[PROPOSAL ##][DRAFT] Initiate a Community Pool Staking Program

Change log

  • 2025-04-23 Created initial post
  • 2025-04-23 Added details regarding “Signed Blocks”, lowered amount to 5m, and increased eligibility to 40 validators

Summary

  • Community Pool Size: Estimated at roughly 9.2 million ATOM (≈ $40 M USD).
  • Proposed Delegation: 5 000 000 ATOM (≈ 55 % of the pool), leaving 4 200 000 ATOM liquid for other purposes (this amount can be modified later in the governance process).
  • Objective: Generate sustainable yield for the community pool by staking with top-performing validators, while incentivizing broader improvements in uptime, decentralization, and governance engagement.
  • Validator Selection: Top forty validators by signed blocks (90d), pre-filtered via quantitative metrics—uptime ≥ 99.9 %, commission ≤ 5 %, voting power ≤ 2 %, governance participation ≥ 90 % and no jailed history.
  • Re-assessment Cadence: Yearly reviews to rotate or add validators based on updated performance data.

1. Rationale

With the recent shift in the ecosystem and the new leadership role taken by Interchain Labs alongside the Interchain Foundation, there is growing clarity around who can effectively drive strategic development in the Cosmos Hub. These two entities have both the experience and the resources to take over where the now-sunsetted Atom Accelerator DAO left off.

This raises a key question: do we still need a community pool?

At Govmos, we strongly believe that the only sustainable path forward for the Hub is to maintain its own independent source of funding, distinct from both Interchain Labs and the Foundation. While we support the initiative—led by some ICL members—to establish an Expert Committee for Fund Allocation Control, we believe the community pool must never be eliminated or fully drained in favor of committee-led models alone.

Instead, we propose the creation of a self-funded operational budget, powered by the staking rewards generated through this delegation program. Assuming the proposed 5 million ATOMs are delegated and the APR remains around 16%, the program would yield roughly 750,000 ATOMs each year. These funds could sustainably fund any grant allocation program with substantial capital. Importantly, such program would be replenished every year through these constant staking rewards inflow.

When paired with a minimum 2% community tax rate, this creates a robust framework that avoids the dilution of the community pool over time, while also ensuring that it remains an effective tool to fund the Hub’s development in a decentralized and sustainable manner.


2. Validator Selection Framework

To ensure this program incentives target the most legitimate actors, we propose the following eligibility criteria drawn from on-chain data (via Mintscan, Keplr Dashboard and SmartStake Analytics):

Metric Threshold Rationale
Uptime (90 days) ≥ 99.9 % Ensures network stability and minimizes downtime slashing.
Commission Rate ≤ 5.00 % Maximizes yield; discourages fee racing.
Voting Power ≤ 2 % Promotes decentralization; reduces single-validator influence.
Jailed Events (last 12 mo.) None Filters out history of misbehavior or downtime.
Governance Participation ≥ 90 % Ensures skin-in-the-game; aligns incentives.

As a community staking program, we also propose to exclude participation of centralized exchange and custodial entities. Assuming the community accepts those recommendations, we will rank all active validators meeting these thresholds and select the top forty by the highest signed blocks[1] amount over 90 days. The final set will be curated in a future update of this topic, before being formally proposed on-chain. Additionally, we propose to update this eligible set every year based on this framework criteria, unless the community decides to change them.

[1] Signed blocks refer to the attestations that validators must submit to approve and finalize a block. This is fundamentally different from proposed blocks, which relate to the role of the proposer — the validator selected (with probability proportional to stake) to produce the next block.

It’s crucial to note that a block requires signatures from at least two-thirds of the vote power to be finalized. Yet, some validators in the current active set consistently underperform on this front. Additionally, we proposed to monitor signature over a 90d period, which also identifies validators who consistently take longer time to perform the planed and emergency upgrades, essentially degrading the quality of the network by extending the downtime. Combat persistent missed signature and extended upgrade downtime are the key motivations behind our proposal: to promote best practices by integrating signing performance as a core selection criterion — after applying baseline quality filters, of course.

