The Impact of Liquid Staked Derivatives on Token Price and Liquidity

In decentralized finance (DeFi), liquid staked derivatives (LSDs) have become a key innovation, enabling users to unlock liquidity from staked assets while still participating in staking rewards. LSDs allow holders of staked tokens to trade or use derivatives of their staked assets, making these otherwise locked tokens available in the market. While this boosts liquidity, the introduction of LSDs often causes a decline in the price of the underlying token—a phenomenon that can persist in the long term if demand fails to keep pace with the increasing supply. This dynamic can be explained through logical and mathematical reasoning, centering on the interaction between supply, demand, and liquidity.

Increased Liquidity

The primary benefit of introducing a liquid staked derivative is the increased liquidity of the underlying token. Liquidity, in this context, refers to the ability to easily buy or sell an asset without significantly affecting its price. LSDs facilitate liquidity by transforming staked tokens, which are typically locked and illiquid, into tradable derivatives that represent these staked positions.

For instance, in the Cosmos Hub ecosystem, ATOM holders who stake their tokens to help secure the network must lock their tokens for a fixed period, preventing them from trading. When a liquid staked derivative such as stATOM is introduced, these staked tokens become tradeable in the form of derivatives, providing users with liquidity while their original tokens remain staked and earning rewards. This significantly increases the overall liquidity of the token because both the native token and its derivative are now in circulation.

Additionally, LSDs offer users more flexibility by allowing them to trade their staked tokens without waiting through lengthy unbonding periods. This increased market flexibility leads to more trading activity and injects more tokens into the market, further enhancing liquidity.

Prolonged Price Pressure Due to Supply Expansion

While LSDs offer benefits in terms of liquidity, they also introduce significant sell pressure on both the derivative and the underlying token, leading to a potential long-term price decline. This is primarily due to the increase in effective supply and the absence of corresponding growth in demand. In cases where demand does not rise proportionally with the expanded supply, the negative price effects can persist beyond the short term.

Upon the introduction of an LSD, the total supply of the token in circulation effectively expands. Prior to LSDs, staked tokens were locked and unavailable for trading, effectively reducing the tradable supply. Once liquid derivatives are introduced, both the native token and its derivative are tradable, effectively increasing the token’s supply on the open market.

This increase in supply creates downward pressure on the price of the underlying token. For instance, some users may sell the liquid derivatives they receive from staking, leading to immediate sell pressure in the market. As more liquid staked derivatives circulate, the supply continues to increase. If demand for the token does not rise at the same pace as supply, the price of the token will inevitably fall.

This price effect can persist in the long term, particularly in cases where the introduction of LSDs does not drive sufficient new demand to offset the increased supply. Users who previously held the token may become more inclined to sell their derivatives, further increasing the supply without boosting demand. Unlike in a short-term scenario, where sell pressure could stabilize once the market adjusts, a long-term imbalance between supply and demand can maintain downward pressure on the token’s price for an extended period.

Mathematical Representation of Prolonged Price Decline

The price of a token is governed by the simple relationship between supply and demand, represented mathematically by the equation:

\ P_0 = \frac{D_0}{S_0} \

Where:

  • P₀ = Initial price of the token before the introduction of LSDs
  • D₀ = Initial demand for the token
  • S₀ = Initial supply of the token

Once the LSD is introduced, the effective supply of the token increases because both the native token and the liquid derivative are now in circulation. Let S₁ represent the new effective supply and D₁ the new demand after the LSD’s introduction. The new price, P₁, can be expressed as:

\ P_1 = \frac{D_1}{S_1} \

If supply expands significantly over time (S₁ > S₀) while demand either stagnates or grows at a slower rate (D₁ ≤ D₀), the price of the token will continue to decline. This situation could persist in the long term if the demand side of the market does not experience a meaningful increase to match the continuously rising supply.

Example of Long-Term Price Impact

Consider a simplified scenario. Before the introduction of an LSD, the supply of a token is 100 units (S₀ = 100) and demand is 1,000 units (D₀ = 1,000). The price of the token would be:

\ P_0 = \frac{1000}{100} = 10 \

After the LSD is introduced, the effective supply increases to 120 units (S₁ = 120) because both the native token and its derivative are circulating in the market. If demand does not increase in proportion to supply and remains constant at 1,000 units (D₁ = 1,000), the new price of the token would be:

\ P_1 = \frac{1000}{120} = 8.33 \

In this case, the price has dropped from 10 to 8.33, and this decline could persist if the demand side remains weak. Without a significant increase in demand, the market may experience continued downward price pressure as more derivatives and native tokens become available for trading.

