This proposition you have is consistent with the option we foresee for this reform. What you propose could be achieved by redirecting the rewards in dedicated covenants in neutron, swapped to ATOM and distributed daily, weekly, monthly… This post isn’t meant to design the new system. Just see if we want to collectively open that door and figure out solution together.
6 Likes
Sending to the community pool in order to fund more PoL (protocol own liquidity) is just one of the many possibilities we could explore. In the meantime this is NOT the purpose of this vote. This is actually quite simple, this vote is querying community feedback to see if we want to change the current system. A Dust sweeper design is very interesting, but currently can’t be delivered due to the minimalist nature of the Hub which we want to maintain as a top priority. This means if we want a dust converter, this requires to process it outside the Hub, and therefore redesigning the system. If you support that thesis, your vote should be YES, and then participate in the community debate to support the sweeper as your favorite option.
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Thanks for raising this discussion. We have been thinking about this, especially in the context of smaller rewards which for smaller accounts that claim frequently may cost more in gas to claim than they are worth. We haven’t been sure how much to prioritize this though since partial set security will change a lot of how this will work anyway. Here are a few ways:
- Pass a governance proposal to turn off rewards from certain denoms. If this happens, the rewards will still be received by the Hub, but they will not be disbursed to everyone’s account. They will build up and if another proposal is passed they can all be sent out. This is the only option in this list which requires no code changes. Somebody could put up the prop today.
- Modify some code so that the above proposal does not just allow rewards to build up in a holding account, but sends them to the community pool. From here they could be used for other things.
- Use a special module to sweep rewards and automatically sell them for ATOM. Notional is working on this module, funded by a grant from Osmosis, and it was already approved for use on the Hub by a signaling proposal last year. However, I am not sure of the status of the work, especially given Notional’s recent staffing changes. Maybe someone else can comment. The module might need to be audited as well before being deployed.
- Wait for Partial Set Security. With PSS, you will only get rewards from a chain if your validator has opted in. This has a few implications which make these issues less relevant:
- A smaller number of validators will generally be opted into each consumer, and so rewards will add up to more.
- If rewards from a consumer really do amount to “dust” then validators will tend not to opt in.
Because of the fact that PSS will change a lot about this question, our team has not put a huge amount of further work into it. Interested to hear people’s opinions here.
11 Likes
@ Govmos
Firstly, we need to address the core issue here. What specific problem are you aiming to solve with this proposal? Why should this even be considered a priority compared to many other needs that exist? The premise that rewards too small to claim justify such a radical change in the system is not only flawed but also overlooks the fundamental principles of reward distribution. This approach appears to be a knee-jerk reaction rather than a well-considered solution to a clearly defined problem.
Govmos’s suggestion of redirecting funds to the community pool to enhance Protocol Owned Liquidity (PoL) is riddled with flaws. This approach assumes that confiscating individual profits from stakers for community use is justified, overlooking the fundamental principle of reward for participation. It’s a classic example of overreach, veiled as community good, echoing the dangerously misguided “Woke Mindset.”
Secondly, the belief that stakers’ rewards should be diverted to the community pool undermines the very incentive structure that drives participation in the ecosystem. Stakers contribute to network security and governance, and their rewards are a rightful return on investment, not a pool for communal redirection.
Thirdly, the notion of ‘protocol owned liquidity’ sounds beneficial, but it dangerously leans towards centralization, contradicting the decentralized ethos of the Cosmos ecosystem. By pooling resources in this way, we risk concentrating power and control, which can lead to manipulation and unfair practices.
Moreover, the idea of a ‘dust sweeper’ while intriguing, requires a systemic overhaul outside the Hub’s minimalist design, as Govmos admits. This contradicts the priority to maintain the Hub’s simplicity and efficiency. Suggesting significant changes without thorough analysis of their impact and feasibility reflects a hasty and poorly thought-out approach.
In essence, Govmos’s proposal, while perhaps well-intentioned, fails to consider the broader implications on network incentive structures, decentralization, and the technical feasibility within the existing Cosmos framework. It’s essential to critically evaluate such proposals, ensuring they align with the core principles and long-term sustainability of the ecosystem.
2 Likes
There is considerable wisdom in your response, and we appreciate you outlining Informal’s current position on this matter. Technical feasibility was not the primary challenge in this initial post; our main focus was on securing early community approval to commence collecting and organizing data concerning those ICS rewards. The current status of the vote indicates a supermajority (two-thirds majority) in favor of supporting the research initiative.
We plan to allow another week to pass to gather more samples and then proceed with constructing a model to determine the best technical solutions. Some of the replies provided in this discussion have already assisted in narrowing the scope, and we anticipate that the data-model based approach will contribute to resolving the matter effectively.
