In this proposal I’m seeing something that has me a little bit confused.
Can someone explain this to me?
I don’t think you can just “ignore” voting power. If the proposal fails, it fails and if it passes, it passes. That’s how on-chain governance works.
Am I missing something?
There’s an element of social consensus here.
tl;dr - Onchain tooling won’t let you define who is eligible to vote on a specific prop, but that specificity is sometimes necessarily, like this case.
Longer answer:
The screenshot’s are from our “AADAO Team” DAO - that has voting weights allocated to each member based on their role(s) as defined in our Internal Protocols.
The DAODAO is set up with the 11 voting members (at that time). One member is no longer with us, but they are still holding on to 6.667% of voting power as far as DAODAO is concerned (FYI, here is the prop to remove them)
And since this proposal is about Youssef, he is not “allowed” to vote on it. Yes, he can technically vote on the prop since he is on DAODAO, but the text of the proposal is basically saying we will ignore his voting power, via social consensus.
Once this proposal actually completes [its a fixed 2 day prop], his voting weight would be removed from that DAODAO [FYI, the prop has now ‘passed’ as per DAODAO’s voting weights too].
p.s. I’d say the Internal Protocols are functioning as expected - that is, for something as big as removing the General Manager - it requires an almost unanimous vote from the rest of the DAO.