Let’s also keep in mind that the Cosmos Hub is undergoing a shift towards becoming a service chain, where blockspace utility will increase — particularly with the potential introduction of a Virtual Machine. A high-performance validator set will be essential to support such evolution. Through this delegation incentive framework, the community helps elevate standards, rewarding performant operators while preparing toward a more resilient network.


3. Proposed Plan

  1. Signaling Proposal (this one): Debating on the eligibility criteria, ranking mechanisms and the overall program’s scope and delegation amount.
  2. Curating the set: Filtering eligible validators based the voted criteria.
  3. Delegating Proposal: Allocate the voted amount across the selected validators, weighted equally.
  4. Reward Handling Proposal: Claiming staking rewards every year around the anniversary date enacting this delegation program.
  5. Update: Unless deciding to change the program’s criteria, the community will simply perform a new iteration to curate a new set, and prepare the re-delegations.
  6. Adjustment Proposal: Submit on-chain proposal to add/remove and re-delegate to validators as needed.

4. Economic Impacts

4.1 Changes to APR

Assuming the 262.13 million ATOM are currently bonded (58.7 % of the 446.25 million total supply) and the proposal to revert the CP tax to 2%, delegating an additional 5 million ATOM from the community pool would:

  • Raise the bonded ratio from 58.7 % to 59.8 %.
  • Change the staking APR from 15.3 % to 15.0 %, assuming we reduce the CP tax down to 2%, this APR would actually increase to 16.4%.

We strongly invite the community to reflect on this proposition as a complementary measure to the CP tax reduction to 2%. As they share interesting synergies to preserving yield for individual delegators and generating sustainable rewards for the community pool.

4.2 Incentives for Top Operators

Because the 5 million ATOM are distributed equally among the forty selected validators, each would receive 125 000 ATOM. Given that the minimum delegation to qualify for the active set is roughly 80 000 ATOM, every participant in this program is guaranteed to maintain—and likely strengthen—their status as a bonded validator.

  • Meritocratic Upside: Smaller, high-performing operators stand to see a proportional revenue boost far greater than that experienced by larger validators, whose existing stake base dilutes this program’s delegation effects.
  • Performance Alignment: By channeling material stake to those who have the highest quality of service, while maintaining the lowest commission, and basic governance participation criteria, we reinforce a culture of excellence, motivating all validators to elevate their service quality if they wish to be considered in future delegation rounds.

Together, these mechanisms ensure that the community’s capital supports—and rewards—the best actors, while simultaneously tightening the performance bar for everyone else.


By implementing this delegation program, the Cosmos Hub community pool will transition from idle reserves to a self-growing treasury, enhance network security through high-quality validators, and foster a meritocratic incentive structure for continuous operational improvement.

We look forward to receive community feedback and improvement suggestions to further strengthen this proposal.


Thank you for reading,
Govmos.

18 Likes

I will vote for this delegation program. For me, it is a very reasonable use of CP funds. A substantial impact on the APY but offset by the reduction in the CP tax. All is well. Thank you, Govmos, for taking care of the valuable funding source of the Atomic Community.

Guinchmos

4 Likes

Very good proposal

To join the discussion, I had this idea:

Do you think it could be interesting to have a dynamic staking system for the community pool — where the percentage of ATOM delegated changes based on the market price?

For example:
When the ATOM price is high, we stake less (because the community pool already has strong value).
*When the price is lower, we stake more — to generate yield and grow the pool.

This way, we can balance safety and performance over time.
What do you think?

1 Like

Agree with this proposal, thank to take care of us :100:

3 Likes

Hi there,

Staking is definitely a better use case for the funds than letting these funds sit, but if the community agrees, I would ask that we hold off on making a move like this before (a) we complete a decision on the reduction of the CP tax from 10%->2% and (b) I have a chance to put up a proposal to use the funds to create the Atom Aligned Apps (AAA) fund, which staking the funds now will make more difficult to execute on.

The AAA fund will also make some use of staking in housing its idle ATOM, but I would suggest waiting to do it from that entity versus from the CP today.

Mag

10 Likes

I think we can all agree on one thing: the community pool funds should be used. And using them to support validation decentralization by delegating to validators is a very solid direction.

