Proposal 75 attempts to limit what NoWithVeto can be used for.
It provides somewhat reasonable arguments, like the below:
It may not always be correct to invoke the underlying consensus mechanism as justification for the 1/3+ ‘NoWithVeto’ threshold: In particular, consensus can be threatened by one third of the total voting power (i.e., all staked ATOM) while a proposal can be vetoed by one third of the participating voting power (i.e., quorum of 40% of all staked ATOM). Thus the consensus threat requires at least 33.3% of the total voting power to censor transactions or halt the chain, but a governance proposal can be vetoed by only 13.2% of the total voting power when voter turnout is low.
This is all true, but for the most important and contentious of proposals, such as those that change the underlying tokenomics of the Cosmos Hub, or those that create a massive inflation of ATOMs, the participation rate would be much higher, making the above point moot.
Then proposal 75 ultimately unjustifiably restricts NoWithVeto:
“A ‘NoWithVeto’ vote indicates a proposal either (1) is deemed to be spam, i.e., irrelevant to Cosmos Hub, (2) disproportionately infringes on minority interests, or (3) violates or encourages violation of the rules of engagement as currently set out by Cosmos Hub governance.”
Now proposal 75 is being used to deny people who would want to veto a proposal. The fact is, the censorship/consensus consideration means it is still important to allow the 1/3 veto for this purpose.
This is a proposal to revert and remove the definition for NoWithVeto as proposed in proposal 75. This allows voters to vote NoWithVeto if they strongly disagree with a proposal for any purpose.
A future proposal may be proposed to create a separate “Spam” voting option that acts like a NoWithVeto that burns the proposal deposit.
According to prop75, you can’t vote NWV unless a proposition explicitly infringes on minority interests. So if even if propXYZ doesn’t infringe on minority interests, prop75 is still infringing minority interests of those who want to veto it. Therefore we should revert prop75 itself.
The clause you quoted is so open as to be meaningless, but in reality people cite prop 75 to tell others that they can’t vote NWV.
It’s my understanding that the people who proposed prop75 have been supporters or co-authors of prop82. Moral hazard if true.
“I feel so strongly about this issue that I can’t in good conscience continue validating for the chain” or “I feel so strongly about this issue that I would rather sell my stake and leave” or “I feel so strongly about this issue, namely that it will cause harm to the hub” etc. There are any number of “I feel so strongly …” statements that work here.
We as Atom stakers are always at risk of being forked out by anyone. Whether you vote NoWithVeto, No, Yes, Abstain, or whatever. If you vote Yes to inflate 400x the total ATOM supply to yourself, you might very well get slashed. Airdrops/exitdrops may slash you for any purpose.
Prop75 should be reverted. It doesn’t make sense to amend a proposal. You can amend a constitution. We don’t want a situation where there is a graph of proposition amendments. And it makes sense for UX to show that proposals have been reverted. Anyways that’s why we need a global constitution like ATOM ONE. The charter for treasury should be for that treasury. A constitution is global. Inflation rules belong in the constitution.
Either way, prop75 is being used to denounce people voting NoWithVeto for legitimate reasons, especially on prop82. It already happened to me.
In fact it is the “No” vote that needs a redefinition, but even still I don’t recommend any restriction on why people vote “No”. “No” means, you disapprove, but you will support the proposition if it is passed with a 1/2 simple majority. “NoWithVeto” means, no even if 1/2 simple majority passes. These are definitions that are baked into logic, and need no further explanation.
Twitter is now filled with people claiming that the validators voting NWV are “abusing” the NoWithVeto option. I find this to be unacceptable, and best resolved by reverting the proposal.
NWV has to be seen as something as not taken too lightly.
And it is a good tool to be able to sway voting if you are really against it. It will still require 33% VP, so it is still a hard number to arrive to. And if people really feel that they should vote with NWV, then that is their rightful choice.
Having a clearer definition would help indeed, because it gives us something to fall back on. Having a constitution in general (not linked to whatever roadmap though) would help in all cases.
Prop 75 has not stopped anyone voting NWV on prop 82- so the problem is that governance is not being respected. A better idea is to do away with NWV altogether, since it is now being misused and will likely be massively misused moving forwards.
Prop #82 has indeed shown the weakness of the NWV option…
And that can never ever be solved in governance, since a definition would always be a text proposal and thus has only value as a gentlemen’s agreement and nothing more…
It will help in the discussions though, since using NWV is totally open for interpretation.
So the proposal should be to revert Prop 75, remove “no with veto” as an option from voting henceforth, and make the minimum to pass 66.6%. I could live with that. “No with veto” is just misused now, and after the last couple of high-profile governance proposals it is never going to be used judiciously again.
This is why we were against any definitions in the first place. IMO, a no with veto should be used subjectively to the situation. No need for extra bureaucracy, that most people wont and will never read