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Govmos, your enthusiasm for early community approval and data collection is noted, but your reliance on a paltry sample size of 38 voters to justify moving forward reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of what constitutes legitimate community consensus.
Let’s dissect this glaring oversight: a “supermajority” based on 38 responses is laughably non-representative of the Cosmos Community at large. This isn’t wisdom; it’s statistical naivety.
Moreover, the actual voting mechanism in Cosmos, where votes are weighted by the amount of ATOM controlled, further skews your so-called supermajority. A single participant among the minority participants can wield disproportionate influence, particularly if they’re a larger ATOM holder.
Ironically, these larger holders, who gain the most from the ICS Rewards system, are unlikely to support what could be perceived as your grossly misguided initiatives.
Your approach, waiting another week to “gather more samples,” is equally misguided. Without addressing the fundamental flaws in your sampling method, any additional data collected will remain fundamentally flawed. This isn’t about narrowing scope or technical solutions; it’s about recognizing the depth of your misunderstanding of community engagement and voting dynamics.
Your proposal, as it stands is an echo chamber, confusing a sampling error for a majority voice. Your “Proposal” lacks a concrete problem statement, clear purpose, defined goals, and tangible community benefits, amounting to nothing more than a misallocation of resources and effort. Can you counter this critique? Please do so.
2 Likes
People will always be uninformed so we’re not stopping innovation because people are uninformed. Two weeks of forum discussions and 2 weeks of proposal voting time is plenty of time for people to get basic information about any subject.
Monetary inflation is PhD level subject so you can teach it to the average person for a lifetime and they still won’t get it. A lot of people can’t perform basic math operations much less comprehend monetary inflation debates. It is totally ridiculous to think that the average person is a PhD level economist and can have similar types of insights. We all use money daily but that doesn’t mean we know anything about it.
We use cars every day too but if I ask you to talk about how the car’s engine works, pretty sure you don’t know. And the average person doesn’t need to know. If car engine knowledge was a requirement for driving cars, nobody would drive cars.
1 Like
I am for 1. I invest in a bunch of coins and two years later I only notice the ones that have gone up in value a lot. The default should be rewards should just accumulate somewhere and then when one of the coins gets to a decent valuation (let’s say, $1 billion market cap) then there is a proposal to send them out.
I agree with the point you raised here, but let me reverse engineer it for a moment. Would we even have cars in the first place if there was no PhD-level thinking to achieve building them? On this matter, I would argue that your argument doesn’t hold when we are pioneering. Defining a distributed network’s PoS inflation modeling isn’t easy, and from my point of view, informing people can only be a net positive. Even if most of them don’t understand or just don’t care, I will never consider skipping the information-sharing phase before a vote like this.
We see the same necessary debate when it comes to distributing rewards. The current system might lead to certain inefficiencies (that’s our standpoint to open a reform). If we open negotiations on the terms, information has to be part of the process in our humble opinion. You might have a different vision of the due process before voting, but we’re not asking for community funds to perform the data mining nor the modeling.
To conclude, at Govmos, we truly believe in collective intelligence. Multiple studies have shown that an uninformed crowd can reach a better answer than an informed selected few. That’s actually the main reason why we believe in the power of the Cosmos Hub’s governance; we have never advocated for a “selected few” solution. We think the best option lies when the two systems are combined. A pre-proposal crafted by informed individuals when it relates to highly technical matters, then voted on-chain by the crowd (still having access to the information if they want to). The best of both worlds in some sense.
4 Likes
I don’t think Cosmos Hub tokenholders are an “uninformed crowd”. There is this tendency to think that “markets” are an “uninformed crowd”. That couldn’t be further from the truth. To be a market participant, you need to own a financial instrument. That immediately puts you in the top 10% of any society. 90% of people don’t have math skills or any other distinguishable skills for that matter and as such don’t have the ability to save, ie store energy. So market participants by default are already the smartest 10% of any society just by virtue of demonstrating an ability to store energy, save money and buy a financial instrument.
When you talk about “markets” vs “committee based decision making” (or communism, the Russian “soviet” means “committee” in English), you are not talking about a contest between the idiot crowd and the educated professional, but a contest between experts who have shown ability to extract storable energy out of an activity (“market participants”) on small, medium and large scale vs academically certified experts (who may or may not have not shown that ability). In other words, capitalism vs communism isn’t the crowd vs expert, but the highly capable unselected professionals vs a pre-selected group of academics. The difference really boils down to pre-selecting a list of certified professionals vs throwing all professionals who might have interest in the topic but might not be necessarily trained in it. What we find is that markets which feature a set of professionals with diverse professional backgrounds wins against a set of professionals with limited but focused expertise. That shouldn’t be a surprise because diverse set of skill results in more diverse forecasts and solutions which might end up guessing reality better. So the supremacy of “markets” is not an accident but should be expected. Having said all of that, markets are far from infallible. Market failures abound (ie diverse expertise can fail).