Right now, there are two paths forward: either use traditional governance, as proposed by Govmos, or go through the AAA (Atom Aligned App) proposed by Magnus and ICL.

At this point, we don’t have details about how the AAA would be managed or what portion might potentially be allocated to staking. Maybe @Mag could shed some light on that.

For now, I lean more toward the Govmos proposal, simply because the allocation to validators would come directly from a general governance vote, which would greatly legitimize the decision. It would also allow governance to retain direct control over part of the community pool before delegating any portion to the AAA effectively diversifying capital exposure across different entities with distinct goals.

That said, I’m also waiting to see how the proposed Atom Aligned App will be structured. It will depend on the kind of governance model it adopts (and what flavor of democracy it offers). Still, I believe centralizing the entire community pool into a single entity might be too direct and too risky, if we seek decentralization and resilience, we must opt ​​for the distribution of roles between different entities.

5 Likes

Hi there, dear Atom Community,

First off, I want to take the opportunity to thank you all for developing this precious decentralized ecosystem.

I’ve been invested in ATOM since early 2022, and although I’ve mostly been a reader here on the forum, today is the day I’ve decided to take action and get more involved — contributing with my (modest) skills and (committed) presence.

So!

I completely agree with @Quentin when he says that CP funds should remain decentralized in some form.
In that regard, I support @Govmos’s proposal, which seems reasonable and economically efficient. Allocating two-thirds of the CP funds among the top 30 validators and using the actual APR to fund the CP sounds like a smart approach.

The 3M ATOM that would remain leaves room for your AAA program, doesn’t it @Mag?
Of course, your desire to innovate and incubate a new DApps ecosystem should be given a real chance — even prioritized. But to me, CP funds are part of the community and could serve multiple purposes.

Thanks for reading and for considering my point of view!

Best regards,
Eru

4 Likes

Thanks @Govmos for another well laid-out proposal.

I agree that allocating a portion of CP funds for staking makes sense, though I’d lean towards expanding the validator set receiving delegations (perhaps doubling to 60 validators?).

That said, I don’t think we need to rush into discussing specifics just yet. We’re all waiting for ICL’s communication regarding the AAA fund, and as @Mag mentioned, that proposal should be hitting the forum soon. Rather than discussing this in isolation, it seems more logical to wait for the AAA proposal and then evaluate all alternatives together, seeing how these proposals might complement each other.

By the way, I believe you meant “6 million ATOM” here:

3 Likes

Could actual skin-in-the-game (aka self bond) be a criteria? Either as a % of their total VP or some kind of set min value?

Also, a note on implementing the 90% participation - it should be calculated from when the val joined the active set, not “all time Hub props”.

I also have a concern about Community Pool ATOMs contributing to gov votes. Intuitively, it feels wrong, but I’m not sure why - I’d normally come to you to draw out the worst-case-gov-exploit scenario…so yeh, what could go wrong with having CP ATOMs vote in gov?

3 Likes

I’m with the idea of increasing the number of validators covered. 200k to a validator with 1% VP is a very small amount, 100-150k to a validator with <0.1% VP is a lot. So maybe evaluating if 45-50 can be a good value in order to not going outside of the active set (it seems strange but there are a LOT of validator that doesn’t meet the criterias).

I would had proposed also to increase the VP limit to <1%, but in the 1-2% range there are only 2 validators that meet the criterias, so it doesn’t change that much.

2 Likes

I strongly disagree.

Your proposal fundamentally conflicts with the Hub’s architectural principles by:

  • Compromising governance
  • Potentially reinforcing or amplifying existing validator centralization
  • Utilizing flawed performance metrics
  • Creating potentially non-trivial compliance vulnerabilities

Purposeful Use vs Abuse

This feels like abuse (albeit unwittingly).

The community pool must be expressively allocated, reflecting diverse stakeholder interests and purposeful governance objectives that serves the network writ large. This means it cannot be used to aid, enable, or abet the economic and political interests of the Hub validators.

