezzling all the money.
Yeah it’s easy to shit on existing systems, but it’s also necessary to point out the problems in order to address them. My post or intent was never to “shit” on the system either, it was to point out the things that a lot of people seem to be feeling and start a conversation to change it. The fact of the matter is that governance is not working as a well oiled machine and there is a tremendous amount of volatility in the visions that are being presented which leads to uncertainty and unproductivity.
I agree with you that futarchy could present a market-based alternative, and I would be supportive seeing experiments with it, but as far as i know, it has never really worked at any scale. It seems like it could be tried to control a limited set of parameters with clear KPIs, and I would be very excited to see a concrete proposal for something like that.
Every large scale, successful business, government and operation I can think of sets KPIs and has defined policies for accountability. How can you say this is a system that hasn’t succeeded at scale ?
Call it a “futarchy” or call it “an organization that chooses well defined success measures and systems for accountability”, but regardless of what you call it this is how stuff gets done successfully pretty much everywhere and for everything at scale full stop.
I think that global committees are tricky, because you are giving one small group of people a lot of power. No matter what you do, someone will always be mad about them, will feel shut out, and someone will be bullying the committee members and alleging that they are corrupt.
Qualified members of the community should be empowered to compound experience in specializations and make tough decisions. If this is something we’re afraid of, that should change in my opinion.
As for the “bullying” that wouldn’t cease to exist in any case. And why should we let bullies dictate the efficacy of governance systems.
The committee is named in the proposal funding the team.
This is a major hazard for conflicts of interest. Why would the team requesting funding do a completely impartial job at picking a committee ?
- The team’s funding vests over the course of the contract.
- The committee can always choose to end the funding and return it to the community pool.
- The voters can always choose to end the funding and dismiss the committee, as well as the team.
I definitely agree with all the rest are important for any system.
The power of the committee comes from the voters. It’s important that this always be front and center.
To me it seems like taking away power from the voters. The voters don’t get to nominate the committee members, the proposers do ! If you wanted to have the voters actually have power over the committee they should vote them in.
One way the voter’s power manifests is in even choosing to approve the proposal with the committee in the first place. If you think that the committee is not going to act as a good check on the team, then vote NO.
I believe that compounding multiple decisions into a single proposal is almost always worse that getting independent validation for each. From what I understand this was one complaint cited with ATOM 2.0 and something brought up in our Duality proposal as well (since we proposed that we would make a proposal at some point in the future for protocol-owned-liquidity)
- Another way the voter’s power manifests is the ability to dismiss the committee at any time.
- A large part of the role of the committee in this scheme is to provide information to the voters. They can meet regularly with the team, and ask questions that might not be getting asked otherwise. These meetings can be distilled into minutes and articles for the voters. This reduces the information burden on voters, helping them to gauge both whether the team is doing a good job and whether the committee is holding the team properly accountable.
Agree these are important but in no way is this unique to having the proposers of the spend choose the committee.
The reason that per-proposal committees aren’t a collusion vector is because they don’t actually try to magically have some kind of perfect representatives that do everything with perfect impartiality and wisdom. The voters are ultimately in control.
I am sorry but the proposers of the funding have an incredibly strong incentive to not nominate an impartial and a fair committee ever. There is a very obvious and strong collusion vector. And moving the voters out of the default choosing process certainly takes away their ability to have an impact on choosing an impartial committee.