Communism in its early years worked because the committee were made of “workers” or capable professionals. Overtime the committee membership changed from workers to academics (people who have not applied their theories in practice) and that is where things started to fall apart for committee based decision making systems.
Like I said, I am not against discussion. I think the Cosmos Hub process of forum discussion followed by a 2 week voting period provides ample time for Cosmos Hub tokenholders to catch up on any topic and make an informed decision. At the very minimum, the validators who more or less control 80% of the voting power are making informed choices. I just wanted to contradict your assessment that the inflation debate was bad. I think it was very good and informed a lot of people. Some people were left with a bitter taste because their minds were pre-made (the debate didn’t swing them) and despite 4 weeks of discussion, they weren’t able to swing the community opinion and lost.
BTW, the inflation posters were absolutely correct. The Hub was overpaying for security. Despite the cut in rewards, 2 months later, the bonding ratio is still around 65%. The projected massive unstaking by the critics of the proposal didn’t transpire!
I won’t name any names here, but there were unquestionably false statements in the forum discussions. Moreover, these statements were deeply misleading, to say the least. This was evidence of a lack of basic information. Once again, we agree with almost all of what you said in this post, but the critical aspect here is that if you query the market’s collective intelligence with false information, the magic won’t work anymore. Let me tell you that after 13+ years of dealing with financial markets, when you deal with false information, you get incorrect results, and being disconnected from reality can only last until you realize it. That’s why we want to set a basic standard of information checking during the forum discussion phase, to make sure the vote is performed under the best circumstances.
3 Likes
Vixcontango offers a strong case for the effectiveness of free markets, pointing out Govmos’s significant misunderstanding of decentralized decision-making. The proven track record of free-market economics demonstrates the shortcomings of centralized control, aligning seamlessly with the Cosmos philosophy.
The notion that market participants form a more informed and capable segment of society underscores the strength of decentralized systems. These individuals contribute diverse expertise, driving innovation and resilience far beyond what centralized models can achieve. Diversity isn’t just an attribute but the core driver of superior market outcomes, affirming the decentralized approach intrinsic to Cosmos.
Govmos’s proposal to steer community decisions through a select few starkly contradicts Cosmos’s fundamental principle: empowerment through decentralization. Historical evidence and basic economic principles confirm that decentralized markets consistently outperform centralized ones. The true strength of Cosmos lies in its community’s collective intelligence and creativity, not in centralized control.
The future of Cosmos, and any decentralized ecosystem, hinges on its diverse community participating in a decentralized model, freely choosing when they want to buy, sell or accumulate their tokens.
Govmos’s advocacy for centralized planning is not only counterproductive but also diametrically opposed to the decentralized essence of Cosmos. The case for decentralization is unequivocal: it remains the sole strategy in harmony with Cosmos’s ethos, guaranteeing innovation, resilience, and efficiency.
I don’t want you touching any of my tokens, no matter how “dusty” they are.
1 Like
This way of doing things reminds me of what Aristotle advocated in Politics: a mixture of democracy and oligarchy. This allows you to avoid the excesses of both systems and benefit from the best of both. Democracy is harder to corrupt but has difficulty moving in one direction and oligarchy is easier to corrupt but has an easier time following a clear and defined path. He essentially saw two ways of achieving this mixture. Either it’s the oligarchs who write the laws and it’s the people who vote for them, what he calls constitutional government, either the opposite.
The advantage of such a system is that those who write the laws have no incentive to go against the interests of those who vote for them, otherwise they will only pass if those who vote are misinformed.
It is possible that what I wrote does not completely reflect Aristotle’s thinking, I just wrote what I remember and understood.
2 Likes
Thank you for your enlightening contribution. Your exploration of the nuanced balance between democracy and oligarchy, inspired by ancient wisdom, strikes at the very heart of our governance discussion.
Your post astutely highlights the philosophical core of this proposal: the contrast between centralized governance versus decentralized, distributed governance.
It’s important that we have a clear and consistent vision about the Governance Principles for the Cosmos Ecosystem. I believe those principles should uphold the following:
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Decentralization of Power: Governance should not allow power to concentrate but rather spread it throughout the network. This approach champions the belief in the inherent right of individuals to self-governance and the collective wisdom that emerges from distributed decision-making. This proposal leans towards centralization, therefore violating this principle of Decentralization of Power.
