Great idea but against " Validator Selection: Top thirty validators by signed blocks"
Why further enrich the largest validators? Everstake has originated more blocks than the bottom 20 validators combined!
Makes more sense to follow Stride’s model. Divide the whole set into traunches, filter out, then stake.
The idea is grand. I have spoken about similar ideas before, and from what I understood this has a lot of technical and decentralization compromises. Beats me as tho why (not the technical part, I really don’t understand why there are no workarounds around those compromises - I think there are). Seems that a lot of these concerns come out of nothing. IMO, if this can be done via on chain governance, we should do it
I strongly disagree.
Firstly, it looks like an attempt to get more commissions by a validator. It will create further selling pressure on ATOM as most of the validators sell their rewards.
Secondly, why would CP need additional ATOM from staking rewards? While we have enough ATOM for future projects, there is always a print button. It will reduce the inflation for ATOM stakers.
Thirdly, there is already an FD programme ICF is leading, so why do we want another? Who will lead this? Why would I trust a few people with millions of USD?
Lastly, your validator performance metrics are flawed. Why is a jail history an ineligibility? Being a validator, you should understand that there are downtime jail cases with the people who are actually providing the geographical redundancy; no cloud validator gets downtime, don’t penalize the true workers.
First of all, we want to sincerely thank all community members who took the time to contribute — both in support and in critique. Every comment was carefully considered, and as a result, we’ve adjusted several proposed amounts and quantities. Below, we address some key points raised in the discussion.
As outlined in our initial post, the APR may decrease by approximately 0.3% — a negligible figure when considered in context. Coupled with a reduction in the CP tax, the net effect should be a meaningful increase in the APR for stakers.
More importantly, this program is designed to maintain the Community Pool’s relative share of the total supply over time while generating ≈750,000 ATOMs per year. These additional funds could support long-term community grant initiatives, such as the Atom Aligned Apps (AAA) program proposed by Interchain Labs — or any other community-led effort.
Our goal is simple: to reduce the CP tax while maintaining the CP’s relative share between 1–2% of the total circulating supply, and to use staking yields to sustainably fund the AAA. The math is straightforward: at 10% inflation, a 2% CP tax is just enough to maintain the CP’s relative share — but not to fund anything beyond that. Any expense beyond the yield at this rate results in net dilution.
Let’s break this down with simple math:
If 125,000 ATOMs are delegated, and validators receive 15% APR with a 5% commission rate, this equates to roughly 80 ATOMs per validator per month.
Yes, some may sell to cover infrastructure costs — which, as we noted, can reach $700/month. Moreover, as the new roadmap of the Hub includes a VM, this will further increase the amount. But this program ensures that only serious, high-quality validators are supported. If they consistently deliver top-tier performance, they will retain their spot in the validator set — regardless of size. This creates a worthy incentive targeted to support financial stability for operators, and increased network performance for the Hub.
We appreciate the intent behind this idea. However, to keep the system governance-controlled and not committee-managed, we’ve deliberately proposed a simple and transparent framework: one yearly revision and redelegation, all fully under the control of Cosmos Hub governance. No multisigs, no representatives — only governance.
We’ve had constructive conversations with ICL, and both parties agree that a community-driven solution is preferable. As suggested by Magnus, we’ll wait for the AAA proposal to be formally posted before advancing ours. This will help the community better compare and understand the broader vision for the CP.
This characterization is both misleading and unfounded. The proposed staking program would constitute a very small share of the staked supply, distributed transparently and equally among 40 validators. Each would receive just ≈0.05% of the total validator vote power — a negligible amount that does not pose any risk of circular influence.
We considered this but ultimately decided against it. Requiring self-bonding would exclude smaller validators — often those operating at breakeven or a loss — and contradict the inclusive purpose of the program. Instead, we favored governance participation metrics, as these allow any validator to qualify based on objective performance, not access to capital.
We respectfully disagree. As noted by another user, you appeared to conflate “signed blocks” with “proposed blocks,” which may have led to your concerns. Our choice to analyze 90-day signed block history ensures we capture both consistent performance and responsiveness to network upgrades. These are the very traits we aim to reward.
This concern doesn’t align with the data. Our metrics prioritize small-to-medium validators, and the upcoming curated list of eligible participants will clearly show how this proposal increases decentralization, not the opposite. We’ll publish that list once the eligibility criteria are validated.
Govmos has long been the highest ranked contributors to this forum. While it’s unfortunate that some may still doubt our motives, our consistent history should speak for itself: we advocate for the network’s long-term resilience, not personal gain.
That’s precisely the problem. Relying on “printing” more ATOM to fund future grants would require increasing the CP tax — which directly reduces staker rewards. This proposal offers a sustainable path: generate yield without inflating the token or compromising rewards.
We believe this proposal provides a sustainable, math-based framework to fund grant programs indefinitely, without ever depleting the CP’s principal.
For example, staking 5 million ATOM and allocating the remaining 4.3 million to kickstart a grant program like AAA would still yield 790,000 ATOM per year, ensuring that the CP maintains at least 1% of the total circulating supply and fund the AAA annually (on top of the initial 4,3m allocation).
