This conversation seems to be worth its own thread, and should rightly delve a bit into economics, politics and tech.
Basically, I’m in agreement on this. Also, I think that the hub is too far gone down its current path in order to be modified to suit this model, and that’s OK because if we’re being realistic, the strategic imperative for the cosmos hub is the deployment of interchain security. ICS is likely to boost the value of the atom and therefore allow it to secure even more projects, and be more and more sustainable as time goes on. This is a virtuous cycle, and so I want to preface all this by saying that this is not really a conversation about truth of steak on the hub but instead how we can do better in the future in cosmos. This is one of the great things about cosmos, we have that kind of flexibility.
- Validators use the network as a user would
This point is a little bit unclear, but let’s say that maybe it’s referring to the fact that there really is no good for interface. Currently validator’s use the command line for almost everything and there aren’t great choices to get around this. I like to say that probably work being done on the telescope project funded by osmosis may be able to offer some relief in the user interface and user experience department. Otherwise I would need to ask Rick what he means here.
- All validators directly fund software development
This is great! However, I think that this point would naturally entail a bunch of questions about what constitutes funding software and mapping of funds earned by validation to software output. I don’t think that’s done much in cosmos right now, and I think that it most certainly should be. Then there are the questions of capital efficiency…
- The range of wealth between the biggest and smallest validator is at most 10x (maybe smaller)
I don’t think that wealth is the correct measuring. Instead, I think that we should be measuring by VotePower, I guess what I’m claiming here is that the current VP->earnings mapping in cosmos is approximately correct. I also think that this item would entail smaller validator sets.
- Some governance decisions are token weighted, while other are one-validator-one-vote, for minority protection purposes.
This works for me. However, what if we sort of threw out minority protection purposes and instead looked at it from a purely technical standpoint, from a purely technical standpoint, things like will you run this upcoming consumer chain, are naturally one validator one vote. Also, I might be missing some context on the minority protection that Rick is describing. So Rick if you have any other comments on the minority protection aspect, please do chime in.
- There is a relatively small common pool that’s used to fund marketing, development, etc. Most of these validators do on their own.
I think that Mr. Joe Dirtay made a powerful argument against large gov pools recently:
But my counterpoint to this is greed. What I’m saying is that read could produce great results here, and encourage the efficient use of capital. It’s possible that we should stop thinking about this as a tax precisely. It’s either that, or he is correct and we need to have a think on governance and funding in cosmos.