Yep, no one is going to be crying when the price is good. The crying comes when the price isn’t good and people are losing money. That’s what investing is all about. It is about getting higher price for the token you buy.
The fact that you don’t care about losing money because you made money somewhere else is not an argument. I have also made 10 other investments and made money there. That’s not the point. Getting into some idiot ego competition with some moron on the internet is not the point of this board. The point here is what is happening with ATOM.
At Solana the foundation is clearly working to benefit SOL. With ATOM, the foundation ISN’T working ot benefit ATOM. This to me looks like the major reason why SOL has become a good investment and ATOM hasn’t. At SOL the foundation is keeping its word it gave at the ICO and working to benefit SOL token holders. At ATOM the foundation is engaged in fraud and is not keeping its word to benefit ATOM token holders.
I absolutely agree with “No Confidence” vote and the audit. Leadership of a foundation that sold ATOM to investors that subsequently didn’t work to benefit ATOM should be removed and replaced with leadership that works to benefit ATOM. It is pretty clear the current leadership doesn’t understand what they need to prioritize.
They claim this release is unrelated to our discussions, here.
The ICF states they already undergo an annual “ordinary audit” as part of their Swiss statutory reporting requirements. (“Ordinary audit” is what the Swiss refer to as an extraordinary audit)
Conflicting Information:
My sources, including the lawyer who helped establish the ICF provide different information about the ICF’s annual audit requirement. I’m told they’re not as expensive as “ordinary audits”
The statutory filings are confidential and not publicly accessible, and they stay private.
Proposed Action:
Instead of debating the extensiveness of their audit requirements, we should:
Request summary reports for each fiscal year from 2019 - 2023, based on statutory filings and audit findings
Give them a 60-day deadline to provide these reports.
If they refuse or fail to provide the reports within this timeframe, we will:
Petition the FSAF directly.
Request that the FSAF conduct an audit of the ICF.
This approach will effectively test the completeness and rigor of their existing audit requirements.whike reserving the right to petition the FSAF 60 days later (assuming proposal passing) if necessary.
“Ordinary examinations (audits)” may NOT be equivalent to what Swiss accounting practices specifically call an “ordinary audit.” The FC President’s use of the term “ordinary” might be " typical." What is typically required of a Stiftung of ICf’s scope is an audit, but it is not as comprehensive as the audit the community requests.
Current Understanding based on Sources:
The ICF does submit an audit yearly.
However, this audit is less comprehensive than a Swiss “ordinary audit.”
Terminology Concerns:
There’s a possibility that the foundation is deliberately using ambiguous language.
This could exploit the community’s unfamiliarity with Swiss accounting frameworks and specific terminology.
Potential Issue:
The foundation may be relying on the confusion between “ordinary examinations” and “ordinary audits” to imply a higher level of scrutiny than actually occurs.
This situation highlights the importance of clarifying exactly what type of audit the ICF undergoes and ensuring reporting wrt financials, ops and governance are scrutinized. If they do participate in “ordinary audits”, they should be able to produce summary reports based on the ordinary audit findings – especially as questions pertain to integrity and robustness of their internal controls.
First off, respect for your work and the reply here.
About the above quote. I can see a lot of danger in those words, let me explain.
The fact that something is protected by law, does not make it ok. Holocaust was also legal, so was slavery. Not the point. Those orgs have collected money with one purpose, so i dont understand how they are private.
The law (because of the existence of which we are building web3 here) might dictate privacy. It dictates privacy to governments today. That doesn’t make them private by definition in the semantics sense. It makes them private according to somebodies “law”.
No foundation can be private. Its absurd, my friend. Orgs can be private, but then they should not be foundations.
PS. We are a team that already has that connection. We are a self hosted bare metal validator running interlay and cosmos hub (and many more chains) + our pod has community in both, and other ecos + we are building a tool for both ecos
Yep. This. Yet no one is interested in responsibility bro. “Follow the leader” =(
This post is not relevant to the discussion. Would appreciate if we all can focus on the issues relevant to the proposal draft and things germane.
Please.
Thanks for putting all of this together Grace, good work.
We’re fully aligned with the objectives sought by the proposal, however petitioning FSAF at a first time might not the best approach.
I believe the revised proposal makes more sense as it gives the ICF the chance to do the right thing before involving the authorities, which could result in more harm than good to the Hub in general.
This proposal is put forth genuinely on behalf of the stakeholder community with the sincere intention of fostering transparency and mutual understanding – I think this is done with structured asks, and structured responses.
The ICF has stated that their annual auditing requirements are comprehensive, implying and explicitly stating via their Medium blog yesterday that the breadth and depth of these audits is that of an ordinary audit each year (an ordinary audit is an extraordinary audit by Swiss accounting standards).
While we take these statements at face value, there exists a significant information asymmetry due to the confidential nature of the statutory filings, making it difficult for us to fully assess the ICF’s operations, and more importantly, the health of their ICS protocols (internal control system).