Conclusion

While liquid staked derivatives bring significant advantages in terms of increasing liquidity, their introduction often results in long-term downward price pressure due to the expansion of supply. The increase in tradable assets through both the native token and its derivative tends to outpace demand, leading to a persistent imbalance that drives prices lower over time. Although LSDs provide flexibility and unlock liquidity for staked assets, they also amplify supply, which can lead to a prolonged price decline if demand fails to rise accordingly.

This price pressure is not just a short-term phenomenon; it can persist over the long term, especially if the demand for the underlying token does not keep pace with the increasing supply. Therefore, while LSDs benefit market liquidity, token holders and investors should be mindful of the potential long-term price effects stemming from the introduction of these derivatives.


I would love to hear your thoughts on this.

5 Likes

While it’s true that the introduction of Liquid Staked Derivatives (LSDs) can boost liquidity, the assumption that this automatically leads to a long-term decline in the price of the underlying token lacks substantiation. We believe the misconception may stem from not accounting for how inflation adjusts based on the ratio of staked tokens.

When the share of liquid staked tokens increases, the economic impact depends on where the funds for liquid staking come from. If users are staking funds that are already part of existing staked tokens, then your assumption holds some merit—liquidity would indeed increase. However, it’s important to note that this view is fundamentally flawed. Real liquidity is only achieved when an LST is sold to obtain liquid ATOM, which, by definition, requires locking liquid ATOM in a liquidity pool. This process ultimately reduces the circulating supply.

The more significant misconception likely arises from the fact that many liquid staking transactions are funded by liquid ATOM (this is something we’d appreciate seeing in an on-chain analysis from a protocol like @Stride). In such cases, liquidity remains relatively unchanged, as the liquid supply is effectively transferred to staked tokens. This increases the bonding ratio, and if it surpasses the bonding ratio parameter (currently set at 67%), inflation decreases.

Therefore, liquid staking could be a highly effective strategy to reduce token inflation by shifting a large portion of the liquid supply into liquid staked form. This creates a dual effect, as previously mentioned: not only does it increase the demand for liquidity in LST/ATOM pairs on decentralized exchanges (DEXs), but it also provides seamless on-and-off ramps for Liquid Staked Tokens (LSTs).


We are currently working on a structural reform of the inflation formula to account for the ratio of liquid staking tokens. We will soon present it to the community, right here in this forum.
If adopted this would further reduce inflation if the demand for liquid staking is raising.


While we wait to present this proposition, we hope this brief answer to your post helps you see the complex picture with a bit more clarity. There’s a lot more to discuss on the matter of inflation and liquid staking. We hope to see a general debate on the matter and your contribution with this post shows you have some valuable knowledge to bring to this table. We can’t wait to have you participate.


Thank you for reading,
Govmos.
pro-delegators-sign

3 Likes

Thank you for your thoughtful response. I appreciate the insights and would like to clarify and expand upon a few points, particularly regarding inflation, liquidity, and the effects of Liquid Staked Derivatives (LSDs).

On Inflation and the Bonding Goal:

You rightly mention that inflation adjusts based on the staking ratio, but I’d like to delve deeper into this. If the liquid tokens being staked via LSDs exceed the amount of staked tokens entering liquidity via the Liquid Staked Module (LSM), then inflation will reduce as we approach Cosmos’ bonding goal of 67%. However, this reduction will halt once we reach that goal, as the inflation rate bottoms out at the current minimum of 7%.

For a continuous effect on inflation reduction, one would need to adjust the minimum commission rate. Without this, the inflation percentage won’t change once the 67% bonding target is met. So while LSDs can positively impact inflation until the staking ratio goal is met, the parameters in place currently suggest that the impact on inflation will stagnate after this threshold.

On Liquidity and Locked Liquidity:

I do agree with your point about liquidity dynamics, but I’d like to respectfully disagree on the matter of “locked” liquidity. In current DeFi environments, many liquidity markets, including those within Cosmos, operate using concentrated liquidity pools, which don’t necessarily lock assets in the traditional sense. These pools are designed to maximize capital efficiency while maintaining high liquidity. Therefore, liquidity remains highly accessible, as the tokens are as liquid in these pools as they would be in the hands of the holders.

This nuance is important because it highlights that LSDs can increase liquidity without necessarily “locking away” tokens in the same way traditional staking does.

On Chain Data and Hypothesis Testing:

I acknowledge that my original essay is more of a hypothesis, one that could benefit from on-chain data analysis to verify its assumptions. By looking at the supply of tokens over the past two years, we can empirically determine whether liquid staking has caused an increase or decrease in liquidity and supply. I would be glad to engage further with the community in this discussion and contribute to this analysis, as it would provide valuable insights into the effects of LSDs and inflation dynamics.

Once again, I appreciate your thoughtful response and look forward to contributing to the broader debate on this topic.

