The Hub has gone through a number of ineffective attempts at moderating the use and purpose of the NoWithVeto vote option. Currently, the NoWithVeto option is simply a far stronger version of the No vote. From a game theory/cost perspective, there is zero rational reason to ever vote No, if one disagrees with a proposal they should always vote NoWithVeto.
My proposal would be to change the mechanism of the NoWithVeto to mean what it’s name implies, that it is a Veto, and that the vote is so strong that it implies the voter would prefer to leave the network if the vote passes. The changes would be:
If a user votes NWV on a proposal and the proposal passes, the user’s delegation is set unbonding.
If a validator votes NWV on a proposal and that proposal passes, the validator is tomb-stoned, and all delegates set unbonding.
This allows the NWV to continue being used as an extra strong No vote, but as it now has a cost, it creates a purpose for a standard No vote. Spam prevention usage of NWV remains unchanged.
There are some obvious issues here, such as a savvy voter being able to vote NWV, and change their vote at the last second, or users cancelling unbonding actions. I believe these could be surmounted or at least made inconvenient enough to address the issue.
What you are referring to is called a central administrative center, deciding on whom, and who doesn’t, have goodwill, who are the bad actors, etc. I’m merely saying that IMO the citizens are well-educated enough to make all these decisions independently of a hard-coded set of rules, instead of following simple A/B testing mechanisms and adjusting to the situation
This has nothing to do with who can vote and who cant. You don’t need to do an A/B test to see a gaping hole in the game theory of a voting scenario where the Yes/No votes count as 1 and the NoWithVeto count as 1.5, with absolutely no other counter. We have already seen this play out with proposal 82.
Hi there, I would like to say that you are correct, did I agree with you, and that overall I support this proposal.
One caveat, just from a brief glance at the situation, I suspect that we’re going to need to do some refinement to the proposal, to decide exactly what and how should happen, but it also looks to me that you’re actually already on top of this, when you say
So I suspect you’re right and I suspect that this is the best proposal for dealing with the reality that NWV is a free, no cost vote, while preserving the rather important mechanisms that NWV provides.
Really cool part about this proposal is that it does not attempt to freaking define NWV, I guess that people felt that the language that I used in my proposal to remove the definition of NWV from hub law was kind of unprofessional, I’m almost feeling like I should maybe do it again, because the vote options should not be defined for the voter.
Anyhow this proposal does not attempt to define the vote options, when it’s actually doing is ensuring that there’s a cost to frivolously using NWV.
I like that, because NWV is well it has a 1/3 threshold, and passing has a 50% threshold and so it isn’t much more powerful vote but that vote comes at no cost.
Hi Flo, seems to me that you have caught a point of this that I did not catch.
So you know, this wouldn’t tombstone the validator, but it would jail it. It would jail it in a way that doesn’t cost the delegators anything but I think that your point would definitely need to be worked into the design.
I don’t think that it would be good for a validator to just sort of randomly get jailed because they used a veto.
If it’s something that can be automatically scripted, like re-staking, then I don’t think it will make any difference. So the question is, what is punitive enough to cause inconvenience or a second guess on using the NWV. And that’s what I am hoping this discussion will uncover
I think validators would out of fear stop voting all together. Some validators just vote abstain or don’t vote at all at this point just because community might react too harsh on some votes. Therefore it would kill decentralization all together by this proposal.
Also i would think most of people voting NWV would change vote last minute. Historically looking some proposals were very tight call like Atom 2.0 which if I remember correctly it barely passed 33.4% with NWV votes and was at last day of voting period.
Maybe something else should be done like if the proposal passes and you voted NWV you can’t vote on the next 10 proposals?
Well actually I figure out a way around this, we could just make it so that NWV is the vote that you can’t change, and when NWV is voted, the delegation can be locked.