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Individual Sovereignty: The autonomy of each participant within the Cosmos Ecosystem to freely make decisions impacting their assets and operations is paramount. This reflects the fundamental notion that individuals are best positioned to make decisions affecting their well-being, guided by their understanding and interests. This proposal erodes Individual Sovereignty by violating individual free choice.
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Voluntary Participation: All changes and governance actions must stem from the voluntary agreement of community members. This principle upholds the idea that society thrives when interactions are based on consent and mutual benefit, rather than coercion. This proposal usurps Voluntary Participation by taking away individual voluntary participation, by removing this choice.
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Market-Driven Decisions: The ecosystem must adopt mechanisms allowing the invisible hand of the market to guide its governance and development. This principle asserts that free exchange and competition lead to the most efficient and beneficial outcomes for the community. This proposal undermines Market-Driven Decisions by imposing centralized control over economic interactions, contradicting the principle that the market should guide development and governance.
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Protection of Property Rights: A core tenet of governance must be the unwavering protection of digital assets and property rights within the ecosystem. This aligns with the belief that security in one’s property is essential for freedom and economic prosperity. This proposal compromises the Protection of Property Rights by introducing mechanisms that infringe on individual control over digital assets, challenging the essential right to property security.
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Minimal Regulation: Necessary regulations should only exist to facilitate smooth interactions within the ecosystem, safeguard users, and uphold the network’s foundational integrity. The notion here is that innovation flourishes in an environment of minimal constraints, fostering innovation and efficiency. This proposal contradicts the principle of Minimal Regulation by introducing excessive controls, stifling innovation and encumbering the ecosystem with unnecessary constraints.
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Transparency and Accountability: Despite advocating for a governance structure that is as lean as possible, the importance of being transparent and accountable to the community cannot be overstated. This ensures that governance actions are not only visible and understandable to all participants but also subject to their scrutiny and feedback. This proposal detracts from Transparency and Accountability by obscuring decision-making processes and diminishing community oversight, deviating from the commitment to open and responsible governance.
2 Likes
Wisdom transcends generations, and governance has always been a challenge for humanity. We firmly believe that blockchain-based governance is the next frontier, applicable to both the public and private sectors. This is why we are so interested in Cosmos, and specifically the Hub, as it pioneers this field. We consider this an impending revolution, bringing both positives and likely some distortions along with it. Nevertheless, it is expected to be a net positive compared to current systems. This is a topic we could debate for hours without ever getting bored. It is also the primary reason why we named our initiative “Govmos,” as most people should have figured out by now!
Despite the love we have for governance discussions, it feels like we have deviated from the initial purpose of this topic. We have many more things in our roadmap regarding governance research and debate, and perhaps we should open a separate topic with @CML and other individuals who seem to be interested in the matter.
Easy yes, there is no interest for small holders to get fraction of tokens which cost more to transfer/swap for them than the value of these fractions.
There are many issues that have not been carefully thought through, causing many unnecessary problems
[Facing a problem is the first step to solving it]
- The increase in pledge rate comes from innovation and reform activities and from obtaining airdrops.
A large number of small amounts of funds are pledged in order to obtain airdrops
Community confidence has not increased and offset each other so 67% is still far away
This shows that holders are not very interested in ATOM
- The distribution rewards obtained are much smaller than the rewards for staking ATOM.
Unless it can be greater than the staking reward of ATOM, I feel that allocating consumption chain rewards to everyone does not form a meaningful incentive for holders.
[Consumption chain rewards must be accumulated into the prize pool and distributed to those who hold ATOM for a long time]
Declared today - 360 days due distribution
Distributed according to four seasons (rewards for each season need to be doubled to be more attractive)
If you stake for more than 90 days, 5% of the reward pool will be allocated
If you stake for more than 180 days, 15% of the reward pool will be allocated
If you stake for more than 270 days, 30% of the reward pool will be allocated
If you stake for more than 360 days, 50% of the reward pool will be allocated
Maximize incentives for long-term holders and reduce excessive dust
[Or exchange the consumption chain rewards for ATOM and move them to a warehouse where no one can take them out]
reduce supply
2 Likes
I like the design behind that idea, but we have to remind you that the current topic isn’t meant to propose any solution yet. We the current status, we only meant to gather early approval in order to collect data and start a debate on the potential solutions at a later date. This data will be essential to guide us correctly with the actual numbers showing the fragmentation as it really is, as well as the growth trends and global rewards distributed so far.
Anyway your solution is interesting and would definitely be worth presenting in this forthcoming debate. Looking at the current status of this poll we are planning on moving forward with this data mining endeavor early next month and we will hopefully be able to present this to open that debate in early Q2.
3 Likes
like it, need to discuss about it
1 Like
I understand
This is just a simple idea, and we need everyone’s ideas to work together to improve it.