1 Like

This is precisely where your perspective should be reconsidered. An LST only becomes liquid if a counterparty is available to provide liquid ATOM. Without this, the LST functions similarly to a staked token. “Liquid” staking occurs only when someone on the opposite side of the transaction provides the ATOM that the user purchases in exchange for the LST they wish to liquidate.

In most cases, a market maker serves as the counterparty, applying a spread and charging a fee for the trade. Typically, the market maker will redeem the LST they acquired for the ATOM they sold to the user and then wait for the 21-day unbonding period before replenishing the DEX pool. Throughout this process, they earn a profit.

Understanding this mechanism highlights that the liquidity of LSTs is directly tied to the market depth of available ATOM in the pool. While concentrated liquidity can reduce the spread, it doesn’t fundamentally increase the pool’s depth. This is why your argument is only partially correct and why we emphasized this point initially.

Using this example illustrates the counterintuitive relationship between LST adoption and market depth in LST/ATOM pools. As LST adoption grows, more liquidity must be provided by market makers, reducing the overall circulating supply of ATOM. However, this relationship isn’t linear—market makers won’t continuously increase liquidity beyond a certain threshold due to the capital inefficiency of liquid holdings, which don’t generate staking rewards.

To explore this further, a full review of professional-grade market-making strategies would be necessary, which might go beyond the general understanding of this forum. That said, we’d be happy to discuss this in more detail in a scheduled call, should you be interested.

In summary, LSTs are not the problem—they are part of the solution to the inflation issue. As LST adoption increases, market makers are incentivized to supply ATOM into liquidity pools, enabling seamless use and redemption of LSTs. Whether concentrated or not, the liquidity they provide depends on the market demand for LSTs, which in turn reduces the circulating supply as these liquid ATOM are used to deepen swap pools.

Lastly, it’s crucial to remember that liquid staking is, in essence, staking. The tokens are staked by the LST provider, which further reduces the supply of liquid ATOM, increases the bonding ratio, and consequently reduces inflation once the ratio crosses 67%. Additionally, we plan to propose an inflation formula reform that accounts for liquid staking ratios, allowing inflation rate adjustments to be amplified or reduced accordingly. This is a topic we’ll explore with all necessary details in a separate forum post. Regarding the inflation level itself, if the community wishes to lower inflation below 7%, this would require a parameter update of course but that wasn’t the point we tried to debate on this particular thread.


We hope this clarification helps you better understand the complex relationship between LST and broad market liquidity. Let us know if you need more details.
Govmos.
pro-delegators-sign

In addition to price, it is imperative to note that liquid staking providers gain that much more leverage in governance, via voting power, in the respective token. This could inherently lead to a steady governance takeover, which honestly seems to be happening already, in the case of ATOM.

Though LST’s can meaningfully serve as being part of the inflation solution, if the software of a specific protocol experiences bugs, the native asset is bound to unnecessary risk via the respective LST provider. Therefore, limiting liquid staking on the Hub is crucial.

I don’t mean to stray too far from the initial discussion at hand, but fully in favor of lowering the mimimum bound of 7%.

I agree with this post. All else being the same, introduction of liquid staking would reduce the price of a token just based on the increase in the supply of available tokens for sale. That’s why I was warning people that the introduction of Drop was not bullish for ATOM. Not every product that comes on market that is associated with ATOM is bullish. When you increase the supply of tokens, that is not bullish. Hydro - which will make more of the ATOM locked in the community treasury available for trading on exchanges - is also bearish for the ATOM price, all else being the same.

To have higher $$ prices for ATOM, you need more $$ to enter the space and acquire ATOM, not make available more ATOM for the same $$. The only reason for the higher prices of Cosmos assets in the 2020-2021 period was the presence of UST (Terra USD) which was giving higher prices because it was a fake USD.

One other, very underappreciated aspect of liquid staking, was that - for retail investors, it makes holding ATOM insecure. Whereas previously you could be sure your ATOM is locked for 21 days, now anyone can come in and steal your ATOM by liquid staking it and then dumping it on the market. Before that wasn’t a theoretical possibility. Now it is.

Overall, adding LST was bearish. It didn’t get traction, hedge fund money didn’t arrive in ATOM because of it. If anything, retail left the scene.

Staking is a good financial product - lock up money and get yield in return. That makes sense. When you introduce liquid staking, you lose the time premium - and the time premium is paid exactly because funds are locked. Treasuries pay you 5% for locking up your money. The moment you make your money liquid, the banks pay you 0%. So making the liquidity instant in theory would reduce your yield to zero.

The people who think adding LST would increase ATOM price simply don’t understand financial products very well. And perhaps have never actually locked up money in bonds. Usually young coders don’t lock up money in bonds, old ladies in old New York with big diamond rings do… lol.