This is not about creating a cartel or consolidating influence. It’s about:
Thank you for your continued feedback and engagement,
Govmos
Thank you for the elaborate reply, but No let’s get to basics, being an active individual for the last 3 years and an investor since the start.
1- Can someone just explain why we need to create another Foundation Delegation-style program parallel to ICF’s when that program already exists and has its own issues? We need the sustainable income for CP. Adjust the Tax rate. That’s a vote away.
This new plan would redirect 750,000 ATOM per year—taken straight out of stakers’ rewards, into the hands of a small group managing the Delgations. Why should anyone trust a few individuals with that level of unchecked influence?
If the goal is to grow the Community Pool (CP), then just adjust the CP tax rate. That’s a trustless, on-chain mechanism that doesn’t require opaque delegation committees or off-chain decision-making.
Also, let’s talk numbers.
There are 9.2 million ATOM in the treasury right now.
Can anyone tell us how much has been spent each year from the CP in the last 3 years?
Because if the idea is that 9.2 million ATOM isn’t enough, what are we even planning to spend that makes us this worried? If you’re preparing to dump $50 million worth of ATOM in the market over the next few years, have you considered whether ATOM’s price can even sustain that level of outflow?
This is starting to look like another round of feel-good coordination proposals that quietly benefit a few insiders while claiming to be for the “ecosystem.” If we’re going to bleed the staking APR to fund this, there better be a rock-solid case—and we haven’t seen one.
(post deleted by author)
GATA HUB Statement on the Community Pool Staking Program Proposal
We appreciate the effort behind this proposal and recognize the broader goal of supporting validator sustainability through community funding. However, as it currently stands, GATA HUB would abstain if this proposal moves on-chain—not out of opposition, but because we find ourselves in a complex position with respect to the proposed eligibility criteria.
The clause disqualifying any validator that has been jailed in the last 12 months is overly rigid in our view. While we agree that uptime and reliability are important, this parameter should be evaluated case by case. As probable reason to avoid Sslashed validators might be to protect treasury funds and stake with higher uptime, GATA HUB has experienced two jail events in the past year, unfortunately, but despite that we are managing highest uptime and In both instances, we were transparent, quick to recover, and compensated 1.5x of losses.
We have nearly 100% governance participation rate at the top 8th position.
We spend 100s of USD each month for relayers and community activities.
We believe this kind of context matters. Automatically excluding validators based on a single binary flag misses the broader picture of operational quality and long-term value creation.
We respectfully urge to revisit this criterion and consider a more dynamic or case-based evaluation of validator eligibility. Once this is addressed, we’ll be better positioned to fully engage with the proposal and its intended impact.
— GATA HUB
Validator since 2022
Thank you again for the reply and for keeping the discussion constructive. Let’s discuss the political aspect of it before indulging in other matters.
You say raising the CP tax to 4% would have the same effect on staking APR as your proposal — then why not just raise the tax? That’s on-chain, trustless, and doesn’t require a new power center. Your argument confirms this program isn’t financially superior, so it’s a political preference disguised as a technical proposal. Even if the CP is needed to fund 900K each year to function properly, we have enough funds for many years. Why are we having this discussion just on the parallel of CP tax reduction? Why do we want to throw a curveball here?
We’ve explained our reasoning in previous posts, but we’re happy to elaborate once more.
The community pool is currently overfunded. The original expectation was that the AAA program would receive the entire CP allocation — and likely have to stake the surplus themselves, as those funds wouldn’t be immediately spendable.
Instead of concentrating this control within a single committee or group, we’re suggesting a more decentralized alternative: a community-managed staking program, governed directly through on-chain mechanisms. No representatives, no multisigs, no power centers — just rules encoded in governance decisions, transparent and open to all.
We outlined a framework for selecting validators based on objective, performance-based criteria — notably signed block counts — after filtering through some basic qualitative metrics like uptime, commission, and governance participation. These criteria are not set in stone: they’re open to adjustment by the community through the very process this proposal initiates.
The key idea is to use today’s surplus to generate yield through staking, and then redirect the staking rewards to fund the AAA program over time — effectively reducing or even eliminating the need to raise the CP tax again in the future.
Yes, we could — and if that’s what the community prefers, we will fully support that outcome. We’re not here to impose anything; we are simply proposing an alternative approach that we believe offers a better long-term value alignment:
If the community disagrees with this direction, that’s perfectly fine — a “No” vote is a valid expression of that position, and we absolutely respect it.
We want to be extremely clear here:
There is no new power center in this proposal.
There is no multisig, no committee, and no intermediary. The funds are entirely controlled by on-chain governance, and all actions — initial delegation, annual redelegations, and even full revocation — are performed through on-chain messages, executed after a successful governance vote, transparently and verifiably.
The intent of this proposal is to start a conversation, define a constructive and objective framework, and explore ways to use available capital in a way that aligns with the community’s long-term interests.
If the community prefers to simply let the funds dilute and raise the tax again in the future instead, that’s a valid path — we just believe this is a moment to consider whether we can do better with the extra funds we already have today.