In part, to address this asymmetry and foster confidence building, I revised the request to:
The production of summary reports based on the ICF’s annual audits and any other third-party assessments, covering the areas outlined in what will be an attached document to the proposal (defining scope);
Explicit identification of which aspects of the ICF’s Internal Control System (ICS) were or were not audited in each annual review, including explanations for any areas not covered;
The publication of complete annual reports for the years 2017-2021, addressing any gaps or inconsistencies in previously released reports;
In the event that the ICF responds that no vulnerabilities or issues were flagged in the course of their audits, we request a detailed explanation of the audit scope and methodologies used to reach this conclusion.
I’m sorry if I missed it above, but I’m confused as to why this pseudo-petition and the discussion about it has failed to mention the fact that the Interchain Foundation HAS NOT CONTRIBUTED TO POLKADOT’S DEVELOPMENT AT ALL.
All this other stuff is kind of conjecture and opinion, and if there was some legal issue with the nonprofit, I’m sure an anonymous tip to a Swiss prosecutor would suffice to get it investigated (not sure the Swiss government cares about on-chain petitions).
But it is very clear and easy to prove that the Interchain Foundation has not contributed to Polkadot at all, even though this is clearly stated in the as one of the foundation’s primary goals in its mandate.
Re your comment about the mandate/given purpose. That’s why I added it for visibility.
If it’s still the purpose in the charter it’s problematic. Indicates there’s been nearly 8 yrs of selective performance on the mandate. And in addition to the foundation’s expressed agnosticism to the hub and such, it only shows the leadership to be deviating from or mutating mandate. Which is forbidden.
Foundations are shut down for breaching or abandoning purpose. Regulators are quite strict about this.
This is not the case. You obviously don’t know how oversight is performed with respect to Swiss foundations and the applicable laws.
Prior to Jan 2024, only active/current board members/foundation council members were allowed to submit concerns or whistleblower reports to the FSAF. A pretty retarded constraint. So the laws changed.
As of this Jan, founders, former FC members, board members, direct beneficiaries and general beneficiaries of a foundation can report concerns.
So a governance proposal expressing no confidence matters. As general beneficiaries of the ICF’s activities what we say matters.
I think the questions to the ICF should be different.
There is a clear call for transparency which apparently is lacking or unsufficient. So the question the ICF can ask itself can also be how to turn it around. How can the ICF frontrun the proposal by delivering what is asked (and maybe promised in the past?) so that the proposal is unneeded
We can fight fire with fire, but we can also work on taking away the fuel of the fire imo.
Clarifying Misconceptions About Proposal #952 and the Interchain Foundation (ICF)
Purpose of the Proposal
This proposal is NOT aimed at removing or suing the ICF.
It’s a call for transparency and accountability, not dissolution.
Understanding Swiss Foundations
Swiss foundations are robust legal entities designed for longevity.
Key characteristics:
a. No owners or shareholders
b. Governed by a mandated purpose
c. Beneficiaries are those who benefit from the foundation’s activities
Oversight and Accountability
Primary oversight authority: Swiss Federal Supervisory Authority for Foundations (FSAF)
Beneficiaries’ role: Can help hold the foundation accountable, but lack direct control
Legal Realities
The ICF, established in 2017, is bound by Swiss law.
Its mandated purpose is nearly immutable.
Dissolution is extremely difficult and not within the community’s power.
Addressing Misconceptions
a. “Decentralized courts” solution:
Currently non-existent
Even if created, they would lack jurisdiction under Swiss law
b. Community-driven dissolution:
Not legally possible
The foundation continues as long as it has funds and its purpose remains valid; the FSAF will only shut it down if the ICF runs out of money or if the given purpose has become illegal or immoral. In situations where board has become corrupt or ineffectual, the FSAF will do what it can to restore proper governance at a Stiftung.
The Danger of Unrealistic Solutions
Insisting on non-existent solutions (like “decentralized courts”) is fanciful at best.
At worst, it’s a distortionist argument that distracts from actionable solutions.
Focus should be on what can be done now within existing legal frameworks.
The Path Forward
Work within existing legal structures to effect change
Aim for increased transparency and engagement with the ICF
Understand and respect legal constraints while seeking improvements
Conclusion: #952 represents a pragmatic approach to address concerns about the ICF’s operations. It acknowledges the legal realities of Swiss foundations while seeking to improve the relationship between the ICF and the Cosmos community. The goal is enhanced transparency and accountability through realistic, actionable steps, not through fanciful or non-existent solutions that distract from viable progress.
The concerns raised in Proposal 952 about the ICF’s leadership and transparency are valid and deserve attention. However, endorsing this proposal may not be the most constructive path forward. By focusing on a declaration of no confidence, we risk escalating tensions without necessarily achieving meaningful change. The legal implications of involving ICF in governance could complicate matters further, particularly in light of ongoing regulatory scrutiny from the SEC. Fighting a legal battel will only add into sufferings of stakeholders.
Instead, a more prudent approach might involve calling for an independent audit through the governance process. This would allow us to address transparency issues within ICF without jeopardizing the legal standing of the Cosmos ecosystem. By advocating for an audit, we can ensure accountability while maintaining a collaborative atmosphere that is vital for the long-term health and stability of the network.