2 Likes

LSM vs. Stride and Liquidity

I still hold that the Liquid Staked Module (LSM) has made more ATOM liquid than Stride has locked into liquid staked ATOM (stATOM). This is a key part of my hypothesis, which fundamentally differs from the assumption that liquid staking has been the dominant factor in reducing circulating supply. To truly assess whether LSM or Stride is making a larger impact, we need to look directly at chain data and compare the amounts of ATOM that have become liquid through LSM versus those staked via Stride.

I suggest that rather than introducing more complexity into the discussion, we first simplify the hypothesis and validate it using on-chain data. By examining the movement of tokens between liquid and staked forms over time, we can better understand whether the LSM has, in fact, released more liquid ATOM into circulation than has been locked into staking. This would give us a clearer picture before adding more variables or assumptions.

Liquidity of stATOM: Is a Counterparty Truly Needed?

You’ve raised an interesting point that stATOM (liquid staked ATOM) is only liquid when there is a counterparty with ATOM available for trade. While this might be true in the traditional sense of liquidity pools, I believe this assumption oversimplifies the liquidity dynamics. Even if a market maker isn’t immediately present, concentrated liquidity pools or other decentralized mechanisms can allow for continuous price discovery and liquidity, even in the absence of a specific counterparty with ATOM.

stATOM, like many Liquid Staked Tokens, can remain liquid by being used as collateral in lending protocols, farming rewards, or being involved in other DeFi mechanisms. This allows for the LST to maintain functional liquidity in ways beyond just direct trade for ATOM, particularly in DeFi ecosystems where LSTs are utilized as an integral part of liquidity provision strategies. So, while a counterparty may be necessary in certain scenarios, liquidity can be maintained through other financial instruments, which provides a broader context for what “liquid” truly means in this case.

A Simplified Approach to Testing the Hypothesis

As we move forward, I think it’s critical to first test the hypothesis with a simplified approach, using chain data to determine whether LSM has indeed made more ATOM liquid than Stride has staked via LSD. By grounding the analysis in empirical data, we can assess the broader implications and then layer on additional complexity as needed. This will provide a clearer, data-driven foundation for understanding the relationship between liquidity and staking within the Cosmos ecosystem.

I look forward to exploring this further with the community, and I’d be happy to contribute to any on-chain data analysis to test these ideas in practice. Thank you again for the thought-provoking discussion.

2 Likes

I support setting the minimum inflation to 0%, as it would simplify our approach. I also acknowledge Stride’s governance bond and recognize that while Stride doesn’t vote directly, it indeed has an influence on the validators it stakes with. It would be beneficial if Stride could enable governance rights to be passed to stATOM holders, promoting a more decentralized governance model.

3 Likes

Although I haven’t analysed how much (in terms of ATOM value) has been extracted using the LSM, I have found a snapshot of Cosmos Hub 2 months ago (19 July), and I could extract the below information, hoping it can help for a start.

image

What I take from it is that there has been around 2 million more liquid staked ATOM during this period, with 600k leaving Stride, and Drop being the winner (+2.6 million).

Also, a bit part of the unstaking was due to the large wallets who unstaked ~1 month ago (around 12 million ATOM if I recall correctly).
So except for these wallets, in general, there has been more staking (liquid and solid).

Based on the above information, how many ATOM do you think the LSM would have needed to release into circulation during these 2 months, for your hypothesis to be valid?

If there is a request to investigate deeper, I am happy to look at extracting the number of staked ATOMs that had been liquefied using the LSM over this 2 months period.

Regards,
arlai

2 Likes

We are 100% aligned with that proposition. However we suggest waiting until the combined LSTs market share represents a bare minimum 5% of the overall staking before collecting and analyzing the datasets.

1 Like
19-Jul 19-Sep Delta
Total supply 406,675,000 415,022,900 8,347,900
Bonded Atom 254,163,000 247,936,300 -6,226,700
Bonded % 62.50% 59.74% -2.76%
Liquid staked tokens 5,310,500 7,258,300 1,947,800
LSDs share % 1.31% 1.75% 0.44%
LSM 41,800 53,500 11,700

Although this data is concerning itself that the bonded % is in a downtrend. But for the above hypothesis to check we need LSM from point A to B that we already have in this data, then we need Liquid Atom that got staked via Liquid stake providers that we don’t have in this image. (dAtom is a outlier) Excluding the dAtom (which won’t be appropriate) the hypothesis is true that we have 11.7K Atom got liquid using the LSM but instead of increasing the liquid staked by at least 11.7K ATOM we can see further unbonding.

Sorry, maybe I was not clear on one point of the data I submitted:
The 11.7k delta in the LSM row is not 11.7k ATOM that has been liquefied through the LSM, it is only the number of times that the LSM “liquefy feature” has been used.
I do not have data (at this time) of how many ATOMs were liquefied through the period.

Regards,
arlai

2 Likes

Thank you for the clarification. Can you help find out the required data?