I think that any large delegator has that burden.
The assumption is that large delegators do so to earn rewards without having to run their own infra. My opinion is such large delegators shouldn’t exist in the first place, those entities should be running their own validators and for the most part this is the case. As I currently understand it, the ICF has no plans for running their own validator, so they’re in a unique position that we probably shouldn’t be creating mechanisms for. That said, As I’ve proposed other places, I think The ICF should first publish an easy to audit policy something like an inverse pro-rata. Then eventually, we can put that policy on chain and allow the active validator set to vote on it.
My ideal PoS system IMO has these properties:
- The Validators use the network as a user would
- All validators directly fund software development
- The range of wealth between the biggest and smallest validator is at most 10x (maybe smaller)
- Some governance decisions are token weighted, while other are one-validator-one-vote, for minority protection purposes.
- There is a relatively small common pool that’s used to fund marketing, development, etc. Most of these validators do on their own.
In the above model, it should be clear that conflicts of interest are minimized and the validator set should be sovereign and self-governing. The model above explicitly excludes coordinating entities such as the ICF, which are required to serve some bootstrapping function. Ideally, they could continue to serve some their bootstrapping function until some point where they become a validator as I’ve outlined above.
I’ll appreciate any feedback on this model.