This proposal incorrectly characterizes the pool as an “idle reserve” when it must function as a mechanism for funding STRONG and COMPLIANT initiatives. Compliance here means the governance of the pool remains objectively independent of the network operators. Therefore, independence for the pool means separating the governance of its resources from staking economics. Why?

Merging the cp with the staking system compromises the critical separation between network security mechanisms and public infra and eco funding. This consolidation creates a circular governance structure where vals both receive treasury delegations and influence how those same funds are allocated via their received delegations.

If you can’t present an idea without compromising governance, leave the pool alone.

Centralization

Your proposed delegation of 6 million ATOM to “just 30 validators” represents a concerning concentration of 3% supply of staked assets within an already centralized validator ecosystem. This worsens existing wealth disparities and power imbalances in the set, contradicting your claims of promoting “decentralization”. This is the opposite of decentralization.

The churn in bottom third of the set is already quite high. This proposal will make the set even more top heavy. While a new val might still join the active set at the bottom (~80,000 ATOM today), it’s much harder for them to grow into meaningful participation (vp) unless your validator name is Mantra kek.

Bad Metrics

While the metrics seem objective (uptime ≥ 99.9%, commission ≤ 5%, governance participation ≥ 90%), they’re objectively bad at rendering an accurate portrait of performance or contribution.

Uptime is misunderstood and overrated. And nearly everyone has near perfect uptime.

  1. Disproportionately advantages operators who can mask outages or configure auto restart systems w superior hardware infra
  2. Creates geographic concentration biases favoring regions with exceptional connectivity

Also, some vals miss blocks due to legit technical improvements they’re implementing which temporarily affect their uptime but ultimately strengthen the network.

The primary selection criteria emphasizing “highest signed blocks” is qualitatively and quantitatively unsound. This measurement favors the haves vs have nots bc those with more voting power sign more blocks. This is Tendermint 's design.

Voting participation is a lame metric. We all know “ABSTAIN” is abused to meet the “participation” requirement without expressing meaningful governance engagement.

For a more extensive explanation on why the chosen metrics are poor, read this

Regulator Bait

Finally, your proposal potentially reconfigures the network power dynamics in ways that make the hub’s behavior resembling a centralized general partnership rather than a decentralized network.

This proposal demonstrates WHY I am proposing to revert the community pool tax rate to 2%. We need to limit its growth, because a big pool keeps inviting bad ideas violating first principles. But limiting its growth is not enough.

We need to establish safeguards and controls for HOW we use public funds.

It’s also poor form to try sniping 8M from the pool (serving your cohort interests) while knowing there’s a forthcoming conversation the ICL wants to have re how to use these funds.

Hard No.

1 Like

It feels intuitively wrong because this proposal validates one of the harshest criticisms about the political economy of the Hub…that it’s cartelized.

Good luck trying to unwind this proposal once it passes.

1 Like

This prop is interesting and seems to mean well, but CosmosNanny brings up very valid points.

Why would anyone want to participate in these forums, moving forward, knowing this all echoes efforts to further compromise governance and concentrate validator (voting) power.

3 Likes

think this reaction is too radical. First, we can absolutely discuss how this will be implemented, and we could easily have the community pool systematically vote “abstain” on all proposals. Also, the fund allocation could be reworked to be even more decentralized (even though I must admit I have trouble understanding your uptime argument personally, I support anything that promotes meritocracy for the health of the network).

Finally, I would point out that if you’re truly concerned about regulatory risks, you should try to avoid concentrating the community pool’s capital exclusively in AAA, which seems to be what you are currently suggesting. As a reminder, the classification of an asset as an unregistered security could also takes into account the lack of decentralization in the management of capital.

Allowing annual delegation to validators without granting them voting power (for example, by having the community pool systematically vote abstain) seems to me to be a good way to manage the community funds. It would also allow validators to be indirectly compensated, while requiring them to demonstrate professionalism throughout their term if they want to retain their delegation the following year.

2 Likes

I agree. And have said the same.

It’s also why I don’t recommend sending the pool to 0.

1 Like

Voting “ABSTAIN” is not a true abstain in hub governance. It affects quorum.

Not voting at all is the true definition and application of ‘abstain’.

