Proposals requesting community funds should have a higher pass threshold and quorum

Based on the reddit poll.

Often, a significant share of regular voters return to chain governance to find a proposal which requested some figure of community funding passed.

The onus of voter participation is mostly on the voter as well as it is the proposer to properly communicate and market their proposal, so as to discourage voter apathy and lack of information. However, currently anyone can propose some figure of their choosing to be taken from the community chest, and with enough yes voters combined with abstainers, under the regular passing conditions could be permitted to take those funds from the community.

While NWV only needs 33% to block a proposal, this can sometimes be too harsh for proposals that need only minor changes.


Special conditions for proposals requesting funding, especially ones which may be considered asking for significant funds, should be implemented. These could include either:

  • A higher pass threshold
  • A higher quorum
  • A threshold for explicit, non-abstainer votes
  • A voting period longer than 14 days
  • Said proposals should pass both a first approval stage, then
    a revised stage, where the final figure of funding is agreed upon by the community.

The Hub really needs a plan of action when it comes to treasury governance. Personally, I don’t think we necessarily need to change voting, I think we need to divvy out to multiple different subDAO’s as well as grant programs similar to the Accelerator DAO (for more business development types of funding).

These subDAO’s could be structured different in terms of Governance with different levels of decentralization and separate mandates, to what their funding should go towards. However, the point is, the decentralized funding option we have now, is not efficient enough to do what we need it to do, in a reasonable amount of time. So we should probably come to some level of agreement on what our treasury needs to look like.

I like the seperate subDAO, grant fund models, where these entities can come back and request more money from the treasury if they need a refill. This holds the entitity accountable to the decentralized Governance of the Hub, while still allowing it to have some level of sovereign control over the funds, after they have received the ATOMs.

Then we don’t have to change governance drastically for treasury requests, we can create these organizations and the multisigs can be with trusted community members, who can be voted in and out of the subDAO multisig, if deemed necessary by the governance structure of the subDAO (could be the community, or it could be the other multisig members in a more centralized entity like the accelerator DAO).

This would require work, creating these subDAOs. The creation of each subDAO and its Governance structure, would need to go through a formal approval from delegators. However, I believe this could be a good structure that relieves the Hub’s governance of constant funding proposals, while still retaining a decentralized treasury system. With this treasury being ultimately accountable to voters.

The Accelerator DAO, while I disagreed with the amount given (in terms of initial funding), I believe they had a good idea and we need to come up with some plans on how we should divvy out some treasury funding to entities that can provide value to the Hub. Because ultimately, the Hub will be left behind if we can’t get a few more, less political funding operations going.

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Personally I’m okay with things as they are.

But I guess that this is because I’m overall taking a bias to action type approach.

One thing that I think that is incredibly important though, is making sure that vesting is available. I’m also interested in a form of streaming payments.

With proposal 104 we tried very hard to make sure that our organization would be accountable to the community.

Maybe the biggest reason that I do not support a proposal to modify funding terms on the hub, is that we simply cannot rely upon the ICF. It has been so long and I have seen so many difficulties and we must ensure that the hub is able to fund its own development work. No one can read this post and say oh I know what’s going on at the ICF, because no one knows what’s going on at the ICF because there is no transparency.

We need to stop relying on them, and I would like to stop relying on them entirely because they simply do not seem to be dependable, even for those that they do give grants to.

So, just to be clear I would likely vote no on this proposal if it were to reach the chain.


This is not the correct solution to this problem. We agree with others that subDAOs for funding are the better direction for hub governance. This would prevent proposals from going through the hub governance every time and ensure that an appointed committee with the right expertise makes the decisions.

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I’m really glad to hear that we are in alignment on this matter. Basically, if there’s a funding proposal, and it isn’t liked, then the community should vote it down and All of the systems necessary are currently in place for that. Biasing governance funding toward those who already have the necessary financial capabilities to pay thousands and thousands of dollars for a governance proposal is not an evolution.

We rarely post such short comments on proposals, in order to encourage discussion and find nuances. But in this case… it’s just a full support in favor of this to become a standard.