2 Likes

Yes, that’s true. If we want real neutrality by voting abstain with the cp on this proposal without fully overhauling the governance, we could increase the quorum proportionally to the amount of funds allocated, based on a staking ratio target for example. However, it would still be a makeshift solution.

Sooner or later, the Hub will need a proper governance reform.

This proposal does not promote validator meritocracy or greater health of the network.

Hoping the below is clearer.

Uptime

Uptime is a vanity metric.

Near-perfect uptime is not a mark of service excellence. It simply reflects the minimum technical competence required to avoid slashing.

It says nothing about broader contributions to the Hub or the quality of operations or its operators either.

And we see this clearly: 179 of 180 hub vals have +99% uptime; 172 maintain 100%. Uptime is a baseline expectation showing non negligent behavior. It’s not a differentiator.

Meaningful metrics differentiate.

Moreover, the community over prioritizing uptime incentivizes geographic clustering as operators chase latency advantages. And this is already happening.

We have a lot of nodes clustering (city, region, data center) around European cloud zones rn like AWS Frankfurt (eu-central-1) and Hetzner.

Geographic and jurisdictional concentration materially increases systemic risk and regulatory exposure. We saw this w U.S. asserting jurisdiction over Ethereum, citing majority of their nodes in TX.

Highest Number of Signed Blocks

Number of signed blocks is marginally better than uptime but also problematic. It’s biased towards those with greater voting power.
Validators with more vp get scheduled more often to sign blocks (propose and vote). This is bc Tendermint Core uses weighted voting.

  • Higher stake = more proposing opportunities.
  • Smaller, high-performing validators propose fewer blocks bc they are selected less often under Tendermint’s rotation.

The reasoning: vals with more stake have more to lose via slashing if they behave badly.

Although on a protocol level, every val has the equal opportunity to sign each proposed block, the same infra that prevents an embarrassing “missed my own proposal” event also reduces the chance of missing any block.

While all vals have the same theoretical chance to sign each block, the ability to use that chance is uneven in practice. Larger vals hosted in Tier-1 data centers/reguons enjoy latency advantages and stronger economic incentives not to miss. Such structural gaps, can amplify unequal signing advantages over time.

Using uptime + clustering + “highest # of signed blocks”, is more expressive of existing power hierarchies and structures. It doesnt accurately capture operator’s service quality or diligence.

Commission ≤ 5%

≤5% commission threshold definitely not capture or indicate excellence either. In practice, operators offering 0–2% commission have frequently used aggressive (arguably anti competitive) pricing strategies to rapidly attract delegators, enter active set, and climb in rankings.

Low commission often correlates with predatory behavior and the bait and switch to much higher commission rates are well known.


I never discourage discussion.

That said, to be candid (again), it’s difficult to take seriously a proposal that relies on weak metrics as the evaluative schema for an unprecedented staking program intended to promote excellence and resilience; especially when suggested metrics risk achieving the opposite.

The primitive nature of these metrics has already been extensively debated in this forum during prior ICS/RSS,/PSS, and voting power tax discussions. The consensus was clear: such metrics are inadequate and, when used without proper context, can be actively harmful.

Assessing validator performance demands far more rigor and nuance than what the OP and some respondents have suggested.

2 Likes

I agree with most of the points you raised and the goal should be to find the most objective criteria possible for selecting validators without harming decentralization and ideally, even strengthening it if possible.

However, regarding this above, I believe you might be confusing proposed blocks with signed blocks. Proposed blocks are usually chosen among those with the highest stake, whereas block signing is supposed to be performed by all validators to reach the two-thirds voting threshold. Maybe I’m missing something, but from what I understand about Tendermint, the ability to sign blocks is not dependent on the amount of stake held.

Overall, I understand most of your comments, and I believe they are largely relevant and should be taken into account. Still, it should be done with the aim of executing this proposal, once adjusted, in order to make part of the community pool funds useful while preserving and strengthening the decentralization of the network.

Also, if you have other, more neutral criteria to suggest, the community could very well be open to accepting them.

3 Likes

Correct. I worded poorly. Thanks very much for pointing it out. I clarified phrasing.